Beech A36 accident near Summerland Key, Florida, January 25, 2020

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot reported that he performed preflight inspection and run-up checks before takeoff, which included a check of the elevator flight control system with no discrepancies noted. During the takeoff roll, the pilot reported the airplane was "nosing down to the front." He twice adjusted the elevator trim toward the airplane nose-up direction then applied aft input on the control yoke to rotate at 85 knots but felt resistance and aborted the takeoff. The airplane exited the runway, and the right wing impacted trees. The airplane’s right wing was substantially damaged during the runway excursion. Shortly after the accident, the pilot reported to the airport manager that he could not get airborne because of "…the control lock or something." The airport manager reported seeing the flight control gust lock on the right wing (and that it was not stored in a container behind the airplane’s rear seats as reported by the pilot). Postaccident examination of the elevator primary flight control system revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. Additionally, comparison of a postaccident photograph of the elevator position with the gust lock installed with the elevator position observed in a video of the accident takeoff roll indicated similar elevator positions: trailing edge down (airplane nose down), which was consistent with the pilot reported nose-down condition during the takeoff roll. Given this information, it is likely that the pilot had not removed the gust lock prior to initiating the takeoff, which resulted in his inability to rotate the airplane. A postaccident photograph of the gust lock also showed that it was missing a portion designed to cover the engine controls and prevent engine start with the lock installed. Although the airframe manufacturer had previously published a service bulletin pertaining to the gust lock, it was for a different reason and did not require an inspection to make sure a proper and complete device was available. Had the gust control lock been complete, it would have blocked the engine controls and provided the intended warning.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

Other NTSB records under N41VK the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time