The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily
Accidents · NTSB ERA23LA376 · Final report

Embraer S A EMB-545 accident near St. Simons Island, Georgia, September 21, 2023

On September 21, 2023 at about 6:36 pm local time, a 2020 Embraer S A EMB-545, registered N434FX, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (flare/touchdown) near St. Simons Island, Georgia (St. Simons Island airport). It was a personal flight under fractional-ownership rules (Part 91 subpart K). No one was hurt; 8 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The control laws of the angle of attack limiter protection system, which precluded the system from disengaging during an approach in gusting wind conditions, limiting the flight crew’s ability to control the airplane’s pitch and resulting in a hard landing.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
September 21, 2023 · about 6:36 pm local time · cases in 2023
Place
St. Simons Island, Georgia · St. Simons Island · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 8 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Embraer S A EMB-545 MOD, built 2020 · all EMB-545s on the register
Registration
N434FX · no longer on the register · serial 55010073
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · fractional-ownership rules (Part 91 subpart K)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

According to the flight crew, the departure and en route phases of the flight in the airplane were uneventful. Gusting wind and visual conditions existed at the destination airport, and the pilot chose to fly a GPS approach (versus a visual pattern) to allow more time for alignment and set-up for landing. The flight crew reported that all checklists and callouts were conducted. During the approach with the autothrottles engaged, the approach was stable as the airplane descended through 500 ft above ground level (agl). After the copilot made the “500 ft stable” callout, the airplane continued its descent, then crossed over a small section of trees. The pilot reported that he felt an “uplift,” then the airplane began to porpoise when it was about 100 to 150 ft agl. The pilot tried to make pitch corrections, but the airplane’s attitude did not change as commanded. The copilot tried to assist but observed the same airplane response. The airplane landed hard and slid along the runway, coming to rest in the grass off the right side of the runway. Although the flight crew at times engaged in nonessential conversation while approaching the airport, there is no indication that this contributed to the accident. Further, review of data from the engines’ full authority digital engine controls did not reveal any anomaly that would have contributed to the accident. The airplane was equipped with a fly-by-wire flight control system that featured an angle of attack (AOA) limiter protection system (instead of a traditional stall warning system) designed to prevent the airplane from stalling by limiting its AOA. Review of flight data recorder (FDR) data indicated that the AOA limiter protection engaged during the approach due to a sudden increase in AOA when the airplane was at a radio altitude of 162 ft. The sudden AOA increase was likely due to a wind gust. The airplane’s AOA then quickly reduced from 12.8° to less than 5° and remained below the engagement threshold for the remainder of the flight, but the AOA limiter protection remained engaged. Although the AOA limiter protection performed as designed, it reduced the flight crew’s ability to pitch up the airplane during the flare. For example, the pilot used the sidestick to command full airplane-nose-up pitch for about 3 seconds before touchdown, but the fly-by-wire system provided less than 3°of airplane-nose-up elevator. About 1.5 seconds before touchdown, the copilot also used the sidestick to command full airplane-nose-up pitch, but the fly-by-wire system responded with 5.5° of airplane-nose-down elevator. Neither flight crewmember indicated any awareness that the AOA limiter protection had engaged. During the flare, the airplane was subjected to a horizontal gust which resulted in a reduction of about 8 kts of indicated airspeed and the airplane touched down hard. An NTSB performance study determined that, at the time the airplane touched down hard, about 10° of AOA or stall margin remained that the flight crew was unable to use during the landing because the AOA limiter protection was engaged. The flight control computer software version current at the time of the accident would allow AOA limiter protection disengagement only on having three conditions met: 1) AOA reduced to values below the engagement threshold, 2) airspeed above a factor of stall speed threshold, and 3) difference between the normal load factor demand determined by the sidestick pitch command and the airplane’s actual load factor being below a specified threshold. Review of FDR data revealed that the frequency and amplitude of the pilot’s oscillating sidestick pitch commands prevented AOA limiter protection disengagement due to condition 3. About 7 months after the accident, the FAA issued airworthiness directive (AD) 2024-05-13, which required revisions to the airplane flight manual (AFM) to incorporate new operational airspeed limitations, flight control limitations, and approach procedures when the AOA limiter protection is engaged. This interim safety measure mandated the actions specified in the National Civil Aviation Agency of Brazil (ANAC) AD 2024-02-02, which was issued about 2 months earlier. Subsequently, about 22 months after the accident, ANAC issued AD 2024-02-02R1, which superseded ANAC AD 2020-02-02 and required a software update to the flight control computers to revise the AOA limiter protection criteria, which included allowing for a higher pitch response to sidestick movement while the AOA limiter protection is engaged and allowing for it to disengage any time there is a sidestick pitch-down command and conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. The FAA indicated that it planned to release its final rule regarding the Embraer EMB-545 and EMB-550 AOA limiter about September 2026.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Hard landing during landing (flare/touchdown) defining event
  2. Attempted remediation/recovery during approach
  3. Miscellaneous/other during approach
  4. Windshear or thunderstorm during approach

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › (general) › Design other cases naming the flight controls
  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Wind › Gusts › Effect on equipment
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › (general) › Attain/maintain not possible

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, flight engineer, private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: airship
  • Flight time: 10,900 hours in all; 1,872 in this make and model; 134 in the last 90 days; 55 in the last 30 days; 7,472 as pilot in command; 584 on instruments
  • Last flight review: July 6, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, military, private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 16,686 hours in all; 306 in this make and model; 131 in the last 90 days; 48 in the last 30 days; 6,152 as pilot in command; 3,412 on instruments
  • Last flight review: September 11, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,424 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, April 11, 2023
  • Maximum gross weight: 37,567 lb
  • Seats: 10
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Honeywell AS907--2-1A (turbofan); 3,424 hours total
  • Engine 3: Honeywell AS907--2-1A (turbofan); 3,424 hours total
  • Operator: Flexjet LLC

The flight

  • Departed from: HPN White Plains NY at 4:39 pm
  • Destination: SSI St.Simons Island GA
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 4, 5,584 ft by 100 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 050° at 13 knots, gusting 23
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 84°F (29°C), dew point 73°F (23°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.03 inHg
  • Observation at 2:53 pm from KSSI

Weather report (METAR): METAR KSSI 211853Z AUTO 05013G23KT 10SM CLR 29/23 A3003 RMK AO2 SLP170 T02890228

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2
Passengers6

Photographs from the investigation 21 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them

The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

21 documents, released by the NTSB on December 5, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 11 pages View Download
2 Pilots Statements and Interview Summaries PDF, 8 pages View Download
3 Meteorology Specialist's Factual Report PDF, 12 pages View Download
4 Flight Track Information (Pictorial) PDF, 3 pages View Download
5 Flight Track Information (Tabular) spreadsheet Download
6 Kssi - RNAV (GPS) Rwy 4 Approach PDF, 1 page View Download
7 Satellite Images of Accident Area - Overview, Initial Ground Contact, and Resting Place PDF, 3 pages View Download
8 Memorandum for Record - Accident Site and Wreckage Examination PDF, 1 page View Download
9 Investigation Photographs PDF, 22 pages · our copy View Download
10 Cockpit Voice Recorder - Factual Report of Group Chair PDF, 35 pages View Download
11 Systems Group Chairman's Factual Report PDF, 15 pages View Download
12 Flight Data Recorder - Specialist's Factual Report PDF, 22 pages View Download
13 Flight Data Recorder - Attachment 1 (Csv Data for Accident Flight) data file Download
14 Airplane Performance Study PDF, 21 pages View Download
15 Embraer Operations Bulletin Ob P550-0002-23 - 10/11/2023 PDF, 6 pages View Download
16 Embraer Operations Bulletin Ob P550-001-24 - 02/05/2024 PDF, 4 pages View Download
17 Anac Ad 2024-02-02 - 02/26/2024 PDF, 5 pages View Download
18 Anac Ad 2024-02-02R1 - 07/14/2025 PDF, 5 pages View Download
19 Memorandum for Record A�� Correspondence, FAA AVP-100 PDF, 1 page View Download
20 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 4 pages View Download
21 Wreckage Release PDF, 1 page View Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

Aircraft
Place

The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA23LA376.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.