Lindstrand 105A and DJI Mavic mid-air collision near Driggs, Idaho, August 10, 2018
On August 10, 2018 at about 12:40 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Lindstrand 105A (N1410C) and DJI Mavic (UNREG), were involved in a mid-air collision near Driggs, Idaho (Driggs airport). No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
the drone pilot's decision to fly without pre-coordination, and without the requisite skills and knowledge, to maneuver the drone in close proximity to another aircraft.
the drone pilot's decision to fly without pre-coordination, and without the requisite skills and knowledge, to maneuver the drone in close proximity to another aircraft.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 10, 2018 · about 12:40 pm local time
- Place
- Driggs, Idaho · Driggs · map
- Type
- Incident · mid-air collision
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Lindstrand 105A No Series, built 2006
- Registration
- N1410C · registry record · serial 5345
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
- Aircraft 2
- DJI Mavic 1P, built 2018
- Registration
- UNREG · no longer on the register · serial 08rde7m001020r
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Flight · small-drone rules (Part 107)
The NTSB's narrative for the Lindstrand 105A final · quoted from the NTSB record
The hot air balloon was operating under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91 as a commercial passenger sightseeing flight, under visual flight rules, within Class G airspace. The pilot saw the sUAS (drone) maneuvering in the area just prior to the collision. There was no opportunity or ability for the balloon pilot to avoid the drone. There was no evidence of any mechanical or software problems with the drone relevant to the flight. The pilot did not report any anomalies, and his narrative was in general agreement with the recorded logs and video. The drone operated as expected at all times. The Active Track feature occasionally lost lock on the camera target (the balloon), however, that was not unexpected given the nature of how the tracking feature operates and the visual appearance of the balloon envelope. The drone control app correctly and appropriately warned the pilot of the loss of Active Track lock. The drone remained connected with the remote controller and was controllable by the pilot at all times. The drone pilot initiated his flight within 5 miles of an airport without notifying the airport authority, contrary to the provisions of 14 CFR 101.41. The drone pilot was unaware of safe operating practices developed by any community-based model aircraft organization, and unaware of the requirement in 14 CFR 101.41 to at all times give way to manned aircraft. The pilot's flying skills were not sufficient to operate in proximity to another aircraft, namely the balloon, and he flew in proximity without coordination with the balloon pilot. The DJO GO control app gave the pilot numerous indications of losing track on the Active Track feature and initiation of Obstacle Avoidance feature, however, he continued to fly in close proximity to the balloon.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the DJI Mavic final · quoted from the NTSB record
The hot air balloon was operating under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91 as a commercial passenger sightseeing flight, under visual flight rules, within Class G airspace. The pilot saw the sUAS (drone) maneuvering in the area just prior to the collision. There was no opportunity or ability for the balloon pilot to avoid the drone. There was no evidence of any mechanical or software problems with the drone relevant to the flight. The pilot did not report any anomalies, and his narrative was in general agreement with the recorded logs and video. The drone operated as expected at all times. The Active Track feature occasionally lost lock on the camera target (the balloon), however that was not unexpected given the nature of how the tracking feature operates and the visual appearance of the balloon envelope. The drone control app correctly and appropriately warned the pilot of the loss of Active Track lock. The drone remained connected with the remote controller and was controllable by the pilot at all times. The drone pilot initiated his flight within 5 miles of an airport without notifying the airport authority, contrary to the provisions of 14 CFR 101.41. The drone pilot was unaware of safe operating practices developed by any community-based model aircraft organization, and unaware of the requirement in 14 CFR 101.41 to at all times give way to manned aircraft. The pilot's flying skills were not sufficient to operate in proximity to another aircraft, namely the balloon, and he flew in proximity without coordination with the balloon pilot. The DJO GO control app gave the pilot numerous indications of losing track on the Active Track feature and initiation of Obstacle Avoidance feature, however he continued to fly in close proximity to the balloon.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Lindstrand 105A from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during enroute (climb to cruise) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot of other aircraft
- cause Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of regulatory reqs › Pilot of other aircraft
The aircraft
- Landing gear: fixed
The flight
- Departed from: KDIJ Driggs ID at 12:35 pm
- Destination: KDIJ Driggs ID
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
- Observation at 5:55 am from DIJ
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 2 |
The factual record for the DJI Mavic from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during maneuvering defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of regulatory reqs › Pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot
The aircraft
- Seats: 0
- Landing gear: fixed
The flight
- Departed from: KDIJ Driggs ID
- Destination: KDIJ Driggs ID
- Flight plan: none
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.
Other NTSB records under N1410C the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
2006-06-15DFW06CA161 · accident near Frisco, TX · substantial damage · no injuries
1989-01-04MIA89TL#02 · accident near Orlando, FL · fatal
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.