Let L 23 SUPER BLANIK and Let L 23 SUPER BLANIK accident near Warm Springs, Georgia, July 14, 2014
On July 14, 2014 at about 6:35 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Let L 23 SUPER BLANIK (N400AZ) and Let L 23 SUPER BLANIK (N342BA), were involved in the same accident near Warm Springs, Georgia (Roosevelt Memorial airport). No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of the flight instructor to move his glider from an active runway in accordance with procedures due to his distraction by having a conversation with the air boss, which resulted in the landing glider colliding with the glider on the runway.
The failure of the other flight instructor to move his glider from the active runway in accordance with procedures due to his distraction by having a conversation with the air boss, which resulted in the landing glider colliding with the glider on the runway.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 14, 2014 · about 6:35 pm local time
- Place
- Warm Springs, Georgia · Roosevelt Memorial · map
- Type
- Accident · collision on the ground
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Let L 23 SUPER BLANIK, built 1999 · all L 23 SUPER BLANIKs on the register
- Registration
- N400AZ · registry record · serial 998702
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
- Aircraft 2
- Let L 23 SUPER BLANIK, built 1999 · all L 23 SUPER BLANIKs on the register
- Registration
- N342BA · no longer on the register · serial 998418
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative for the Let L 23 SUPER BLANIK final · quoted from the NTSB record
A landing glider collided with another glider on the active runway. The flight instructor of the glider on the runway stated that he and the student pilot landed the glider and that it came to rest about 1,000 ft from the runway threshold. The instructor was having a conversation with the air boss while the glider was still on the runway when it was struck from behind by the landing glider. The air boss indicated that, during this conversation, he watched the second glider turn from the base to the final leg in the traffic pattern and then land. The flight instructor of the second glider stated that he and the student pilot landed just beyond the displaced threshold markers at the approach end of the runway and that both he and the student applied "maximum braking" but were unable to stop the glider before impacting the glider on the runway. According to both flight instructors, they had performed numerous landings that day in their respective gliders as part of the training requirements for the students. Both glider instructors reported no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with either glider that would have precluded normal operation. The Civil Air Patrol procedures stated that, after landing and coming to rest, each glider was to be removed from the runway and that at no time was a glider to be on the runway while another glider was landing. Federal Aviation Administration regulations and guidance indicated that the landing glider has the right-of-way over all aircraft on the surface and that, after landing, the pilot "should move or taxi the glider clear of all runways." Given that the air boss watched the landing glider turn from base to final leg in the traffic pattern while talking to the instructor in the glider on the runway, it is likely that the instructor would have had sufficient time to move the glider off the runway before the other glider landed, which would have prevented the accident. It is also likely that the instructor of the first glider was distracted by talking to the air boss and that neither he nor the air boss realized that the second glider was a concern until it was too late. The pilot of the glider on the runway should have moved the glider off the runway as soon as possible to allow the landing glider sufficient space to land without the possibility of a collision.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Let L 23 SUPER BLANIK final · quoted from the NTSB record
A landing glider collided with another glider on the active runway. The flight instructor of the glider on the runway stated that he and the student pilot landed the glider and that it came to rest about 1,000 ft from the runway threshold. The instructor was having a conversation with the air boss while the glider was still on the runway when it was struck from behind by the landing glider. The air boss indicated that, during this conversation, he watched the second glider turn from the base to the final leg in the traffic pattern and then land. The flight instructor of the second glider stated that he and the student pilot landed just beyond the displaced threshold markers at the approach end of the runway and that both he and the student applied "maximum braking" but were unable to stop the glider before impacting the glider on the runway. According to both flight instructors, they had performed numerous landings that day in their respective gliders as part of the training requirements for the students. Both glider instructors reported no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with either glider that would have precluded normal operation. The Civil Air Patrol procedures stated that, after landing and coming to rest, each glider was to be removed from the runway and that at no time was a glider to be on the runway while another glider was landing. Federal Aviation Administration regulations and guidance indicated that the landing glider has the right-of-way over all aircraft on the surface and that, after landing, the pilot "should move or taxi the glider clear of all runways." Given that the air boss watched the landing glider turn from base to final leg in the traffic pattern while talking to the instructor in the glider on the runway, it is likely that the instructor would have had sufficient time to move the glider off the runway before the other glider landed, which would have prevented the accident. It is also likely that the instructor of the first glider was distracted by talking to the air boss and that neither he nor the air boss realized that the second glider was a concern until it was too late. The pilot of the glider on the runway should have moved the glider off the runway as soon as possible to allow the landing glider sufficient space to land without the possibility of a collision.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Let L 23 SUPER BLANIK from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Ground collision during standing defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure › Instructor/check pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Instructor/check pilot
- factor Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Task monitoring/vigilance › Instructor/check pilot
Flight instructor
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: glider; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: glider
- Flight time: 2,105 hours in all; 205 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rear
- Injury: no injuries
Dual student
- Flight time: 1 hours in all; 1 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: None
- Seat: frt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 2,688 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, July 1, 2013
- Maximum gross weight: 1,124 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Operator: Civil Air Patrol INC
The flight
- Departed from: 5A9 Warm Springs GA at 6:23 pm
- Destination: 5A9 Warm Springs GA
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 36, 5,004 ft by 75 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 250° at 8 knots, gusting 14
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 5,000 ft
- Temperature: 95°F (35°C), dew point 75°F (24°C)
- Altimeter: 30.02 inHg
- Observation at 6:35 pm from KLGC, 19 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
The factual record for the Let L 23 SUPER BLANIK from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Ground collision during landing (landing roll) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure › Pilot of other aircraft
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Pilot of other aircraft
- factor Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Task monitoring/vigilance › Pilot of other aircraft
Flight instructor
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: glider; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: glider
- Flight time: 8,400 hours in all; 675 in this make and model; 46 in the last 90 days; 20 in the last 30 days; 7,900 as pilot in command; 2,650 on instruments
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rear
- Injury: no injuries
Dual student
- Flight time: 2 hours in all; 2 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: None
- Seat: frt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 998 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, May 22, 2014
- Maximum gross weight: 1,124 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Operator: Civil Air Patrol
The flight
- Departed from: 5A9 Warm Springs GA at 6:25 pm
- Destination: 5A9 Warm Springs GA
- Runway 36, 5,004 ft by 75 ft
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.