Amateur-built RANS S-6ES COYOTE II accident near Rincon, Puerto Rico, February 19, 2015
On February 19, 2015 at about 10:35 pm local time, a 1994 amateur-built RANS S-6ES COYOTE II, registered N5196W, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering near Rincon, Puerto Rico. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed and 1 person had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The inadequate maintenance and inspection of the fuel system, which resulted in partial blockage of a fuel filter, a partial loss of engine power, and subsequent ditching.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 19, 2015 · about 10:35 pm local time
- Place
- Rincon, Puerto Rico · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed and 1 person had minor injuries.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Amateur-built RANS S-6ES COYOTE II, built 1994
- Registration
- N5196W · no longer on the register · serial 0492295
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The private pilot had just purchased the experimental, amateur-built airplane on the day of the accident following a short flight with the previous owner. The pilot purchased premium automobile gasoline at a local gas station and refueled the airplane for the flight to his home airport. He and his passenger then boarded the airplane and taxied for takeoff. After takeoff, the pilot climbed the airplane along the shoreline to about 1,000 ft above sea level. About 20 minutes into the flight, the pilot noticed that the engine was not producing enough power to sustain level flight, so he began to troubleshoot while he flew a course parallel to the shoreline over shallow water. Due to people and rocks along the shoreline, he decided not to land on the beach, but to ditch the airplane in the water. Upon touchdown, the airplane decelerated and sank. The pilot released his seatbelt, egressed, and swam to the surface. When the pilot reached the surface, he did not see his passenger. He swam back down to the wreckage, released the passenger's seatbelt, and swam him up to the surface. However, the passenger was not breathing and cardiopulmonary resuscitation was unsuccessful. Examination of the airplane's fuel system revealed that the single fuel filter located between the electric fuel pump and the primer plunger was full of sand and debris, which obstructed the mesh filter screen. The condition of the filter indicated that it was not being maintained and inspected regularly, even though the fuel filter had a transparent housing and was in a location that allowed it to be inspected easily. The airplane build manual, engine operator's manual, engine installation manual, and engine maintenance manual all called for frequent inspection of the fuel filter. According to the maintenance manual, the flow through the filter could be restricted due to long-term buildup of dirt, and the fuel filter should be inspected every 25 hours of operation and replaced every 100 hours of operation. Review of the airplane's maintenance records found no entries indicating the inspection or replacement of the fuel filter since 2009, when a new engine was installed. The airplane's most recent condition inspection was performed about 3 months before the accident.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Aircraft maintenance event during prior to flight
- Aircraft inspection event during prior to flight
- Loss of engine power (partial) during maneuvering defining event
- Ditching during emergency descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel filter › strainer › Not serviced/maintained
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Owner/builder
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Scheduled/routine inspection › Owner/builder
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Maintenance personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Flight time: 609 hours in all; 1 in this make and model
- Last flight review: November 17, 2014
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: frt
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 881.5 hours
- Last inspection: condition inspection, November 26, 2014
- Maximum gross weight: 1,320 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Rotax 582 (piston); 192 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: TJMZ Mayaguez PR at 10:15 pm
- Destination: TJMZ Mayaguez PR
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 310° at 9 knots
- Visibility: 7 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 2,100 ft; scat at 1,000 ft
- Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
- Altimeter: 29.98 inHg
- Observation at 9:50 pm from TJBQ, 11 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Other NTSB records under N5196W the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.