Piper PA28R accident near Moosic, Pennsylvania, September 21, 2020
On September 21, 2020, a 1967 Piper PA28R, registered N3790T, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Moosic, Pennsylvania (Wilkes-Barre/Scranton airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was seriously injured and 1 person had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The inadequate torquing of anchored-thru and free-thru studs during installation of the No. 2 cylinder, resulting in their fatigue fracture and subsequent total loss of engine power. Contributing to the undershoot landing was the pilot’s failure to divert to closer airports than the original diversion airport after experiencing engine performance issues.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 21, 2020
- Place
- Moosic, Pennsylvania · Wilkes-Barre/Scranton · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was seriously injured and 1 person had minor injuries.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA28R 180, built 1967 · all PA28Rs on the register
- Registration
- N3790T · no longer on the register · serial 28R-30103
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
During a personal cross-country flight, the owner seated in the right front seat noted the No. 2 cylinder exhaust gas temperature had decreased about 1/2 of its value. The pilot-in-command (PIC) and owner both then felt a vibration and positive control of the airplane was transferred to the owner as was briefed before departure. An emergency was declared with air traffic control while (best glide speed) airspeed was maintained. The PIC reported there were no suitable airports nearby and proceeded to a diversion airport 77 miles away. While continuing toward the diversion airport, the oil pressure decreased to zero. Realizing the flight would not reach the airport, the pilot maneuvered for a forced landing to a residential street and collided with a powerline. The accident site was located less than 2 nautical miles north-northeast from the approach end of the intended runway at the diversion airport. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that all anchored-thru or free-thru studs that secured the No. 2 cylinder to the crankcase exhibited fatigue. The fatigue originated at the roots of the threads and propagated though about 70% to 80% of the diameter of the studs before finally fracturing due to overstress. The fatigue-fractured studs led to the cylinder separating from the engine, the loss of oil supply, and subsequent total loss of engine power. Although the pilot was not aware of the extent of the problem with the No. 2 cylinder, about the time the problem arose, the flight was about 30 nautical miles west-northwest of an international airport with available runways of sufficient length. As the flight continued in a southerly direction, about the time and location the oil pressure decreased to zero, another airport with a runway of more than adequate length was located 20 nm closer than the intended diversion airport. Thus, had the pilot diverted to the nearest airport immediately after the loss of the No. 2 cylinder, or diverted to an airport about 20 nautical miles closer than his intended airport after the oil pressure decreased to zero, it is likely an uneventful on-airport forced landing could have been performed. Twelve years after the engine was overhauled, or 3 years and 270 hours prior to the accident, the No. 2 cylinder was removed to replace a fractured anchored-thru stud. After the fractured anchored-thru stud was replaced, the cylinder was installed. Several entries indicated that the hardware that clamped the crankcase halves together on the top portion of the engine was re-torqued. It is likely that during installation of the No. 2 cylinder following replacement of the fractured anchored-thru stud, the anchored-thru and free-thru studs were inadequately torqued, which resulted in fatigue fracturing of all studs followed by cylinder separation, oil exhaustion, and resulting total loss of engine power.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
- Collision during takeoff/land during approach (VFR pattern final)
- Loss of engine power (total) during enroute (cruise) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip eng cyl section › Incorrect service/maintenance
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Maintenance personnel
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,000 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: serious injuries
Pilot-Rated Passenger
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 5,291.4 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, December 5, 2019
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Lycoming IO-360-B1E (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: BTV Burlington VT at 11:09 pm
- Destination: DMW Westminster MD
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 48°F (9°C), dew point 36°F (2°C)
- Altimeter: 30.54 inHg
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
13 documents, released by the NTSB on June 16, 2022. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Other NTSB records under N3790T the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
