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Accidents · NTSB CEN23LA208 · Final report

Luscombe 8E accident near Cortez, Colorado, May 19, 2023

On May 19, 2023, a 1947 Luscombe 8E, registered N2515K, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (flare/touchdown) near Cortez, Colorado (Cortez Muni airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

Failure of the right main landing gear due to prolonged corrosion of the landing gear tube, which weakened the gear.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
May 19, 2023
Place
Cortez, Colorado · Cortez Muni · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Luscombe 8E, built 1947 · all 8Es on the register
Registration
N2515K · registry record · serial 5242
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The conventional geared airplane’s right main landing gear collapsed during landing and the airplane’s left wing sustained substantial damage. The pilot reported that the flight instructor performed the final landing and that the landing was very hard. The flight instructor reported that he landed on centerline and as the airplane was rolling out the right main landing gear collapsed. He noted that there were no brakes in the right seat pilot station where he was located. Metallurgical examination of the failed landing gear revealed corrosion on the inside of the main landing gear tube in the area where it was welded to the wheel axle. The corrosion progressively thinned the leg tube walls over time and caused pitting and microcracking on the tube interior. The combination of missing material, pitting, and microcracks led to an overstress fracture of the leg at this location on the final landing, which led to two other subsequent overstress fractures. The Federal Aviation Administration issued a special airworthiness information bulletin (SAIB), CE-17-14, to alert operators of this and other similar model airplanes of the need to inspect and address corrosion issues on main landing gear. The SAIB recommended following the procedures of the Don Luscombe Aviation History Foundation Service Recommendation No. 4, dated Jan. 22, 1996, which provided instructions for installing a drain hole in the lower portion of the leg, performing repetitive inspections of the gear legs for corrosion, and cleaning and sealing the gear legs’ internal surfaces. Compliance with the SAIB is not mandatory. Limited maintenance records were available during the investigation; however, the most recent annual inspection entry did not indicate that the landing gear were inspected for corrosion. The fractured main landing gear did not have drain holes as noted in the service recommendation, indicating that that procedures in the service recommendation had not been performed. Based on the available evidence the accident was the result of failure of the right main landing gear leg due to weakening from prolonged internal corrosion of the landing gear tube, which weakened the leg.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Landing gear collapse during landing (flare/touchdown) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Main landing gear › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Main landing gear › Failure

Flight instructor

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: glider
  • Flight time: 24,064 hours in all; 1,402 in this make and model; 38 in the last 90 days; 26 in the last 30 days
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: glider
  • Flight time: 5,000 hours in all
  • Medical certificate: BasicMed
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Last inspection: inspection type not recorded
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,400 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Continental C85 (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 21, 7,205 ft by 100 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 360° at 6 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 36°F (2°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.00 inHg
  • Observation at 5:53 pm from KCEZ

Weather report (METAR): METAR KCEZ 182353Z AUTO 36006KT 10SM CLR 23/02 A3000 RMK AO2 SLP092 T02330022 10239 20178 56015=

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

7 documents, released by the NTSB on March 28, 2024. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.