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Accidents · NTSB ERA25LA141 · Final report

Piper PA-28-181 accident near Hollywood, Florida, March 12, 2025

On March 12, 2025 at about 1:00 pm local time, a 1978 Piper PA-28-181, registered N3055B, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Hollywood, Florida (North Perry airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person had minor injuries; 1 other was unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

A total loss of engine power was due to a fracture of the crankshaft at the No. 3 main journal, which originated from a preexisting, thermally induced crack that had gone undetected by maintenance personnel during an inspection performed as part of the engine’s most recent overhaul.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
March 12, 2025 · about 1:00 pm local time
Place
Hollywood, Florida · North Perry · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person had minor injuries; 1 other was unhurt.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA-28-181, built 1978 · all PA-28-181s on the register
Registration
N3055B · registry record · serial 28-7990137
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

During the initial climb on an instructional flight, the airplane’s engine lost total power. The flight instructor then performed a forced, off-airport landing, during which the airplane impacted a tree, resulting in substantial damage to the right wing. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the crankshaft had fractured at the No. 3 main journal. Metallurgical analysis determined the fracture originated from a preexisting, thermally-induced crack at the aft side of the oil supply hole for the No. 3 connecting rod journal. A fatigue crack then initiated at the edge of the preexisting crack and propagated toward the No. 3 connecting rod journal, culminating in fracture of the crankshaft. The detailed metallurgical examination found that the features observed on the crankshaft showed evidence of three different fracture mechanisms associated with the crankshaft fracture. The region closest to the origin had intergranular features consistent with brittle overstress fracture. The next region showed evidence of mixed intergranular and transgranular features with dimple features consistent with ductile overstress fracture. The largest region showed features consistent with fatigue. It is likely that the final fracture region had features consistent with ductile overstress fracture, but the remaining overstress region was substantially obscured and obliterated by post-fracture contact damage. The intergranular region and part of the overstress region near the origin were oxidized, consistent with a different environmental exposure relative to the remainder of the overstress region and the fatigue region. Additionally, the bore of the No. 3 connecting rod oil supply hole was heat tinted in the area where the fracture surface was oxidized. This suggested that the No. 3 main journal likely experienced a high heat event, such as a bearing failure and/or inadequate lubrication. The high heat event then likely led to formation of the intergranular crack. Lead deposits consistent with the Babbitt layer on the interior surface of the main journal bearings were observed only in the intergranular region, including some deposits that ended precisely at the boundary. This suggested that Babbitt material migrated into the intergranular crack during the high heat event. While scoring and bearing damage was observed on the accident parts, the condition of the journals as found did not show evidence of a high heat event in the current installation. This indicated that the intergranular region likely formed during a previous period of service. Flakes and serrated chips of metallic debris were observed scattered throughout the intergranular and ductile overstress regions; however, similar debris was not observed in the fatigue region. The debris was consistent with material generated during journal grinding. Given the difference in oxidation across part of the overstress region and the presence of the debris across most of the overstress region, it is likely that the crack grew slightly during the grinding process, producing a comparatively short ductile overstress region. Once the cracked crankshaft was placed back in service, a fatigue crack initiated at the boundary of the ductile overstress crack. At the outer surface, the fatigue fracture intersected the ductile overstress crack behind the crack tip, further indicating that the fatigue crack was secondary to the overstress crack. The fatigue crack propagated aft along the oil supply hole for the No. 3 connecting rod journal and into the aft cheek until the remaining section could no longer support the load, resulting in fracture through the cheek at the aft end of the No 3. main journal. Review of the engine’s maintenance logbook showed that the engine was overhauled nearly 2 years before the accident and since that time, it had accumulated almost 2,400 flight hours. The maintenance records also indicated that the crankshaft was inspected by magnetic particle inspection during the last engine overhaul. The evidence observed on the crankshaft fracture surfaces indicated that the No. 3 main journal was likely cracked at the time of the inspection. The crack at the aft side of the oil supply hole for the No. 3 connecting rod journal likely had a total length of 0.147 inch at the No. 3 main journal surface at the time of inspection, which should have been detectable.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of engine power (total) during initial climb defining event
  2. Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip engine power section › Failure
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Scheduled/routine inspection › Maintenance personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot, remote
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,258 hours in all; 422 in this make and model; 265 in the last 90 days; 78 in the last 30 days; 1,186 as pilot in command; 868 on instruments
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

Dual student

  • Certificate: student
  • Flight time: 48 hours in all; 48 in this make and model; 20 in the last 90 days; 4 in the last 30 days; 10 as pilot in command
  • Medical certificate: Class 3
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 18,303 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, February 26, 2025
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,150 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O320-A4M (piston); 4,787 hours total

The flight

  • Flight plan: none
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 160° at 4 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 79°F (26°C), dew point 45°F (7°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.10 inHg
  • Observation at 11:53 am from KHWO, 13 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KHWO 121553Z 16004KT 10SM CLR 26/07 A3010 RMK AO2 SLP193 T02560072 $

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew11

Photographs from the investigation 2 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them

The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

7 documents, released by the NTSB on September 18, 2026. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.