Beech V35A accident near Statesboro, Georgia, June 1, 2023
On June 1, 2023 at about 6:55 pm local time, a 1969 Beech V35A, registered N8074R, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Statesboro, Georgia (Statesboro-Bulloch County airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
Maintenance personnel’s improper installation of the pitch servo bridle cable clamp, which led to binding in the elevator control system that restricted aft yoke movement during the landing approach.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- June 1, 2023 · about 6:55 pm local time
- Place
- Statesboro, Georgia · Statesboro-Bulloch County · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person had minor injuries.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Beech V35A, built 1969 · all V35As on the register
- Registration
- N8074R · registry record · serial D-8982
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot reported that the purpose of the flight was to test the newly installed autopilot servos and calibrate the fuel flow sensor. The pilot stated that the control surfaces moved as expected during the preflight inspection. Near the end of the flight, the autopilot did not turn to a programmed waypoint. The pilot disconnected the autopilot and took over manual control of the airplane but was unable to prevent an unintended nose-down pitch. Despite verifying the autopilot disconnection, the yoke was unresponsive and the airplane continued to descend on the final approach, striking a light pole about 1,000 ft short of the runway threshold before impacting the ground. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the pitch servo bridle cable clamp had not been properly installed, which resulted in the cable binding when the yoke was pulled aft. The installer had not verified that the required clearance was maintained and did not perform the necessary post-installation control movement checks as specified in the autopilot’s installation instructions. The incorrect positioning of the bridle cable clamp resulted in restricted elevator control, which prevented the pilot from recovering from the nose-down condition during the approach.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Flight control sys malf/fail during enroute (cruise) defining event
- Loss of control in flight during approach
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during approach
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Auto flight system › Autopilot system › Malfunction
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Maintenance personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot, private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 110 hours in all; 2 in this make and model; 158 in the last 90 days; 45 in the last 30 days; 1,039 as pilot in command; 150 on instruments
- Medical certificate: Class 2
- Seat: left
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 6,929 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, May 30, 2023
- Maximum gross weight: 3,412 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Continental TSIO-520D (piston); 1,485 hours total
The flight
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 32, 6,000 ft by 101 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 4,500 ft
- Temperature: 85°F (29°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
- Altimeter: 29.00 inHg
- Observation at 2:00 pm from TBR
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
10 documents, released by the NTSB on June 4, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 11 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Pilot's Statement | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Gfc 500 Installation Manual Excerpts | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Supplemental Type CERTIFICATE-SA01866WI | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Wreckage Examination Summary | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 6 | Memorandum for Record - Telephone Interview, Southeast Aviation Manager | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 7 | Memorandum for Record - Video File Description | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 8 | Video File | MOV file | Download |
| 9 | Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation | PDF, 11 pages | View Download |
| 10 | Investigative Photos | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Other NTSB records under N8074R the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.