Boeing 717-200 accident near Inverness, Florida, August 27, 2009
On August 27, 2009 at about 8:03 pm local time, a Boeing 717-200, registered N994AT, was involved in an accident during enroute (climb to cruise) near Inverness, Florida. It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). 1 person was seriously injured; 85 others were unhurt. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The flight crew's encounter with convective turbulence. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the operator's dispatch department to provide the flightcrew with current adverse weather information along the planned route of flight. Also contributing was the failure of the flightcrew to provide relevant forecast information to the cabin crew, and their failure to detect and avoid the existing convective conditions.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 12, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 27, 2009 · about 8:03 pm local time · cases in 2009
- Place
- Inverness, Florida · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was seriously injured; 85 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Boeing 717-200 · all 717-200s on the register
- Registration
- N994AT · registry record · serial 55138
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The scheduled passenger flight was climbing through 25,000 feet when it encountered convective turbulence in daytime instrument meteorological conditions. A flight attendant, who was servicing the aft cabin, sustained leg and ankle fractures when her service cart became airborne and struck her in the leg. Both the flight and cabin crew members stated that the turbulence was unexpected. The National Weather Service (NWS) had issued multiple, sequential warnings of significant meteorological activity (SIGMETs) regarding the potential for thunderstorms and turbulence along the flight's planned route. The operator's dispatch department provided the flightcrew with a SIGMET that was valid until about one hour before the scheduled departure time. Contrary to operator and regulatory requirements, the dispatch department did not provide the flight crew with updated, current information, which included two new SIGMETs, one of which was issued an hour before the scheduled departure time, and all of which were similar in content and coverage area. The flight crew did not check with dispatch to determine whether any SIGMETS were current for the planned departure time. None of the air traffic controllers who handled the flight prior to the event relayed any hazardous weather information to the flight, despite their requirement to do so. Correlation of meteorological and flight path data indicated that the turbulence encounter occurred when the airplane penetrated a continuous line of thunderstorms that was present in the SIGMET coverage area. Strong radar echoes, indicative of potential turbulence, were detected below the airplane's altitude by ground-based weather radar. Review of the operator's flight and cabin crew guidance revealed that the procedures incorporated some of the latest industry strategies for mitigating turbulence hazards, but did not provide the flight attendants with the recommended level of autonomy when it came to decisions about when to provide service, or how to prioritize tasks, in the event of turbulence. Although hindered by the failure of the dispatch department to provide them with current SIGMETs, given the previous SIGMET and forecast for significant thunderstorms along the route, and atmospheric activity that was likely readily detectable by the airplane's onboard weather radar, the flightcrew could have anticipated the turbulence, and the flight attendants could have either been instructed to remain seated, or been provided with sufficient information to decide on their own, until the airplane was clear of the hazard area.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Turbulence encounter during enroute (climb to cruise) defining event
- Cabin safety event during enroute (climb to cruise)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Turbulence › Convective turbulence › Effect on operation
- cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Turbulence › Convective turbulence › Awareness of condition
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Weather planning › Flt operations/dispatcher
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › Flt operations/dispatcher
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of available resources › Flight crew
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › Flight crew
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › ATC personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 18,700 hours in all; 5,000 in this make and model; 197 in the last 90 days; 83 in the last 30 days; 9,000 as pilot in command; 0 on instruments
- Last flight review: June 5, 2009
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 10,000 hours in all; 3,000 in this make and model; 257 in the last 90 days; 101 in the last 30 days; 5,000 as pilot in command; 800 on instruments
- Last flight review: September 28, 2008
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme
- Maximum gross weight: 121,000 lb
- Seats: 123
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Rolls-Royc BR 700 SERIES (turbojet); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Rolls-Royc BR 700 SERIES (turbojet); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: TPA Tampa FL at 7:49 pm
- Destination: ATL Atlanta GA
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 0 statute miles
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
- Altimeter: 29.92 inHg
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 1 | 2 | ||
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 81 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
22 documents, released by the NTSB on April 25, 2011. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N994AT on the register today · the tail number may have moved to another aircraft since
- Boeing 717 111 registered today · the model family and its accident history
- Boeing 6,672 aircraft on the register
- Engine: Rolls-Royc BR 700 SERIES 345 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Engine: Rolls-Royc BR 700 SERIES 345 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Tampa International · departed from
- Hartsfield/Jackson Atlanta International · bound for
- Accidents and incidents in Florida 6,103 since 1982 · 984 in the last ten years
- Florida 21,706 aircraft registered
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA09LA488.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
