Cessna 208B accident near Oceanside, California, February 24, 2022
On February 24, 2022 at about 8:45 pm local time, a 2002 Cessna 208B, registered N10JA, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach near Oceanside, California (Bob Maxwell Memorial Airfield). It was a skydiving flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot’s intentional inflight operation of the propeller in beta, which led to an aerodynamic lock, his inability to restore forward thrust, and subsequent collision with terrain.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 24, 2022 · about 8:45 pm local time
- Place
- Oceanside, California · Bob Maxwell Memorial Airfield · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were seriously injured.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 208B Supervan, built 2002 · all 208Bs on the register
- Registration
- N10JA · registry record · serial 208B0961
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Skydiving flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot was performing skydiving operations in the turboprop-equipped airplane. During the fourth flight of the day, after the skydivers departed the airplane, the pilot initiated a steep, turning descent with the power at idle, during which the airplane reached a maximum descent rate of 6,400 ft per min (fpm). While the airplane was on the base leg of the traffic pattern, the pilot attempted to arrest the descent by adding power; however, the engine did not respond to his movements of the power lever. He moved the propeller speed lever, which was also had no effect. He applied full nose-up trim and pulled the control yoke full aft against the stop, but the airplane would not maintain a level attitude, and subsequently collided with terrain short of the runway in a nose-low attitude. There were numerous publications from the STC holder and the engine and propeller manufacturers warning pilots to not use beta mode during inflight operations unless it is certified for those operations. If the power lever is placed below the flight idle gate into beta mode while inflight, the blade position will move to a fine blade angle. Depending on propeller rpm and flight speed, this adjustment may cause the moment from the aerodynamic load on the blade to shift from coarsening to fining, and may result in the propeller blades entering reverse and remaining “aerodynamically locked” in that position. No power lever input from the pilot can alter this, and using the feather valve is ineffective. It is likely that the only viable option to unlock the propeller is to shut down the engine to reduce the moments locking the propeller in place, given it could overcome windmilling speed loads on the blades. Postaccident examinations revealed no evidence of a mechanical malfunction with the engine, propeller, or airframe. A bench-flow test and subsequent teardown examination of the propeller governor revealed a few test points outside of limits that would not have precluded normal governor operation. The propeller rigging was incorrect and it is unknown if the rigging was changed on purpose to aid with faster descent rates; if this was the rigging at the time of the accident flight, it would have contributed to entering an aerodynamic lock sooner. A performance study of the flight based on Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) data revealed high negative thrust values that can only be achieved with the power lever below the flight idle gate. It is likely that the propeller blade pitch angle was in beta and that the aerodynamic moment on the blades had reversed, locking the propeller in place and preventing the pilot from recovering control of the propeller.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during approach defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Propeller system › Propeller feather/reversing › Incorrect use/operation
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 4,516 hours in all; 246 in this make and model; 243 in the last 90 days; 94 in the last 30 days; 3,315 as pilot in command; 1,688 on instruments
- Last flight review: April 3, 2021
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: serious injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 9,568 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, February 16, 2022
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Honeywell TPE331-12JR (turboprop); 1,192 hours total
The flight
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 25, 2,712 ft by 75 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 260° at 11 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 61°F (16°C), dew point 27°F (-3°C)
- Altimeter: 30.22 inHg
- Observation at 12:52 pm from KOKB
Weather report (METAR): KOKB 242052Z AUTO 26011KT 10SM CLR 16/M03 A3022 RMK AO2 SLP232 T01611028 58023
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
11 documents, released by the NTSB on May 16, 2024. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Supplemental Investigative Material | PDF, 20 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Memorandum- Airplane Performance Plots for WPR22LA114 | PDF, 15 pages | View Download |
| 3 | ADS-B Data | data file | Download |
| 4 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 7 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 - Changed and Later Submitted | PDF, 9 pages | View Download |
| 6 | Records of Conversation Investigator-in-charge | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
| 7 | Records of Conversation - Duty Officer | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 8 | Weather | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 9 | Hartzell Examination Notes | PDF, 6 pages | View Download |
| 10 | Honeywell Advisory Letter and Pilot Tips | PDF, 117 pages | View Download |
| 11 | Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Other NTSB records under N10JA the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
