Amateur-built G5 and Raytheon Corporate Jets H25B incident near Teterboro, New Jersey, December 27, 2007
On December 27, 2007 at about 1:02 pm local time, 2 aircraft, amateur-built G5 (N90AM) and Raytheon Corporate Jets H25B (N818MV), were involved in the same incident near Teterboro, New Jersey. No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The probable cause of this incident was the TEB tower local controller's failure to ensure that the runway was free of all known ground vehicles, equipment, and personnel before permitting a departing aircraft to start takeoff roll.
The probable cause of this incident was the TEB tower local controller's failure to ensure that the runway was free of all known ground vehicles, equipment, and personnel before permitting a departing aircraft to start takeoff roll.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made September 29, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- December 27, 2007 · about 1:02 pm local time
- Place
- Teterboro, New Jersey · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Amateur-built G5
- Registration
- N90AM · registry record
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight of an unrecorded kind · general aviation rules (Part 91)
- Aircraft 2
- Raytheon Corporate Jets H25B
- Registration
- N818MV · no longer on the register
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative for the amateur-built G5 final · quoted from the NTSB record
On December 27, 2007, 0802 Eastern Standard time, a runway incursion occurred at Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey involving East Coast Jets (ECJ) flight 81, registration number N818MV, a Hawker 25, and N90AM, a G5. There was training in progress on ground control and there was a certified professional controller on local control. Tower staffing included a tower supervisor, a local controller, a ground controller and ground control developmental and a fight data/clearance delivery controller. ECJ 81 had landed on runway 6 and was advised by the local controller after landing to "turn left at taxiway bravo if able, cross [runway] one contact ground". ECJ81 exited the runway at taxiway B and contacted ground control for taxi to the Meridian FBO located on the north side of the airport. The developmental ground controller requested approval from the tower local controller to taxi ECJ81 across runway 1 at taxiway B. The local controller approved the request. About this time, N90AM called local control for takeoff and was directed to taxi into position and hold on the approach end of runway 1. The local controller, who was responsible for 2 aircraft and had 2 previous operational errors with some similarities, cleared N90AM for takeoff as ECJ81 was crossing the runway. The developmental ground controller reminded the local controller of the crossing and advised that it was not complete. The local controller, anticipating that appropriate separation would exist prior to N90AM beginning takeoff roll, instructed ground controller to expedite the crossing of ECJ81 and did not cancel the takeoff clearance. According to the Federal Aviation Administration, the closest proximity was 4,000 feet. The incident occurred during day visual meteorological conditions.
The NTSB's narratives can run to many pages; this is the opening. Read the full report at the NTSB.
The NTSB's narrative for the Raytheon Corporate Jets H25B final · quoted from the NTSB record
On December 27, 2007, 0802 Eastern Standard time, a runway incursion occurred at Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey involving East Coast Jets (ECJ) flight 81, registration number N818MV, a Hawker 25, and N90AM, a G5. There was training in progress on ground control and there was a certified professional controller on local control. Tower staffing included a tower supervisor, a local controller, a ground controller and ground control developmental and a fight data/clearance delivery controller. ECJ 81 had landed on runway 6 and was advised by the local controller after landing to "turn left at taxiway bravo if able, cross [runway] one contact ground". ECJ81 exited the runway at taxiway B and contacted ground control for taxi to the Meridian FBO located on the north side of the airport. The developmental ground controller requested approval from the tower local controller to taxi ECJ81 across runway 1 at taxiway B. The local controller approved the request. About this time, N90AM called local control for takeoff and was directed to taxi into position and hold on the approach end of runway 1. The local controller, who was responsible for 2 aircraft and had 2 previous operational errors with some similarities, cleared N90AM for takeoff as ECJ81 was crossing the runway. The developmental ground controller reminded the local controller of the crossing and advised that it was not complete. The local controller, anticipating that appropriate separation would exist prior to N90AM beginning takeoff roll, instructed ground controller to expedite the crossing of ECJ81 and did not cancel the takeoff clearance. According to the Federal Aviation Administration, the closest proximity was 4,000 feet. The incident occurred during day visual meteorological conditions.
The NTSB's narratives can run to many pages; this is the opening. Read the full report at the NTSB.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database and is rewritten in plain English only where the NTSB used codes; the probable cause and narrative are the NTSB's own words. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number OPS08IA004.