Cessna 335 accident near Fort Lauderdale, Florida, December 1, 2018
On December 1, 2018 at about 6:27 pm local time, a 1980 Cessna 335, registered N79HP, was destroyed in an accident during initial climb near Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Fort Lauderdale Executive Airp airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's improper decision to fly the unairworthy airplane and his failure to feather the left propeller following a partial loss of power from the left engine after takeoff. Also causal was the partial loss of power to the left engine due to detonation.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- December 1, 2018 · about 6:27 pm local time
- Place
- Fort Lauderdale, Florida · Fort Lauderdale Executive Airp · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 335 No Series, built 1980 · all 335s on the register
- Registration
- N79HP · no longer on the register · serial 335-0047
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot and pilot-rated passenger were planning to conduct a repositioning flight. Shortly after takeoff, a video depicted white smoke trailing the airplane from the left engine. Subsequently the flight advised the tower controller that there was a fire in the left engine and the airplane was observed turning to the left to return to the airport. While maintaining controlled flight with the landing gear retracted and the left propeller in an unfeathered position, the airplane clipped the roof of a building adjacent to the airport, impacted the ground about 67 knots ground speed, and came to rest after impacting another building. A postimpact fire ensued. At ground impact, the left and right propellers were rotating about 900 rpm and 2,700 rpm, respectively. Postaccident examination of the left engine revealed detonation damage to several pistons, and the rod-oil gauge and cap assembly was not attached to the engine. Examination of the oil filler breather assembly revealed contact marks consistent with the rod-oil gauge and cap assembly coming out. There was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the right engine, propeller, or propeller governor. Although the flight reported a fire in the left engine compartment to air traffic control, and the video showed trailing smoke, it is likely the left engine’s damaged pistons allowed the crankcase to become pressurized and the missing rod-oil gauge and cap assembly allowed oil to exit the engine and contact either the exhaust or turbocharger exhaust duct, resulting in the smoke. Although the left propeller and propeller governor were heat damaged, there was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of either that would have precluded feathering of the propeller blades. The pilot's failure to feather the left propeller following the partial loss of left engine power resulted in a negative climb performance. Had the pilot feathered the left propeller following the partial loss of engine power, it is likely that a positive rate of climb could have been attained. The airplane had been flown once in the last several years before the accident pilot purchased it several months before the accident. Maintenance records located within the wreckage at the accident site revealed the airplane was deemed unairworthy during an annual inspection 6 months before the accident. The accident pilot then attempted to obtain a ferry permit for the airplane twice from the FAA; however, the FAA inspector did not approve the request due to maintenance discrepancies that were noted during his ramp inspection. After the second denial for a ferry permit, the pilot requested assistance from another maintenance facility. That facility initiated an inspection on the airplane; however, they stopped the inspection after over 100 discrepancies were noted, 9 of which were associated with the left engine. Acquaintances of the pilot stated that progress was made fixing the airplane over the next several months, although problems were still noted as recently as 3 weeks before the accident. The pilot reported that the costs of parking the airplane and his flights to and from where the airplane was located were mounting. On the morning of the accident, the pilot performed engine runs on the airplane and had borrowed some tools, although it could not be determined what maintenance, if any, he performed. The pilot’s unsuccessful attempts to obtain a ferry permit, the most-recent list of discrepancies identified by a maintenance facility during their inspection, and the fact that the airplane did not pass its annual inspection clearly indicated the airplane was not airworthy. The pilot's desire to reposition the airplane due to mounting costs likely influenced his decision to fly the unairworthy airplane.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (partial) during initial climb defining event
- Fire/smoke (non-impact) during initial climb
- Off-field or emergency landing during maneuvering
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent
- Fire/smoke (post-impact) during post (impact)
- Explosion (post-impact) during post (impact)
The NTSB's findings
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip eng cyl section › Damaged/degraded
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Propeller system › Propeller feather/reversing › Not used/operated
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 2,000 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
Pilot-Rated Passenger
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Flight time: 30 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,200.1 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, July 18, 2018
- Maximum gross weight: 5,990 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Continental TSIO-520-EB (piston); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Continenntal TSIO-520-EB (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: FXE Fort Lauderdale FL at 6:24 pm
- Destination: 01J Hilliard FL
- Flight plan: VFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 160° at 16 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 20,000 ft; scat at 3,200 ft
- Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 70°F (21°C)
- Altimeter: 29.97 inHg
- Observation at 5:53 pm from FLL, 8 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
27 documents, released by the NTSB on October 6, 2020. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
