Air Tractor INC AT-802 and Air Tractor INC AT-502B mid-air collision near Arco, Idaho, June 20, 2024
On June 20, 2024 at about 6:55 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Air Tractor INC AT-802 (N802TP) and Air Tractor INC AT-502B (N581TW), were involved in a mid-air collision near Arco, Idaho (Arco-Butte County airport). 1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A midair collision between two airplanes during aerial application operations due to both pilots’ insufficient awareness of their proximity to each other and their failure to see and avoid each other. Contributing to the accident was the operator and both pilots’ failure to develop and follow a deconfliction and communications plan.
A midair collision between two airplanes during aerial application operations due to both pilots’ insufficient awareness of their proximity to each other and their failure to see and avoid each other. Contributing to the accident was the operator and both pilots’ failure to develop and follow a deconfliction and communications plan.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- June 20, 2024 · about 6:55 pm local time
- Place
- Arco, Idaho · Arco-Butte County · map
- Type
- Accident · mid-air collision
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Air Tractor INC AT-802, built 2016 · all AT-802s on the register
- Registration
- N802TP · registry record · serial 802-0665
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Aerial application (crop spraying) flight · agricultural flying rules (Part 137)
- Aircraft 2
- Air Tractor INC AT-502B, built 2005 · all AT-502Bs on the register
- Registration
- N581TW · registry record · serial 502B-2581
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Aerial application (crop spraying) flight · agricultural flying rules (Part 137)
The NTSB's narrative for the Air Tractor INC AT-802 final · quoted from the NTSB record
Two airplanes, an Air Tractor AT-502B and an Air Tractor AT-802, owned and dispatched by the same operator, were conducting aerial application operations from the same airport and in the same geographic area when they collided in flight during day visual meteorological conditions. Both airplanes had been dispatched from their base of operations to an airport near the operating area the morning of the accident, and each pilot was tasked to apply products to different agricultural fields. After leaving the fields northwest of the airport, the AT-502B maneuvered south toward fields assigned to the AT-802. These fields were west of both the airport and the other fields assigned to the AT-502B. The AT-502B maneuvered to the south about the same time that the AT-802 departed the airport and flew west back toward its assigned fields. Both airplanes were flying at similar low altitudes above ground level. Two witnesses traveling westbound on a highway observed one airplane, likely the AT-502B, traveling from north to south over the highway at low altitude. They also observed a second airplane, likely the AT-802, traveling toward the first on a northerly heading. They said the southbound airplane appeared to make a left turn in front of the northbound airplane. The northbound airplane then appeared to make a hard right turn before they collided. Impact damage and debris field findings were consistent with each airplane impacting the other’s right side. According to operator personnel, the pilots discussed which fields each pilot would be responsible for, and they were aware of each other’s area of operations. Operator personnel also stated the company and pilots did not have formal deconfliction or communications plans, and that the pilots primarily used cell phone voice and text to communicate with each other and the ground crews. The last documented communication between the pilots occurred three hours before the accident. The AT-802 pilot’s toxicological testing indicated that he had used or been administered ketamine, fentanyl, and ondansetron. These are common postaccident treatment medications, and there is a strong possibility that they were administered to the pilot after the accident. If so, the toxicology results would not constitute evidence of pre-crash ketamine, fentanyl, or ondansetron use. Other detected substances (dextromethorphan and naproxen) are not typically impairing with appropriate use. Whether they were used to treat active symptoms of minor acute illness could not be determined. The AT-502B pilot had cardiovascular conditions, including coronary artery disease and diabetes, that were associated with increased risk of an impairing or incapacitating cardiovascular event, such as arrythmia, heart attack, or stroke. There is no autopsy evidence that such an event occurred, although such an event does not leave reliable autopsy evidence if it occurs just before death. Based on HbA1c values, the AT-502B pilot’s diabetes was incompletely controlled at the time of his last FAA medical examination and remained incompletely controlled in the months before the accident. The fact that his medication-treated diabetes had been waived by the FAA indicates it is unlikely that significant medication side effects or long-term ocular or neurological complications of the disease had been identified as of that time. Symptoms such as fatigue or blurry vision may occur in incompletely controlled diabetes. Overall, the investigation could not determine whether the AT-502B pilot was experiencing impairing effects of his incompletely controlled diabetes, such as fatigue or blurry vision, at the time of the accident. Both pilots were required to use corrective lenses to meet vision standards at all required distances. The AT-802 pilot was likely wearing corrective lenses at the time of the accident. Investigators could not determine if the AT502B pilot was wearing corrective lenses at the time of the accident. The accident is consistent with both pilots failing to see and avoid each other in sufficient time to avoid a collision. However, the operation of both airplanes in the same geographic area increased the likelihood of a conflict between the two airplanes, the risks of which could have been reduced if the operator and pilots had developed and followed a formal deconfliction plan and the pilots had communicated their locations and intentions regularly during the flights. Both pilots likely had little or no situational awareness as to their proximity to the other airplane until immediately before impact.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Air Tractor INC AT-502B final · quoted from the NTSB record
Two airplanes, an Air Tractor AT-502B and an Air Tractor AT-802, owned and dispatched by the same operator, were conducting aerial application operations from the same airport and in the same geographic area when they collided in flight during day visual meteorological conditions. Both airplanes had been dispatched from their base of operations to an airport near the operating area the morning of the accident, and each pilot was tasked to apply products to different agricultural fields. After leaving the fields northwest of the airport, the AT-502B maneuvered south toward fields assigned to the AT-802. These fields were west of both the airport and the other fields assigned to the AT-502B. The AT-502B maneuvered to the south about the same time that the AT-802 departed the airport and flew west back toward its assigned fields. Both airplanes were flying at similar low altitudes above ground level. Two witnesses traveling westbound on a highway observed one airplane, likely the AT-502B, traveling from north to south over the highway at low altitude. They also observed a second airplane, likely the AT-802, traveling toward the first on a northerly heading. They said the southbound airplane appeared to make a left turn in front of the northbound airplane. The northbound airplane then appeared to make a hard right turn before they collided. Impact damage and debris field findings were consistent with each airplane impacting the other’s right side. According to operator personnel, the pilots discussed which fields each pilot would be responsible for, and they were aware of each other’s area of operations. Operator personnel also stated the company and pilots did not have formal deconfliction or communications plans, and that the pilots primarily used cell phone voice and text to communicate with each other and the ground crews. The last documented communication between the pilots occurred three hours before the accident. The AT-802 pilot’s toxicological testing indicated that he had used or been administered ketamine, fentanyl, and ondansetron. These are common postaccident treatment medications, and there is a strong possibility that they were administered to the pilot after the accident. If so, the toxicology results would not constitute evidence of pre-crash ketamine, fentanyl, or ondansetron use. Other detected substances (dextromethorphan and naproxen) are not typically impairing with appropriate use. Whether they were used to treat active symptoms of minor acute illness could not be determined. The AT-502B pilot had cardiovascular conditions, including coronary artery disease and diabetes, that were associated with increased risk of an impairing or incapacitating cardiovascular event, such as arrythmia, heart attack, or stroke. There is no autopsy evidence that such an event occurred, although such an event does not leave reliable autopsy evidence if it occurs just before death. Based on HbA1c values, the AT-502B pilot’s diabetes was incompletely controlled at the time of his last FAA medical examination and remained incompletely controlled in the months before the accident. The fact that his medication-treated diabetes had been waived by the FAA indicates it is unlikely that significant medication side effects or long-term ocular or neurological complications of the disease had been identified as of that time. Symptoms such as fatigue or blurry vision may occur in incompletely controlled diabetes. Overall, the investigation could not determine whether the AT-502B pilot was experiencing impairing effects of his incompletely controlled diabetes, such as fatigue or blurry vision, at the time of the accident. Both pilots were required to use corrective lenses to meet vision standards at all required distances. The AT-802 pilot was likely wearing corrective lenses at the time of the accident. Investigators could not determine if the AT502B pilot was wearing corrective lenses at the time of the accident. The accident is consistent with both pilots failing to see and avoid each other in sufficient time to avoid a collision. However, the operation of both airplanes in the same geographic area increased the likelihood of a conflict between the two airplanes, the risks of which could have been reduced if the operator and pilots had developed and followed a formal deconfliction plan and the pilots had communicated their locations and intentions regularly during the flights. Both pilots likely had little or no situational awareness as to their proximity to the other airplane until immediately before impact.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Air Tractor INC AT-802 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during maneuvering (low-alt flying) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Flight planning/navigation › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › Pilot
- Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Operator
- Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Situational awareness › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Medical certificate: Class 2
- Seat: frt
- Injury: serious injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,474 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, March 25, 2024
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: P&W Canada PT6A-67AG (turboprop); 0 hours total
- Operator: Visser AG INC
The flight
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 270° at 4 knots, gusting 8
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 74°F (23°C), dew point 26°F (-3°C)
- Observation at 1:10 pm from Air, 3 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
The factual record for the Air Tractor INC AT-502B from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during maneuvering (low-alt flying) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Flight planning/navigation › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › Pilot
- Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Operator
- Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Situational awareness › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Last flight review: December 7, 2023
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: sngl
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 6,040.9 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, January 4, 2024
- Seats: 1
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: P&W PT6A SERIES (turboprop); 6,041 hours total
- Operator: Visser AG INC
The flight
- Flight plan: none
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
14 documents, released by the NTSB on September 18, 2026. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Record of Conversation - Witnesses | PDF, 1 page · our copy | View Download |
| 2 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 9 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 3 | Operator Interviews | PDF, 17 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 4 | ADS-B Flight Data - N581TW | PDF, 1 page · our copy | View Download |
| 5 | Global Positioning System Devices - Specialist's Factual Report | PDF, 18 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 6 | Air Tractor Examination Report | PDF, 24 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 7 | Attachment 1 to Global Positioning System Devices - Specialist's Factual Report - N581TW Tabular Data | data file · our copy | Download |
| 8 | Attachment 2 to Global Positioning System Devices - Specialist's Factual Report - N802TP Tabular Data | data file · our copy | Download |
| 9 | Attachment 3 to Global Positioning System Devices - Specialista��s Factual Report - N802TP Spray Log | map file · our copy | Download |
| 10 | Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation | PDF, 1 page · our copy | View Download |
| 11 | Mor - Pilots' Use of Corrective Lenses | PDF, 1 page · our copy | View Download |
| 12 | Toxicological Report N581TW Pilot | PDF, 1 page · our copy | View Download |
| 13 | Toxicological Report - N802TP Pilot | PDF, 1 page · our copy | View Download |
| 14 | Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 | PDF, 2 pages · our copy | View Download |
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.