Canadair LTD CL-600-2B16 accident near Hallandale, Florida, May 23, 2012
On May 23, 2012 at about 7:47 pm local time, a Canadair LTD CL-600-2B16, registered N207JB, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Hallandale, Florida (Ft Lauderdale-Hollywood Intl airport). It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of the co-pilot to properly close and latch the passenger door before departure, and the flight crew's failure to ensure that the door was secure by using the door warning system. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew's inadequate use of checklists.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 23, 2012 · about 7:47 pm local time · cases in 2012
- Place
- Hallandale, Florida · Ft Lauderdale-Hollywood Intl · cases near this airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Canadair LTD CL-600-2B16
- Registration
- N207JB · registry record · serial 5194
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
About 3 minutes into the positioning flight, at 3,000 feet, the flight crew heard a "loud bang" and became aware that the main passenger door had separated from the airplane. The pilot declared an emergency, diverted to a nearby airport, and landed without further incident. The separated passenger door was subsequently found on a nearby golf course. The co-pilot reported in a written statement that he closed the main passenger door and checked for a green light to ensure that it was secure. In a subsequent interview, he reported that he "believed" that the door warning lights were working, but he could not positively recall seeing the "Door Safe" light illuminated after closing the door. He also did not remember activating the "Recall" switch before takeoff. Ramp security video showed that the main passenger door appeared to close; it then re-opened momentarily and closed again before the airplane taxied out of the ramp area. The co-pilot reported that he re-closed the door because it did not secure on the first attempt. An examination of the recovered door and the door frame did not reveal evidence of a pre-existing mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation. The top half of the door was crushed from the impact with the ground, which prevented establishing the condition of door rigging before the accident. An examination of the fuselage revealed a skin puncture that matched the location of the door pull-out handle and is consistent with the door being in the open position when the puncture occurred. Although the door's external handle was found in the closed position, smudging on the fuselage was consistent with the handle's movement from the open to the closed position during impact with the fuselage. Although it is apparent from the cockpit voice recording that the flight crew referenced the pilot checklist at some stages during ground operations, crew challenge and response items were sporadically mentioned. After the sound of the passenger door closing, neither crewmember mentioned the door warning lights. At no point during ground operations through the takeoff sequence were the doors, door warning lights, or master caution system mentioned. The co-pilot mentioned the "Annunciator" check in the Before Takeoff checklist; however, no "Recall" response was noted on the recording. Activating the recall switch would have alerted the flight crew to an unsecured door before takeoff.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Part(s) separation from AC during enroute (cruise) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Doors › Passenger/crew doors › Incorrect use/operation other cases naming the airframe structure
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Flight crew
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › (general) › Copilot
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of checklist › Flight crew
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 12,300 hours in all; 3,500 in this make and model; 75 in the last 90 days; 9,000 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 2,550 hours in all; 65 in this make and model; 61 in the last 90 days; 25 in the last 30 days; 1,400 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: November 14, 2011
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,966 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, March 1, 2012
- Maximum gross weight: 45,100 lb
- Seats: 11
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: General Electric CF34 Series (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: General Electric CF34 Series (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Majestic Jet Inc.
The flight
- Departed from: OPF Opa Locka FL at 7:43 pm
- Destination: Pompano Beach FL
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 10L, 9,000 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 110° at 10 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds at 2,000 ft
- Temperature: 82°F (28°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
- Altimeter: 29.87 inHg
- Observation at 7:50 pm from FLL, 5 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
15 documents, released by the NTSB on September 26, 2013. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Other NTSB records under N207JB the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N207JB on the register today · the tail number may have moved to another aircraft since
- Engine: General Electric CF34 Series 672 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Engine: General Electric CF34 Series 672 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International · nearest airport
- Miami-Opa Locka Executive · departed from
- Accidents and incidents in Florida 6,111 since 1982 · 984 in the last ten years
- Florida 21,709 aircraft registered
- Other NTSB records under N207JB 1 records · the number may have belonged to another aircraft at the time
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA12LA356.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
