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Accidents · NTSB WPR20LA280 · Final report

Arrow-Falcon Exporters, Inc. UH-1H accident near Coalinga, California, August 19, 2020

On August 19, 2020 at about 4:45 pm local time, a 2009 Arrow-Falcon Exporters, Inc. UH-1H (helicopter), registered N711GH, was destroyed in an accident during maneuvering (low-alt flying) near Coalinga, California. It was a firefighting flight under public-use (government) rules. 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s inability to maintain control of the helicopter due to a hydraulic system failure for reasons that could not be fully determined due to the thermal destruction from the postimpact fire.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
August 19, 2020 · about 4:45 pm local time
Place
Coalinga, California · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Arrow-Falcon Exporters, Inc. UH-1H, built 2009
Registration
N711GH · no longer on the register · serial 65-1002
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Firefighting flight · public-use (government) rules

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot was engaged in external load fire-fighting operations when the accident occurred. After dropping several loads of water, the pilot reported abnormal noises and vibrations and stated "it's my hydraulics" before he lost airspeed and control of the helicopter. The helicopter made several uncontrolled rotations before colliding with terrain and erupting in flames. The wreckage was highly fragmented and most consumed by the postimpact fire. The hydraulic system continuity could not be confirmed due to fire damage. The servos exhibited exposure to fire, including an oxide layer on the outer surface, micro-cracks, resolidified metal, and deformation damage. Foreign high-density particles were found in the hydraulic system. Hydraulic flight control stiffness and hard-over conditions are most likely a result of a malfunction of the servo irreversible valve. Only one of the three irreversible hydraulic valves was not destroyed in the postcrash fire. Examination of this valve found high-density metal particles deep within the valve assembly and preexisting damage to the seat of a check valve. Since all the servos were operated from a single hydraulic pressure source, it is likely that the other two irreversible valves also had similar particles within their assemblies. Foreign high-density particles and a worn check valve within the irreversible valve could have interfered with the valves’ proper operation and resulted in control stiffness or a hard-over condition. There was no evidence of preexisting mechanical damage on the three servo actuator pistons or rods as the internal moving parts within the servo actuators showed no evidence of gouging. There was no wear damage in the bushing areas or around the housing ball assembly. Toxicological tests detected the antidepressant medication citalopram and an augmenting agent buspirone in the pilot’s system. Given that the pilot was performing complex firefighting tasks when the helicopter developed mechanical problems and he made reasonable decisions to attempt to land the helicopter, he appears to have been functioning at a high level. It appears unlikely that the pilot’s use of the antidepressants or his depression were factors in the accident. The pilot’s declaration that he had a hydraulic problem and the final uncorrected right hand descending spiral turn flightpath are consistent with what would be expected if the helicopter experienced control stiffness or a hard-over condition. However, due to the extent of the impact and postimpact fire damage, the reason for the loss of control could not be conclusively determined.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control in flight during maneuvering (low-alt flying) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Hydraulic power system › Hydraulic, main system › Unknown/Not determined
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 11,200 hours in all; 414 in this make and model; 225 in the last 90 days; 11 in the last 30 days; 11,150 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: August 12, 2020
  • Medical certificate: Class 2
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 10,389 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, June 16, 2020; 66 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 9,500 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Honeywell T53-L-703 (turboshaft); 1,458 hours total
  • Fire on the ground
  • Operator: Guardian Helicopters Inc

The flight

  • Departed from: C80 Coalinga CA at 3:46 pm
  • Destination: C80 Coalinga CA
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 3 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 70°F (21°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
  • Observation at 4:00 pm, 11 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

16 documents, released by the NTSB on June 14, 2023. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.