Mcdonnell Douglas MD 10-10F accident near Fort Lauderdale, Florida, October 28, 2016
On October 28, 2016 at about 9:51 pm local time, a 1972 Mcdonnell Douglas MD 10-10F, registered N370FE, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (landing roll) near Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood Intl airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of the left main landing gear (MLG) due to fatigue cracking that initiated at a corrosion pit. The pit formed in the absence of a required protective cadmium coating the cause of which could not be determined from available evidence. Contributing to the failure of the left MLG was the operator's overhaul limit, which exceeded that recommended by the airplane manufacturer without sufficient data and analysis to ensure crack detection before it progressed to failure.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 28, 2016 · about 9:51 pm local time
- Place
- Fort Lauderdale, Florida · Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood Intl · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Mcdonnell Douglas MD 10-10F 10F, built 1972 · all MD 10-10Fs on the register
- Registration
- N370FE · no longer on the register · serial 46608
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
On October 28, 2016, about 1751 eastern daylight time, FedEx Express (FedEx) flight 910, a McDonnell Douglas MD-10-10F, N370FE, experienced a left main landing gear (MLG) collapse after landing on runway 10L at Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport (KFLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and the left wing subsequently caught fire. The airplane came to rest off the left side of the runway. As the flight crew was preparing to evacuate, the nearly empty left main fuel tank exploded after the exterior surfaces were heated by burning fuel, which flowed from a broken fuel supply tube in the left engine pylon. The two flight crewmembers evacuated the airplane, and the captain sustained minor injuries during the evacuation. The first officer was not injured. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The first officer, who was the pilot flying the cargo flight, conducted an approach and landing that were stabilized and within specified limits. Although crosswind conditions were present at the time the airplane landed, the weather did not affect the landing. The application of braking by the flight crew did not initiate or contribute to the landing gear fracture. A review of the status of all applicable airworthiness directives and service bulletins for the airplane, powerplants, and appliances found no discrepancies. Metallurgical examination of a 3-by-3-inch fragment of the left MLG cylinder (see images B and C in figure 1) and the mating fracture region on the largest piece of the fractured left MLG (see figure 2) found indications consistent with overstress fracture having emanated from the air filler valve bore. The overstress features emanated from a small thumbnail crack, located at the radius between the cylinder inner diameter surface and the air filler valve bore surface. This thumbnail crack was observed on both mating fracture surfaces of the MLG and the 3-by-3-inch fragment, and it exhibited features (such as crack arrest marks) consistent with a pre-existing crack that progressed to fracture of the MLG. The observed features in the initiation region of the thumbnail crack were found to be consistent with fatigue cracking, as exhibited by the fatigue striations observed during microscopic examination. Later propagation regions of the thumbnail crack revealed features consistent with mixed mode fatigue, overstress, and intergranular fracture. These findings confirmed that once the crack progressed to a critical length, the left MLG cylinder fractured in overstress due to the loads imposed during landing. Figure 1. A diagram of an MD-10-10F left MLG (A), photograph of the 3-by-3-inch fragment from the lower section of the accident left MLG cylinder (B), and closer view of the region pointed out in image B (C). Figure 2. Photographs of largest piece of fractured left MLG pointing to the crack initiation site (top) and a closer view of the crack initiation site, with a yellow dashed line highlighting the mating thumbnail crack (bottom). The most prominent quality of the crack initiation site was a feature consistent with a corrosion pit. No indications of nickel, chrome, or cadmium plating were found at the radius or along the smooth sections of the air filler valve bore, as stipulated by maintenance instructions. The absence of a protective coating, over time, could lead to corrosion pitting. Any corrosion pitting or mechanical damage to the protective coating incurred during maintenance can lead to fatigue cracking. Figure 3. Closer view of the primary fatigue crack region (highlighted by the dashed yellow line) and the region of mixed-mode crack propagation (highlighted by the dashed blue line). The MLG's last overhaul was completed on February 28, 2008, during which the air filler valve bore was inspected per Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) DC10-32A259. This ASB (which was prompted by an MLG collapse on a FedEx MD-10-10F in 2006 and indicated that stray plating, if present, can enhance local corrosion under the edge of the plating in and around the bore) instructed operators to inspect the air filler valve bore for stray nickel or chrome electroplating deposits, corrosion, or cracks to prevent fatigue failure of the cylinder. Although neither stray plating nor cracks were found as part of the ASB inspection, corrosion repair was completed on the accident cylinder, and it underwent brush cadmium plating per maintenance instructions before being returned to service. It was not possible to determine whether cadmium plating applied during the last overhaul did not properly bond to the bore surface, was removed during later maintenance, or wore off over time because there is no routine procedure to effectively inspect this area during on-wing maintenance activities conducted since the last MLG overhaul. To be effective, it is critical that a protective coating be uniform, adherent, and complete when applied in areas known to be susceptible to pitting corrosion. Finite element analysis of this MLG cylinder (conducted using the same method, tools, and format as those used in the investigation of the 2006 event) concluded that residual stress levels at the corrosion pit were sufficiently high to promote crack propagation leading to full fracture of the cylinder barrel. Since the accident, the maintenance facility that performed the last MLG cylinder overhaul has introduced a tank dip method for plating air filler valve bores, which provides improved uniformity, adherence, and coverage over the brush plating method. The manufacturer-recommended overhaul limit for the MLG assembly is every 8 years or 7,500 flight cycles, whichever occurs first. At the time of the accident, FedEx's MLG overhaul limit was 9 years or 30,000 flight hours, whichever occurred first, and the left MLG outer cylinder on the accident airplane was 152 days away from its next required overhaul. FedEx reportedly adopted the 9-year overhaul interval used by the previous owner/operator of the first DC10s it purchased. The company produced no documentation or data analysis supporting the longer overhaul interval. Following this accident, FedEx inspected all MLGs in its MD-10-10F fleet (27 in-service airplanes and 54 MLG). Sixteen cylinders were identified as "concerns" and were permanently removed from service. After reviewing its maintenance program, FedEx reverted to an 8-year overhaul limit for MLG cylinders, as recommended by the manufacturer. The NTSB notes that if FedEx had not adopted an overhaul limit that exceeded the manufacturer's recommendation, the fatigue crack in the accident MLG cylinder, which was last overhauled 8.5 years before the accident, likely would have been detected and addressed before it could progress to failure.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Miscellaneous/other during prior to flight
- Landing gear collapse during landing (landing roll) defining event
- Runway excursion during landing (landing roll)
- Fire/smoke (post-impact) during post (impact)
- Explosion (post-impact) during post (impact)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Main landing gear › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Main landing gear › Inadequate inspection
- factor Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Operator
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 10,000 hours in all; 1,443 in this make and model
- Last flight review: October 9, 2016
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 6,300 hours in all; 1,244 in this make and model
- Last flight review: July 20, 2016
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 84,589.0 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, September 21, 2016
- Maximum gross weight: 440,000 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: General Electric CF6-6D (turbofan); 67,044 hours total
- Engine 2: General Electric CF6-6D (turbofan); 65,061 hours total
- Engine 3: General Electric CF6-6D (turbofan); 68,711 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: KMEM Memphis TN at 8:00 pm
- Destination: FLL Fort Lauderdale FL
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 10L, 9,000 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 050° at 15 knots, gusting 24
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 4,100 ft; a few clouds at 2,100 ft
- Temperature: 79°F (26°C), dew point 70°F (21°C)
- Altimeter: 29.98 inHg
- Observation at 9:53 pm from KFLL
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
19 documents, released by the NTSB on July 17, 2018. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
