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Accidents · NTSB CEN21FA304 · Final report

Focke-Wulf FWP-149D accident near Killeen, Texas, July 4, 2021

On July 4, 2021 at about 10:22 pm local time, a 1960 Focke-Wulf FWP-149D, registered N9145, was destroyed in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Killeen, Texas (Skylark Field Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The total loss of engine power due to a fatigue failure of a crankshaft counterweight mounting lobe, which resulted in a counterweight separation and catastrophic secondary damage to the engine drivetrain. Contributing to the accident was the mislabeled warning light, the pilot’s erroneous belief that the airplane was safe to operate after the metal contamination was observed in the oil filtration system, and his failure to maintain best glide airspeed during the forced landing, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle-of-attack and an inadvertent aerodynamic stall at a low altitude.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 4, 2021 · about 10:22 pm local time
Place
Killeen, Texas · Skylark Field Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Focke-Wulf FWP-149D, built 1960 · all FWP-149Ds on the register
Registration
N9145 · no longer on the register · serial 167
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot was conducting a cross-country flight when the airplane had a total loss of engine power while it approached the intended destination airport. Based on witness accounts, the pilot was unable to glide the airplane to the intended destination airport and entered an inadvertent aerodynamic stall at a low altitude. One witness reported that the airplane’s wings rolled left-and-right 2 to 3 times before the airplane “stalled” with the left wing down. The airplane impacted the ground in a left-wing down roll attitude and was destroyed during a postimpact fire. Postaccident examination of the engine determined that the loss of engine power was due to a fatigue failure of a crankshaft counterweight mounting lobe, which resulted in the separation of a counterweight and catastrophic secondary damage to the engine drivetrain. A couple days before the accident, an aviation mechanic found metal contamination in the engine oil filtration system after an associated warning light illuminated during a post-maintenance engine run. The mechanic and pilot discussed the metal contamination and agreed to have it submitted to a laboratory for identification. The oil filtration system was equipped with a ball-and-spring “bypass” switch, which when wired to a cockpit warning light offered a visual indication of when the filtration system was bypassing engine oil instead of flowing through the filter screen. A separate magnetic chip detector was offered as an optional feature for the oil filtration system; however, postaccident examination of the oil filtration system confirmed that the optional chip detector was not installed. As such, the warning light installed in the instrument panel was mislabeled “chip detector” instead of a label that conveyed the oil filtration system was in a bypass condition. When the mechanic saw the warning light illuminated during his post-maintenance engine run, it was a visual indication that the engine had produced enough metal contamination to restrict oil flow in the filtration system, resulting in a bypass condition. The mechanic cleaned the filtration housing, filter screen, and bypass switch. He then added new oil to the engine and performed another engine run, during which the “chip light” did not illuminate. The mechanic told the pilot not to fly the airplane until the laboratory results were returned, but he did not ground the airplane to prevent additional flights. The pilot conducted three flights, totaling at least 1.8 hours, following the maintenance. As such, it is likely he erroneously believed the airplane was safe to fly if the “chip detector” warning light was not illuminated, when, in fact, the engine was not in an airworthy condition due to the progressive failure of the crankshaft counterweight mounting lobe that likely produced the metal contamination found during the last maintenance. A review of automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast track data revealed that the pilot did not maintain the airplane’s best glide airspeed during the final minutes of the flight. Based on the published glide performance, the airplane did not have sufficient altitude to reach the runway at any point during the approach. However, had the pilot maintained best glide airspeed the airplane would have retained a safe margin above the aerodynamic stall speed and, as such, might have resulted in a less severe off-field landing.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of engine power (total) during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Loss of control in flight during enroute (descent)

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip engine power section › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip engine power section › Failure
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Understanding/comprehension › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip eng oil sys › Incorrect use/operation
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Angle of attack › Not attained/maintained

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; rotorcraft: glider
  • Flight time: 402.5 hours in all; 141.6 in this make and model; 38.4 in the last 90 days; 10.5 in the last 30 days
  • Last flight review: October 12, 2019
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2,579.5 hours
  • Last inspection: condition inspection, September 8, 2020; 66.7 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 4,004 lb
  • Seats: 5
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Bmw GO-480-B1A6 (piston); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Departed from: BAZ New Braunfels TX at 9:34 pm
  • Destination: ILE Killeen TX
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 1, 5,495 ft by 100 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 080° at 13 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 2,200 ft
  • Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 75°F (24°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.93 inHg
  • Observation at 4:56 pm from KILE, 2 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KILE 042156Z AUTO 08013KT 10SM FEW022 SCT027 27/24 A2993 RMK AO2 LTG DSNT SE-SW SLP123 T02720239

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

21 documents, released by the NTSB on September 7, 2023. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.