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Accidents · NTSB ERA23LA298 · Final report

Douglas A-4K accident near Mcas Cherry Point, North Carolina, July 12, 2023

On July 12, 2023 at about 6:00 pm local time, a 1970 Douglas A-4K, registered N143EM, was substantially damaged in an accident during takeoff near Mcas Cherry Point, North Carolina (Cherry Point Mcas (Cunningham airport). It was a public-use flight (federal) under public-use (government) rules. 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s failure to identify and appropriately respond to an anomalous nose-down trim condition during the takeoff roll, which resulted in his decision to eject and the airplane’s subsequent runway excursion.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 12, 2023 · about 6:00 pm local time · cases in 2023
Place
Mcas Cherry Point, North Carolina · Cherry Point Mcas (Cunningham · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Douglas A-4K, built 1970 · all A-4Ks on the register
Registration
N143EM · no longer on the register · serial 154905
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Public-use flight (federal) · public-use (government) rules

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot reported that a preflight inspection and flight control checks revealed no anomalies, and the pilot, maintenance personnel, and another pilot confirmed that the airplane was properly configured for takeoff. During the takeoff roll, as the pilot reduced forward stick pressure to rotate the airplane, he felt the nose strut extend; however, the airplane did not rotate. The pilot applied full aft stick and nose-up trim, but the airplane remained on the runway. As the airplane approached the end of the runway, the pilot chose to eject, and subsequently sustained serious injuries during the ejection and subsequent landing under parachute. The airplane departed the runway surface and continued an additional 3,000 ft through the runway overrun area, resulting in substantial damage from the impact and subsequent fire. Postaccident examination of the airplane’s wreckage revealed that the horizontal stabilizer trim was at 0° (the normal takeoff setting was between 6° and 8° nose up) and the wing flaps were retracted. Examination and operational testing of the horizontal stabilizer actuator and trim components revealed no anomalies. Further examination of the airplane revealed that the front left throttle quadrant air-to-air refueling store control head cannon plug was loose. The cannon plug was resting against the horizontal stabilizer manual override push-pull rod end in a way that could limit operation. The cannon plug also showed evidence of severe chafing consistent with contact with the push-pull rod end. However, it is likely that the airplane’s manual trim override was working normally, since functional tests of both the normal horizontal stabilizer trim and manual trim override were part of the after engine start checks, and the pilot reported no anomalies. Based on the available information, it could not be determined whether the trim system exhibited a runaway condition or if the pilot inadvertently actuated nose-down trim while holding the stick forward during the takeoff roll, as both situations would have presented the same to the pilot. According to the operator, a runaway nose-down trim condition during the takeoff roll was a known issue in the accident airplane make and model. Regardless of the reason for the nose-down trim, the pilot should have recognized the airplane’s failure to rotate as a runaway nose-down trim scenario and immediately completed the associated emergency procedure, which included employing the manual trim override. The procedure likely would have resulted in the airplane becoming airborne, and thus preventing the accident.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Runway excursion during takeoff defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › (general) › Malfunction other cases naming the flight controls
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Pitch control › Attain/maintain not possible
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring equip/instruments › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 945 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: December 7, 2022
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: sngl
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 8,576 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme
  • Maximum gross weight: 21,500 lb
  • Seats: 1
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Pratt and Whitney J52-P8 (turbojet); 5,246 hours total
  • Fire on the ground
  • Operator: Draken International LLC

The flight

  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 5L, 8,978 ft by 200 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 220° at 6 knots, gusting 15
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: scat at 4,900 ft
  • Temperature: 90°F (32°C), dew point 79°F (26°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.02 inHg
  • Observation at 1:56 pm from NKT

Weather report (METAR): METAR KNKT 121756Z 22006G15KT 10SM TS SCT049 32/26 A3002 RMK AO2 TSB02B40 SLP162 T03220256 10322 20256 58005=

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Photographs from the investigation 4 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them

The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

7 documents, released by the NTSB on June 24, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

Aircraft
Place

The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA23LA298.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.