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Accidents · NTSB ERA23FA249 · Final report

Cessna 182 accident near Plymouth, New York, May 28, 2023

On May 28, 2023 at about 6:52 pm local time, a 1961 Cessna 182, registered N8775X, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering near Plymouth, New York (Lt Warren Eaton Airport). It was a skydiving flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

A total loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
May 28, 2023 · about 6:52 pm local time
Place
Plymouth, New York · Lt Warren Eaton Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cessna 182 D, built 1961 · all 182s on the register
Registration
N8775X · registry record · serial 18253175
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Skydiving flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot departed on the third skydiving flight of the day with four skydivers on board and climbed to about 11,000 ft mean sea level (msl) when the jumpers departed the airplane. The pilot flew back to the airport and reported over the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) that he was descending through 6,000 ft msl. The operator reported hearing the pilot make another radio call on the CTAF but the “…call did not sound like a normal one and I could not identify what he said. I thought by the sound of his voice something was off.” A witness heard the engine sputtering followed by the engine losing power and then heard the impact. The airplane impacted trees and terrain about 1 nautical mile from the center of the intended airport, coming to rest in a nose-low, tail-high attitude with the left wing separated at the wing root. Postaccident examination of the flight controls revealed flight control continuity, and all fractures were consistent with overload. The examination of the engine revealed crankshaft, camshaft, and valvetrain continuity. The air induction, exhaust, lubrication systems, magnetos, and spark plugs revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The carburetor heat was found in the off position. Postaccident examination of the airframe revealed that the right-wing fuel bladder was intact and contained about 25 ounces of fuel. The left-wing fuel bladder was breached; there was no evidence of significant fuel leakage from the ruptured left-fuel tank evidenced by minimal fuel blight of the vegetation in the immediate area. There was no evidence of fuel siphoning aft of either wing-tank fuel filler cap. The fuel selector was found in the left-tank detent. No fuel was found in the left- or right-inlet fuel lines or the outlet line of the fuel selector valve. No fuel stains were noted on the interior panel below the fuel selector valve. About 5 ounces of fuel were drained from the airframe fuel strainer and about 4 ounces were found in the carburetor bowl. The pilot fueled the airplane the day before by adding 30.3 gallons of 100 low lead fuel. The amount of fuel in the airplane before he added the fuel is unknown. He then flew two uneventful skydiving flights that day. The operator reported that on the next day the pilot flew another skydiving flight in the morning, and when the pilot returned from the flight, he checked the fuel level with a dipstick and stated that he had 40 gallons of fuel on board. The operator reported that the pilot had enough time to refuel the airplane but chose not to. The pilot flew another skydiving flight before the accident flight, which was the fifth flight since he fueled the airplane the day before. The operator reported the airplane burned 7 to 9 gallons of fuel per skydiving flight. The pilot used a fuel dipstick to assist in determining the fuel level in the tanks. However, the fuel dipstick used was not made for the make and model of the accident airplane. Therefore, a fuel conversion chart was created to indicate how much fuel was actually in the tank when the dipstick was used. If the airplane had 40 gallons of fuel on board as the pilot stated, there should have been enough fuel for the intended flight. However, had the pilot misinterpreted the fuel dipstick reading, he may have believed he had about 43 gallons of fuel on board, as indicated by the dipstick, when instead there were about 24 gallons, as indicated by the conversion chart. In that case, during the next three flights, the airplane could have sustained fuel exhaustion as a result of the fuel burn and the unusable fuel in each tank. The nearest weather station, located about 29 miles from the accident site, indicated the temperature and dew point spread was 27°C and 8°C, respectively, which was conducive for carburetor icing at glide or cruise power. About 1443, ADS-B data indicated that the airplane began its descent from about 11,000 ft msl and 3 minutes later it descended through 6,000 ft msl, about a 1,666 ft-per-minute rate of descent. The last ADS-B radar point was about 1450, and the airplane was about 1,500 ft msl. While the pilot had a history of diabetes being treated with a medication and a documented history of retinopathy, it is unlikely that the pilot had symptoms of severe high or low blood glucose at the time of the accident. Minor symptoms of diabetes, such as fatigue or blurry vision, could not be entirely excluded. Due to his heart disease, the pilot was at significantly increased risk of a sudden impairing or incapacitating cardiac event, including angina, arrhythmia, or heart attack. There is no autopsy evidence that such an event occurred; however, such an event does not leave reliable autopsy evidence if it occurs immediately before death. It is possible that the pilot’s report of the fuel level using the dipstick did not account for the fuel conversion chart that would have indicated that the airplane had about 24 gallons of fuel on board, and not the reported 40 gallons. In this scenario, the pilot would have departed on the flight with substantially less fuel than anticipated, and the engine lost power due to fuel exhaustion. However, the evidence supports another possible scenario: the airplane was descending from about 11,000 ft msl and at a high rate of descent in atmospheric conditions that were conducive to carburetor icing in cruise and glide power. The carburetor heat was found in the off position after the accident. Had the pilot not used carburetor heat during the descent, it is also possible that the engine sustained a complete loss of engine power due to carburetor icing. Accordingly, the definitive cause of the total loss of engine power could not be determined.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during maneuvering
  2. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
  3. Fuel related during maneuvering defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › (general) › Unknown/Not determined
  • Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Unknown/Not determined
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Temp/humidity/pressure › Conducive to carburetor icing › Unknown/Not determined

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 451 hours in all; 18.5 in the last 90 days; 10.5 in the last 30 days; 451 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: March 18, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 7,099 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, November 4, 2022; 41 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,000 lb
  • Seats: 1
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Continental O-470-L (piston); 5,305 hours total
  • Operator: Just Jump Skydiving LLC

The flight

  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 46°F (8°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.09 inHg
  • Observation at 2:53 pm from KBGM, 29 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KBGM 281853Z VRB03KT 10SM CLR 27/08 A3009 RMK AO2 SLP179 T02720078

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

27 documents, released by the NTSB on July 22, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 10 pages · our copy View Download
2 Witness Statements PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
3 Record of NTSB Conversations PDF, 10 pages · our copy View Download
4 Operator Fuel Records PDF, 5 pages · our copy View Download
5 Excerpts from Pilot Logbook PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
6 Pilot Training Records PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
7 Excerpts from Airplane Owner's Manual PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
8 Excerpts from Maintenance Records PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
9 Navigation Log Found in Wreckage with Fuel Level in Each Tank Documented PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
10 FAA Chronological Summary of Flight Communications PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
11 Memorandum for Record - ADS-B Data for May 27, 2023 and May 28, 2023 for Correlation with Fuel Upload May 27, 2023 PDF, 10 pages · our copy View Download
12 Automatic Dependent Surveillance A�� Broadcast (ADS-B) Tabular Data for May 27, 2023 Flight spreadsheet · our copy Download
13 Automatic Dependent Surveillance A�� Broadcast (ADS-B) Tabular Data for 2ND May 27, 2023 Flight spreadsheet · our copy Download
14 Automatic Dependent Surveillance A�� Broadcast (ADS-B) Tabular Data for 3RD May 27, 2023 Flight spreadsheet · our copy Download
15 Automatic Dependent Surveillance A�� Broadcast (ADS-B) Tabular Data for May 28, 2023 Flight spreadsheet · our copy Download
16 Automatic Dependent Surveillance A�� Broadcast (ADS-B) Tabular Data for 2ND May 28, 2023 Flight spreadsheet · our copy Download
17 Automatic Dependent Surveillance A�� Broadcast (ADS-B) Tabular Data for Accident Flight May 28, 2023 spreadsheet · our copy Download
18 Wreckage Examination Summary PDF, 18 pages · our copy View Download
19 Memorandum for Record - Cockpit Examination Summary PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
20 Memorandum for Record - Dipstick Information and Dipstick Conversion Chart PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
21 Memorandum for Record - Hand Written Log Found On-scene PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
22 Toxicological Report PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
23 Medical Officer's Factual Report-memorandum for Record PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
24 NTSB Memorandum for Record - E-mail Report Concerning Examination of Fractured Left Flap Up Cable PDF, 5 pages · our copy View Download
25 Electronic Devices - Specialist's Factual Report PDF, 5 pages · our copy View Download
26 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 9 pages · our copy View Download
27 Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15, and NTSB Evidence Control Forms PDF, 7 pages · our copy View Download

The same docket at the NTSB.

Other NTSB records under N8775X the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time

2013-05-17ERA13CA247 · accident near East Moriches, NY · substantial damage · no injuries

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.