Airbus A319-112 accident near Fort Lauderdale, Florida, May 10, 2012
On May 10, 2012 at about 5:53 pm local time, a Airbus A319-112, registered N951FR, was involved in an accident during enroute (descent) near Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Fort Lauderdale airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). 1 person was seriously injured; 143 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
an inadvertent encounter with convectively induced turbulence developing upwards into the flight path, which was not detected on weather radar as configured by the crew. Contributing to the delay in emergency medical personnel notification was the incomplete coordination of paramedic response by air traffic control and ineffective communications monitoring by Frontier Airlines.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 10, 2012 · about 5:53 pm local time
- Place
- Fort Lauderdale, Florida · Fort Lauderdale · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was seriously injured; 143 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Airbus A319-112 · all A319-112s on the register
- Registration
- N951FR · no longer on the register · serial 4127
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
On May 10, 2012, at 1224 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) an Airbus 319, registration N951FR, operated by Frontier Airlines as flight 384, encountered turbulence resulting in serious injuries to a flight attendant during descent into the Fort Lauderdale Airport (FLL). The flight was descending through 12,400 feet about 45 miles west of FLL at the time of the encounter. The airplane was not damaged. The flight crew reported that on initial descent into the Fort Lauderdale area they noticed typical Florida summertime cumulus cloud conditions. About 20 minutes before the event, the Captain appropriately briefed the flight attendants to prepare the cabin for landing early and to be seated after completing the initial clean-up. The flight crew subsequently illuminated the seat belt sign during the descent. The flight attendants were still in the process of preparing the cabin for landing when the turbulence was encountered. During descent, the airplane passed in and out of cloud formations. The crew described, and CVR data is consistent with, passing out of a cloud and noticing a larger developing cumulus in front of them. The autopilot and autothrust were engaged. The crew reported that the radar did not indicate any echoes ahead of them. The Airbus weather radar system includes a Turbulence detection function, which was not used by the crew. The Airbus flight crew training manual describes effective mode, range, and tilt settings for detecting “wet” (convective) turbulence. As the airplane passed into the cumulus development, the airplane encountered convectively induced turbulence, resulting in a peak vertical acceleration of about +2 G and -0.5 G. The activity was likely developing upwards, possibly below the field of view of the radar, and into the flight path. As a result of the injuries to the forward flight attendant, the flight crew advised ATC that they had an injured crew member and requested priority handling and for paramedics to meet the airplane on arrival. The ATC approach controller did not forward the request for paramedics. The crew also attempted to contact the company station agents and dispatch, but received no response. The lack of ATC coordination, and lack of company personnel to monitor communications from inbound flights, delayed the arrival of emergency medical personnel to meet the flight.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Turbulence encounter during enroute (descent) defining event
- Cabin safety event during enroute (descent)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Turbulence › Convective turbulence › Effect on personnel
- factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Navigation system › Weather radar system › Incorrect use/operation
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Forgotten action/omission › ATC personnel
- Organizational issues › Management › Resources › Availability of personnel › Operator
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 7,586 hours in all; 7,297 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 1
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Seats: 100
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Cfm Intl CFM56-5B6 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Cfm Intl CFM56-5B6 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Frontier Airlines INC
The flight
- Departed from: DEN Denver CO
- Destination: FLL Fort Lauderdale FL
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 1 | 2 | ||
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| LapC | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 138 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
