Cessna 182P accident near Gilbert, Arizona, September 18, 2016
On September 18, 2016 at about 2:18 am local time, a 1972 Cessna 182P, registered N20844, was destroyed in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Gilbert, Arizona (Chandler Muni airport). It was a skydiving flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was seriously injured; 4 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
An inadvertent explosion of pyrotechnics, which were contained in a box that had been installed on the airplane's left main landing gear assembly spring leg which resulted in shrapnel striking the airplane's left wing and breaching the left wing fuel tank, which led to a subsequent fuel leak and fire. Contributing to the accident was the airplane owners' improper decision to install an untested pyrotechnic box and his failure to attain proper authorization to use it during the flight.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 18, 2016 · about 2:18 am local time
- Place
- Gilbert, Arizona · Chandler Muni · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was seriously injured; 4 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 182P NO SERIES, built 1972 · all 182Ps on the register
- Registration
- N20844 · no longer on the register · serial 182261251
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Skydiving flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The commercial pilot was conducting a skydiving flight with a night aerial pyrotechnic display. According to the pilot and the lead jumper, who was also one of the airplane's co-owners, a pyrotechnic box was installed on a step on the airplane's left main landing gear assembly spring leg just before the flight. The pilot and the lead jumper reported that, after departure and as the airplane arrived at the planned jump area and altitude, the skydivers were given the go-ahead to jump, and one of the jumper's activated the sparklers in the pyrotechnic box. Shortly thereafter, they heard an explosion and then saw damage to the bottom of the left wing with fuel pouring out of it. The left wing became engulfed in flames, and the skydivers successfully jumped out of the airplane. The pilot shut off the fuel and performed a slip maneuver in an attempt to extinguish the fire to no avail. After realizing that the airplane would not be able to reach the nearest airport, he tried to aim the airplane toward a field and then jumped out of the airplane. The airplane subsequently impacted a house, and most of the airplane and the house's interior were consumed by fire. Examination of aluminum metal pieces from the pyrotechnic box revealed a high degree of fragmentation, fractures along the fold lines, outward deformation, curling of some of the edges, and cratering from high-velocity particle impact, consistent with an explosion originating from inside the pyrotechnics box. Shrapnel from the box, which was located near the left wing, likely punctured the left wing fuel tank, which led to the subsequent fuel leakage and fire. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane before the explosion. The pilot added that the co-owner told him the pyrotechnic box was approved and properly tested. When he asked the co-owner about the box, the co-owner said that it was a sparkler box and that its installation was considered a minor alteration because it could be easily removed and that it did not need a field approval. The pilot stated that, although he checked the security of the box during the preflight inspection, he did not read the certificate of approval (COA) for the flight given the co-owner's statements indicating that is was airworthy and approved correctly. He stated that this was his second flight with the company using pyrotechnics. The co-owner reported that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was not aware of the box installation. Although the FAA had provided a COA for the night parachute operation, the COA did not include a special provision for night airborne pyrotechnics; therefore, the accident flight did not have the necessary authorization for flight. Further, a review of maintenance records revealed no documentation for a supplemental type certificate or field approval for the installation of the pyrotechnic box, both of which were required for this type of installation and operation. The FAA had not examined the box before the flight to determine its safety or whether the airplane was airworthy. The owners were responsible for ensuring the airworthiness of the airplane. Further, per federal regulations, the pilot is responsible for the overall safety of the flight, including ensuring the flight complies with all applicable regulations. The owners' failure to attain proper authorization and approval to install the pyrotechnic box and use it during the flight and the pilot's failure to ensure that the use of pyrotechnics during the flight was properly authorized and approved before the flight led to the airplane being operating in an unsafe manner and contributed to the accident.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Aircraft maintenance event during prior to flight
- Explosion (non-impact) during enroute (cruise) defining event
- Attempted remediation/recovery during enroute (cruise)
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent
- Fire/smoke (non-impact) during enroute (cruise)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Misc hardware › (general) › Incorrect service/maintenance
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Wing structure › (general) › Damaged/degraded
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel storage › Damaged/degraded
- factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Owner/builder
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Unauthorized maint/repair › Owner/builder
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Modification/alteration › Owner/builder
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot, private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 875 hours in all; 200 in this make and model
- Last flight review: May 20, 2015
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: serious injuries
Passenger
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
Passenger
- Seat: unk
- Injury: no injuries
Passenger
- Seat: unk
- Injury: no injuries
Passenger
- Seat: unk
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,458 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, November 23, 2015
- Maximum gross weight: 2,950 lb
- Seats: 1
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Continental O-470 U (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire in flight and on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: CHD Chander AZ at 2:04 am
- Destination: CHD Chander AZ
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Wind: at 5 knots
- Visibility: 15 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 95°F (35°C), dew point 30°F (-1°C)
- Altimeter: 29.86 inHg
- Observation at 2:18 am from KCHD, 4 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 4 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
20 documents, released by the NTSB on May 7, 2019. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
