Curtiss JN4 accident near Williamson, Georgia, November 17, 2016
On November 17, 2016 at about 10:40 pm local time, a 2013 Curtiss JN4, an amateur-built aircraft,, registered N1662, was destroyed in an accident during initial climb near Williamson, Georgia (Peach State airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The in-flight failure of the propeller due to excessive engine vibration loads and the use of an incorrectly-sized propeller, which resulted in a fatigue crack of the leading edge strip. Contributing to the accident was the inadequate repair of the propeller following a previous crack.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 17, 2016 · about 10:40 pm local time · cases in 2016
- Place
- Williamson, Georgia · Peach State · cases near this airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Curtiss JN4 D, built 2013, amateur-built · all JN4s on the register
- Registration
- N1662 · no longer on the register · serial 6062
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airline transport pilot and pilot-rated passenger were departing on a local flight in the experimental amateur-built airplane. During the initial climb after takeoff, a witness heard backfire and popping noises coming from the airplane, followed by visual indications of an in-flight fire. The fire intensified and the airplane disappeared behind a tree line and crashed. The airplane came to rest in an upright position, and fire consumed the airplane forward of the empennage. A 45-inch section of one wood laminate propeller blade was found in a wooded area about 380 ft southwest of the departure end of the runway and about 670 ft from the main wreckage. This section of propeller blade separated in flight, and the ensuing engine vibrations most likely separated fuel and/or oil lines, which resulted in the in-flight fire and a loss of airplane control. An examination of the propeller pieces revealed that the propeller likely fractured due to excessive vibrational loads associated with engine operation. These loads most likely began well before the accident flight. Documentation revealed that the engine underwent troubleshooting and repair on several occasions for issues related to hesitation, improper cylinder firing, and other anomalies. The copper cladding on the propeller tip was relatively heavy, which also made the propeller particularly susceptible to damage from vibration loads. The leading edge copper strip showed evidence of fatigue crack growth in a plane perpendicular to the leading edge near the tip of the blade. While adding weight at the tip, the leading edge strip and full-width tip sections provided chordwise reinforcement to the wood at the tip. However, once the leading edge strip fractured, the chordwise reinforcement of the wood was reduced, resulting in a spanwise fracture in the wood along the wood grain and subsequent liberation of the tip and trailing edge of the blade. During the restoration of the airplane, the builders noted that the thickness of the newly-manufactured propeller did not match the length of the hub on the engine, and they elected to reduce the length of the hub rather than purchase a new, thicker propeller that was properly sized to the existing hub. The accident propeller was made for a 180-hp engine instead of the 200-hp engine on the accident airplane. This decision may have contributed to higher stresses on the propeller. About 16 months before the accident, a crack was found in the copper cladding on the suction side of the fractured propeller blade. The propeller was removed and returned to the manufacturer for repair. After the blade was returned to service, another crack initiated and propagated in the pressure side of the copper cladding from an adjacent repair rivet located closer to the hub from the original crack location. The blade fractured through the copper cladding at the original crack, the crack emanating from the adjacent repair rivet, and through the wood, intersecting the hole in the wood for the rivet associated with the repaired crack and an adjacent repair rivet hole closer to the tip. The repair did not effectively redistribute the loads to prevent further cracking in the area, as evidenced by the rapid formation of a crack at the repair rivet. Furthermore, the additional rivet hole aligned through the same grain of the supporting wood may have further weakened the remaining structure of the propeller as the crack on the pressure side of the leading edge initiated and propagated to merge with the repaired crack on the suction side. Although the primary cause of the fracture was likely the result of excessive engine vibration loads and use of a propeller that was too thin for the hub installed on the engine at the start of restoration, the inadequate repair may have contributed to the accident by providing a false sense of security that the structural integrity of the cracked propeller had been restored.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Part(s) separation from AC during initial climb defining event
- Fire/smoke (non-impact) during initial climb
- Loss of control in flight during initial climb
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Propeller system › Propeller blade section › Failure
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Owner/builder
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Propeller system › (general) › Incorrect use/operation
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Repair › Maintenance personnel
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Propeller system › Propeller blade section › Damaged/degraded
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, flight engineer
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: glider
- Flight time: 25,200 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rear
- Injury: fatal
Pilot-Rated Passenger
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
- Ratings: multi-engine land; multi-engine sea; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 13,862 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: frt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 71 hours
- Last inspection: condition inspection, June 20, 2016; 10 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 2,400 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Hispano-Suiza E-2 (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire in flight and on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: GA2 Williamson GA at 10:40 pm
- Destination: GA2 Williamson GA
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 31, 2,400 ft by 100 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: dusk
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 63°F (17°C), dew point 48°F (9°C)
- Altimeter: 30.12 inHg
- Observation at 11:15 pm from GA2, 6 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Photographs from the investigation 15 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them
Photo 1 – Main Wreckage (NTSB Photo)
Photo 2 - Empennage (NTSB Photo)
Photo 3 – Right Wing (NTSB Photo)
Photo 4 – Empennage (NTSB Photo)
Photo 5 – Empennage (NTSB Photo)
Photo 6 – Engine (NTSB Photo)
Photo 7 – Engine and Fuselage (NTSB Photo)
Photo 8 – Propeller Hub, Radiator, and Engine (NTSB Photo)
Photo 9 – Fuel Tank (NTSB Photo)
Photo 10 – Propeller Tip (NTSB Photo)
Photo 11 – Fuel Valve (NTSB Photo)
Photo 12 – Spark Plugs (NTSB Photo)
Photo 13 – Propeller Blade Components (NTSB Photo)
Photo 14 – Propeller Tip (NTSB Photo)
Photo 15 – Witness Photo of Aircraft in FlightThe NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
15 documents, released by the NTSB on March 26, 2018. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N1662: not on the register today · the record of its deregistration
- Curtiss JN-4 13 registered today · the model family and its accident history
- Curtiss 20 aircraft on the register
- Engine: Hispano-Suiza E-2 · as the NTSB recorded it
- Peach State Aerodrome · nearest airport
- Accidents and incidents in Georgia 2,138 since 1982 · 360 in the last ten years
- Georgia 8,799 aircraft registered
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA17FA050.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
