The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily
Accidents · NTSB ERA20LA008 · Final report

Raytheon HAWKER accident near Fort Myers, Florida, October 8, 2019

On October 8, 2019 at about 3:05 am local time, a 1997 Raytheon HAWKER, registered N86MN, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Fort Myers, Florida (Southwest Florida Intl airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

Maintenance personnel's improper installation of the nose landing gear assembly, which resulted in separation of the actuator arm and the failure of a nose landing gear to lock in place.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
October 8, 2019 · about 3:05 am local time
Place
Fort Myers, Florida · Southwest Florida Intl · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Raytheon HAWKER 800XP, built 1997
Registration
N86MN · no longer on the register · serial 258330
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

During the initial climb, the flight crew attempted to retract the landing gear; the main landing gear retracted normally but the nose landing gear failed to retract. Several attempts to retract and extend the nose landing gear to a locked position were unsuccessful and the flight crew completed an emergency landing, during which the airplane skidded to a stop on its nose and fuselage. The fuselage sustained substantial damage. Examination of the nose landing gear actuator drag stay found that it was missing its nut, washer, and split pin, and deformation was observed in the attachment area. The nose landing gear leg was removed, overhauled, and re-installed by a contract maintenance facility as part of a broader routine maintenance inspection about 9 months before the accident. The airplane had flown 124 cycles since the removal and re-installation. The maintenance task reportedly followed in the maintenance manual required that the nut, washer, and split pin be installed during the installation, and records indicated that the installation task was performed by a mechanic and verified by a separate quality assurance inspector mechanic at the contract maintenance facility. There were no other inspections performed on the nose landing gear since the overhaul. Thus, it is likely that the split pin was not installed during installation of the nose landing gear following the overhaul, and over the course of the 124 cycles after installation, the nut and washer backed out, which allowed for the actuator arm to disconnect from its attach point. As a result, the actuator arm was free to move during the retraction and extension cycles, which damaged its attachment area and ultimately led to its complete separation. This is consistent with the pilot’s report of hearing a thud and feeling vibration emanating from the nose landing gear area during the retraction cycle.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during initial climb defining event
  2. Landing gear collapse during landing

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Maintenance personnel
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Post maintenance inspection › Maintenance personnel
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Nose/tail landing gear › Incorrect service/maintenance
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Landing gear actuator › Incorrect service/maintenance

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 3,905 hours in all; 450 in this make and model; 68 in the last 90 days; 18 in the last 30 days; 3,270 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: August 3, 2019
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 5,366 hours in all; 24 in this make and model; 83 in the last 90 days; 24 in the last 30 days; 2,058 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: September 26, 2019
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 10,080.6 hours
  • Last inspection: condition inspection, October 1, 2019
  • Maximum gross weight: 28,120 lb
  • Seats: 11
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Garrett-Honeywell TFE731-5BR-1H (turbofan); 9,868 hours total
  • Engine 2: Garrett-Honeywell TFE731-5BR-1H (turbofan); 9,868 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: APF Naples FL at 11:53 pm
  • Destination: ERV Kerrville TX
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 06, 12,000 ft by 150 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Wind: from 150° at 6 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 12,000 ft; scat at 3,000 ft
  • Temperature: 75°F (24°C), dew point 52°F (11°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.79 inHg
  • Observation at 11:41 pm from RSW

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2
Passengers2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

6 documents, released by the NTSB on May 27, 2020. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.