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Accidents · NTSB CEN21LA237 · Final report

Grumman G164 accident near Celina, Ohio, May 27, 2021

On May 27, 2021 at about 11:50 am local time, a 1982 Grumman G164, registered N8376K, was substantially damaged in an accident during takeoff near Celina, Ohio (Lakefield Airport). It was an aerial application (crop spraying) flight under agricultural flying rules (Part 137). 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

A loss of engine power for undetermined reasons.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
May 27, 2021 · about 11:50 am local time
Place
Celina, Ohio · Lakefield Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Grumman G164 B, built 1982 · all G164s on the register
Registration
N8376K · no longer on the register · serial 675B
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Aerial application (crop spraying) flight · agricultural flying rules (Part 137)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot was departing on an agricultural flight when shortly after liftoff the airplane had a sudden engine power fluctuation from high-power to low-power and back to high-power. The pilot stated that he was “thrown forward” into his safety restraints and then “thrown back” into his seat. The forward/backward motion only occurred once and was “pretty quick and hard.” The pilot stated that after the loss of engine power, the propeller speed remained at 100% but the airplane’s climb performance was significantly diminished. The pilot pitched the airplane for best glide airspeed and entered a slight right turn from the runway heading to avoid trees. Believing the engine was still running, the pilot did not want to jettison the airplane’s load unnecessarily into the river near the airport. The pilot reported that the engine lost all power shortly after he entered the right turn. He then jettisoned the airplane’s load in an attempt to maintain a climb, but the airplane descended and impacted a levee, where it nosed over into the river. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the vertical stabilizer, rudder, upper wings, and the fuselage. Postaccident examination of the engine and propeller revealed no evidence of internal failure or other anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The rotational rub/scoring observed in the engine, metal spray on the turbine stator vanes, and earthen debris throughout the engine core are all consistent with the engine producing power at impact. The engine’s torsion shaft aft spline was fractured consistent with sudden stoppage damage sustained when the propeller impacted the ground. The propeller exhibited impact-related damage that was consistent with high impact forces with the propeller rotating in the normal blade angle range of operation at moderate engine power. During takeoff and initial climb, the engine speed is controlled by the propeller governor and fuel flow is determined by the fuel control unit (FCU) Power Lever Schedule. Although postaccident testing of the FCU revealed anomalies with the Standard Day Acceleration and Deceleration Schedules, the FCU did not contribute to the loss of engine power because the Power Lever Schedule controls fuel flow to the engine during takeoff/initial climb. Additionally, according to the pilot, the propeller speed remained at 100% after the initial power fluctuation and is consistent with the engine operating with the condition lever set for takeoff. Postaccident examination revealed that the airframe control linkage to the engine propeller pitch control (PPC) was disconnected from the splined end of the shouldered shaft of the PPC, and the retaining bolt that normally secured the airframe linkage to the splined end was loose and was not secured by safety wire. Additionally, although the PPC shouldered shaft had an internally threaded hole for a secondary retention feature, there was no evidence that the secondary retention feature was installed at the time of the accident. There are no outside forces acting on the PPC other than the linkage connection to the cockpit power lever. The PPC and FCU main metering valve are connected through the concentric shaft and are rigged to move together. A disengagement of the airframe PPC linkage will result in the pilot’s inability to change fuel flow and/or propeller pitch (blade angle) during flight and landing. If the airframe control linkage disconnected from the PPC shouldered shaft during initial climb at takeoff power, vibration could potentially rotate the PPC cam and reduce engine power as if the cockpit power lever had been pulled back by the pilot. The pilot’s description of being thrown-forward and then backward would have required the PPC cam to rotate from high-power to low-power and back to high-power before settling at a low power setting that would not sustain a climb. However, it is unlikely the propeller blade angle pitch change would be fast enough to cause the pilot to believe the engine had surged. As such, the pilot’s description of being thrown-forward and then backward is not consistent with a disconnected PPC airframe linkage. Although the airframe control linkage to the PPC shouldered spline was found disconnected after the accident with a loose retention bolt that was not secured with safety wire, the investigation was unable to conclusively determine if the control linkage disconnected from the PPC while inflight or during impact. Additionally, the investigation did not reveal any evidence of a preimpact failure or other anomalies that would have prevented normal engine operation.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of engine power (partial) during takeoff defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Not determined › Not determined › (general) › (general) › Unknown/Not determined

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 3,300 hours in all; 1,350 in this make and model
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: sngl
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 9,187.2 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, May 20, 2021; 14.1 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 7,200 lb
  • Seats: 1
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Honeywell TPE331-1-151A (turboprop); 7,733 hours total
  • Operator: Gaerte Ag Service, LLC

The flight

  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 8, 4,400 ft by 75 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 070° at 8 knots, gusting 15
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 57°F (14°C), dew point 55°F (13°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.15 inHg
  • Observation at 7:55 am from KAXV, 12 miles away

Weather report (METAR): METAR KAXV 271155Z AUTO 07008G15KT 10SM 14/13 A3015 RMK AO2=

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

18 documents, released by the NTSB on August 16, 2023. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Other NTSB records under N8376K the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time

2011-06-15WPR11CA261 · accident near Pullman, WA · substantial damage · minor injuries
2006-07-23SEA06CA145 · accident near Lamont, WA · substantial damage · minor injuries

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.