Bombardier INC CL-600-2B19 incident near Dayton, Ohio, October 5, 2022
On October 5, 2022 at about 10:59 pm local time, a 2003 Bombardier INC CL-600-2B19, registered N447AW, suffered minor damage in an incident during landing (landing roll) near Dayton, Ohio (James M Cox Dayton Intl airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 45 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The airplane’s right turn, which developed during the landing rollout and persisted until the airplane came to rest, for reasons that could not be determined based on the available evidence. Contributing to the incident was the pilot’s reliance primarily on differential braking, rather than sufficient and sustained opposing rudder pedal, when attempting to arrest the turn.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 5, 2022 · about 10:59 pm local time
- Place
- Dayton, Ohio · James M Cox Dayton Intl · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 45 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Bombardier INC CL-600-2B19, built 2003
- Registration
- N447AW · registry record · serial 7812
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
Following a normal touchdown, spoilers, reverse thrust, and wheel braking was used for the initial deceleration (about 5 knots/second), and the airplane tracked the centerline of the runway for about 9 seconds. About 1-2 seconds before the thrust reversers were stowed, the lateral acceleration began to increase (consistent with a right turning tendency). Subsequently, the magnetic heading began to increase as the airplane began a continuous right turn. The flight crew made two brief 4° to 5° left rudder inputs (each lasting 1 second or less) followed by increased wheel braking that provided more brake pressure on the left main landing gear wheels than on the right main landing gear wheels. The airplane continued to turn right, departed the runway surface into the grass alongside the runway, and came to rest on an adjacent taxiway. The airplane sustained minor impact damage to the left wingtip and a puncture in the left wing leading edge. The investigation was unable to determine what caused the airplane’s continuous right turn. The thrust reverser use was asymmetric with the peak right engine power about 12% higher than the peak left engine power, which would have produced a right-turn tendency. However, the amount of asymmetry was brief, not unusual, and unlikely to cause a continuous right turn. Once the reversers were stowed, any right-turn tendency due to asymmetrical reverse thrust would no longer be present. Three previous landings that involved the incident airplane revealed thrust asymmetries of 5% to 15% (favoring the right engine) during reverser use, and no loss of directional control ensued. For the incident landing, the right turn persisted well after the stowage of the thrust reversers. The flight crew’s two brief left rudder inputs and increased wheel braking on the left main wheels would have provided some left-turn tendency to counter the right turn; however, the right turn continued. The reported weather conditions included a crosswind from the right, which could produce a right-turning tendency. However, the crosswind component was about 3 knots, which would have had a negligible effect on the airplane. The rudder pedals also control the nosewheel steering angle. A full rudder pedal input (25°) will move the nosewheel to a maximum of 5.3° left or right. Using the rudder pedals to sufficiently turn the nosewheel is particularly important as the airplane slows and the rudder becomes less effective for directional control. Had the flight crew made a larger and sustained left rudder pedal input, the rudder surface would have deflected to generate an opposing aerodynamic yawing moment and the nosewheel would have turned to the left (or turned farther so) for a longer period, both of which would likely have been more effective in countering the airplane’s turn to the right. The investigation found no indications of a nosewheel steering system failure or malfunction in the recorded data or the operator’s post-incident examination of the airplane. However, because neither the nosewheel steering angle nor tiller control were required/recorded parameters on the flight data recorder, a determination regarding the operation of the nosewheel steering system could not be made. The flight crew’s left differential braking (until the airplane departed the runway) would have provided some left-turning tendency to counter the right turn. Although differential braking is a technique that can be used to help steer the airplane, the operator’s flight crew manual did not reference the use of differential braking for a normal landing. The manual advised that rudder steering (via the pedals) should be used at all speeds. Thus, the flight crew should have used the rudder pedals which would have provided aerodynamic yaw via the rudder surface as well turning the nosewheel steering, to prevent the airplane from departing the runway.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Runway excursion during landing (landing roll) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › (general) › (general) › Unknown/Not determined
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 12,955 in this make and model
- Last flight review: June 8, 2022
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 645 in this make and model
- Last flight review: November 6, 2021
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 39,851 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, September 28, 2022
- Maximum gross weight: 53,250 lb
- Seats: 55
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Ge CF34-3B1 (turbofan); 41,975 hours total
- Engine 2: Ge CF34-3B1 (turbofan); 38,315 hours total
- Operator: Air Wisconsin Airlines LLC
The flight
- Departed from: IAD Dulles VA at 9:41 pm
- Destination: DAY Dayton OH
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 24L, 7,285 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 350° at 3 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 25,000 ft
- Temperature: 72°F (22°C), dew point 39°F (4°C)
- Altimeter: 30.08 inHg
- Observation at 6:56 pm from KDAY, 1 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KDAY 052256Z 35003KT 10SM SCT250 22/04 A3008 RMK AO2 SLP185 T02170039
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 3 | |||
| Passengers | 42 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
18 documents, released by the NTSB on October 3, 2024. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
