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Accidents · NTSB OPS16IA008 · Final report

Embraer S A EMB-505 and Boeing 737 823 incident near Dallas, Texas, April 7, 2016

On April 7, 2016 at about 11:36 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Embraer S A EMB-505 (N304QS) and Boeing 737 823 (N896NN), were involved in the same incident near Dallas, Texas (Dallas-Fort Worth Intl airport). The NTSB record does not give the injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The controller's miscommunication of a clearance and failure to recognize and correct the readback resulting in the flight crew initiating takeoff without a clearance.
The controller's miscommunication of a clearance and failure to recognize and correct the readback resulting in the flight crew initiating takeoff without a clearance.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 12, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
April 7, 2016 · about 11:36 pm local time · cases in 2016
Place
Dallas, Texas · Dallas-Fort Worth Intl · cases near this airport · map
Type
Incident
Injuries
The NTSB record does not give the injuries.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft 1
Embraer S A EMB-505 NO SERIES, built 2013 · all EMB-505s on the register
Registration
N304QS · registry record · serial 50500143
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
Aircraft 2
Boeing 737 823 823, built 2012 · all 737 823s on the register
Registration
N896NN · registry record · serial 33224
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative for the Embraer S A EMB-505 final · quoted from the NTSB record

This runway incursion resulted from communications errors. The local control east controller (LE1) misspoke when intending to issue a landing clearance for a flight on approach to runway 35C and instead issued the flight on approach a takeoff clearance from runway 35L. The pilot of AAL2408, already in line up and wait position on runway 35L, interpreted the communication to be a takeoff clearance for his flight, acknowledged the takeoff clearance, and initiated takeoff. Immediately prior to AAL2408 initiating takeoff roll, the LE1 controller had cleared three different aircraft to cross runway 35L on three different taxiways. As AAL2408 began its takeoff roll the Runway Status Lights (RWSLs) on runway 35L activated Activation of the RWSL illuminated the Runway Entrance Lights (RELs) at the hold short locations of the three aircraft that had just been instructed to cross runway 35L and illuminated the Takeoff Hold Lights (THLs) at the approach end of the runway. The RELs provided a visual signal to the pilots holding short of runway 35L indicating the runway was unsafe to enter or cross. The THLs provided a visual signal to the pilot of AAL2408 that the runway was occupied however, data indicate that AAL2408 had progressed too far down the runway to observe the THLs by the time they had illuminated. Of the three aircraft holding short of runway 35L, only one proceeded across runway 35L. As that aircraft cleared the runway at taxiway K8 the Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model-X indicated AAL2408's speed to be 120 knots and the closest proximity between the two aircraft was approximately 2,800 feet. In this incident, the LE1 controller adjusted his speech rate to the traffic volume while attempting to comply with the requirements of issuing explicit runway crossing clearances for each runway that intersects a taxi route resulting in an excessive speech rate by the LE1. During a System Service Review after the event, controllers identified a recent procedural change that required additional verbiage when issuing crossing instructions, and an increased speech rate associated with increased workload.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the Boeing 737 823 final · quoted from the NTSB record

This runway incursion resulted from communications errors. The local control east controller (LE1) misspoke when intending to issue a landing clearance for a flight on approach to runway 35C and instead issued the flight on approach a takeoff clearance from runway 35L. The pilot of AAL2408, already in line up and wait position on runway 35L, interpreted the communication to be a takeoff clearance for his flight, acknowledged the takeoff clearance, and initiated takeoff. Immediately prior to AAL2408 initiating takeoff roll, the LE1 controller had cleared three different aircraft to cross runway 35L on three different taxiways. As AAL2408 began its takeoff roll the Runway Status Lights (RWSLs) on runway 35L activated Activation of the RWSL illuminated the Runway Entrance Lights (RELs) at the hold short locations of the three aircraft that had just been instructed to cross runway 35L and illuminated the Takeoff Hold Lights (THLs) at the approach end of the runway. The RELs provided a visual signal to the pilots holding short of runway 35L indicating the runway was unsafe to enter or cross. The THLs provided a visual signal to the pilot of AAL2408 that the runway was occupied however, data indicate that AAL2408 had progressed too far down the runway to observe the THLs by the time they had illuminated. Of the three aircraft holding short of runway 35L, only one proceeded across runway 35L. As that aircraft cleared the runway at taxiway K8 the Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model-X indicated AAL2408's speed to be 120 knots and the closest proximity between the two aircraft was approximately 2,800 feet. In this incident, the LE1 controller adjusted his speech rate to the traffic volume while attempting to comply with the requirements of issuing explicit runway crossing clearances for each runway that intersects a taxi route resulting in an excessive speech rate by the LE1. During a System Service Review after the event, controllers identified a recent procedural change that required additional verbiage when issuing crossing instructions, and an increased speech rate associated with increased workload.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record for the Embraer S A EMB-505 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Runway incursion veh/AC/person during taxi (from runway) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › ATC personnel
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › Flight crew

The aircraft

  • Maximum gross weight: 10,472 lb
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine 1: P&W Canada PW535E (turbofan); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: P&W Canada PW535E (turbofan); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Netjets Sales INC

The flight

  • Departed from: SAT San Antonio TX
  • Destination: DFW Dallas TX
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 35L, 13,401 ft by 200 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 010° at 17 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 25,000 ft; a few clouds at 18,000 ft
  • Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 39°F (4°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.93 inHg

The factual record for the Boeing 737 823 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Airport occurrence during takeoff defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › ATC personnel
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › ATC personnel
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Expectation/assumption › Flight crew

The aircraft

  • Maximum gross weight: 174,200 lb
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine 1: Cfm Intl CFM56-7B24E (turbofan); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Cfm Intl CFM56-7B24E (turbofan); 0 hours total
  • Operator: American Airlines

The flight

  • Departed from: DFW Dallas TX at 11:36 pm
  • Destination: ATL Atlanta GA
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 35L, 13,401 ft by 200 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

Aircraft
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Analytics

The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/OPS16IA008.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.