Cirrus SR22 accident near Hoagland, Indiana, September 13, 2019
On September 13, 2019 at about 7:45 pm local time, a 2009 Cirrus SR22, registered N578SP, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute near Hoagland, Indiana (Fort Wayne Intl airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people had minor injuries. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A catastrophic engine failure and forced landing due to the separation of the No. 1 connecting rod as a result of migration of the connecting rod piston pin bushing. Contributing to the accident was the mechanic’s failure to follow manufacturer guidance during the most recent oil change, which likely would have detected bushing material lost from the rod piston pin, which would have indicated impending migration and connecting rod failure.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 13, 2019 · about 7:45 pm local time · cases in 2019
- Place
- Hoagland, Indiana · Fort Wayne Intl · cases near this airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people had minor injuries.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Cirrus SR22 Undesignat, built 2009 · all SR22s on the register
- Registration
- N578SP · no longer on the register · serial 3578
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The private pilot was conducting an instrument flight rules cross-country flight. While en route, the engine began to lose oil pressure, and the pilot diverted to a nearby airport. An inspection after landing revealed that the engine contained adequate oil and there was no evidence of oil leaking. The oil pressure and temperature indicated normally during a subsequent engine test run, and the pilot continued the flight to his destination. After about 40 minutes of flight, the engine abruptly lost total power and the pilot activated the airframe parachute system upon realizing that the airplane was not within gliding distance of an airport. The airplane came to rest upright in a field. The forward fuselage, two engine mounts, and both wings sustained substantial damage. The accident occurred about 2 months and 17 flight hours after the airplane's most recent annual inspection, during which the engine oil filter was cut open and no abnormalities were noted. The engine oil was subsequently changed about 1 month and 8.5 flight hours before the accident. The mechanic who performed the oil change reported that the engine was not equipped with a magnetic engine oil drain plug and that he did not cut open and examine the oil filter element, although the maintenance manual stated that oil screens and filter elements should be examined for contaminants at each oil change. The accident engine was equipped with a magnetic drain plug; however, postaccident examination revealed that the quick drain coupling and the magnetic oil drain plug were switched from their respective locations. Because of the switch, on removal of the plug to drain the oil, the mechanic most-likely wouldn’t have seen any indication of bushing material. Additionally, the manufacturer had issued a service bulletin advising that the magnetic drain plug be examined for recovered bushing material. A postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the No. 1 connecting rod separated from its piston and crankshaft and was found in the oil sump. Its bushing was not present; however, its piston pin was found in place. The No. 1 connecting rod bearing end components and sections of its bearing were found within the sump. Ferrous material was found on the magnetic oil drain plug and debris was found on the oil filter material. The piston pin bushings in the Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 6 connecting rods were displaced. The Nos. 2, 3, and 4 connecting rod bushings were chipped. The split lines for the Nos. 2, 3, and 4 bushings were found not clocked in accordance with manufacturer specifications. Although the reason for the piston pin migration could not be determined, it is likely that the impending migration and connecting rod failure may have been detected during the most recent oil change if the mechanic had followed the manufacturer's guidance to inspect the oil filter element and magnetic drain plug. Following the accident, the engine manufacturer issued a maintenance manual revision and a critical service bulletin that directed enhanced screening of oil and removing the non-magnetic oil plug or quick drain coupling and installing a magnetic drain plug in the oil sump to attract and collect ferrous wear particulate and larger particles.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (total) during enroute defining event
- Miscellaneous/other during emergency descent
- Aircraft maintenance event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip engine power section › Failure other cases naming the engine
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Maintenance personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 641.2 hours in all; 553.7 in this make and model; 22 in the last 90 days; 2 in the last 30 days; 560.9 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: March 28, 2019
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,248 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, July 26, 2019
- Maximum gross weight: 3,400 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Continental IO-550-N (piston); 1,199 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: KFDY Findlay OH at 3:15 pm
- Destination: KSBN South Bend IN
- Flight plan: IFR
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 240° at 17 knots, gusting 28
- Visibility: 0.8 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 7,000 ft; scat at 4,300 ft
- Temperature: 79°F (26°C), dew point 73°F (23°C)
- Altimeter: 30.02 inHg
- Observation at 7:37 pm from FWA, 9 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Photographs from the investigation 40 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them
Photo 1 – View of the top of the engine at the accident site. Both magnetos are displaced from their designated locations.
Photo 2 - View of the right side of the empennage in a recovery facility. A computer is viewed performing an RDM download.
Photo 3 - View inside of the right side of the empennage. A port is viewed through which an RDM download is being conducted.
Photo 4 - View of the engine mounted on a crate for shipment for a disassembly examination.
Photo 5 - Close up view of a hole in the crankcase above the No. 1 cylinder.
Photo 6 - View of the Hobbs and flight time meters. The Hobbs indicates 3,908.9 hours and the flight indicates 3,254.8 hours.
Photo 7 - View of the engine as received for the disassembly examination.
Photo 8 - View of the partially disassembled engine on a motor stand.
Photo 9 - Close up view of the oil pressure adjustment.
Photo 10 - Close up view of the oil pump cavity. No marks consistent with passage of hard particles are observed on the cavity's walls.
Photo 11 - Close up view of the oil pump's drive and driven gears. No marks are observed on the gear's surfaces.
Photo 12 - View of the oil sump pan as it is being removed.
Photo 13 - View of the crankcase area below the No. 1 and 2 cylinders. Sections of the crankcase structure there are displaced, and the camshaft is bent.
Photo 14 - Close up view of the connecting rod from the No. 1 cylinder.
Photo 15 - View of the piston inside the No. 1 cylinder.
Photo 16 - View of the removed cylinders.
Photo 17 - Close up view of the bent camshaft.
Photo 18 - View of the removed crankshaft and connecting rods.
Photo 19 - Close up view of the magnetic plug from the oil sump pan.
Photo 20 - Magnified view of particles attached to the magnetic plug from the oil sump pan.
Photo 21 – View of the pickup tube from the oil sump area.
Photo 22 - View of media from the oil sump pan.
Photo 23 - View of media removed from the sump pan using a magnet.
Photo 24 - View of the cut open oil filter. Particles are observed on the internal side of the filter base.
Photo 25 - View of the removed filter element from the oil filter. Particles are observed on the pleats within the element.
Photo 26 - View of the oil filter contents being poured into a sample container.
Photo 27 - View of the contents of the oil filter being drained in to the sample container.
Photo 28 - View of a connecting rod being measured.
Photo 29 - View of a setup to measure the pressure required to displace connecting rod bushings.
Photo 30 - View of a setup to measure the pressure required to displace connecting rod bushings.
Photo 31 – Supplied close up view of the No. 1 connecting rod and a separated section of its rod end.
Photo 32 - View of the disassembled engine being crated for return shipment.
Photo 33 - View of the disassembled engine being crated for return shipment.
Photo 34 – Supplied close up view of removed sparkplugs.
Photo 35 – Supplied close up view of the crankcase under the No. 1 cylinder.
Photo 36 – Supplied view of the oil sump pan. An end of a connecting rod is observed in a hole in the pan.
Photo 37 – Supplied view of the left magneto. The magneto exhibits damage witness marks.
Photo 38 – Supplied close up view of the No. 6 connecting rod. Its bushing is displaced.
Photo 39 – Supplied close up view of the No. 6 connecting rod. Its bushing split is marked.
Photo 40 – Supplied view inside the No. 1 cylinder.The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
28 documents, released by the NTSB on January 19, 2021. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N578SP: not on the register today · the record of its deregistration
- Cirrus SR22 7,129 registered today · the model family and its accident history
- Engine: Continental IO-550-N 2,790 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Fort Wayne International · nearest airport
- Findlay Airport · departed from
- South Bend International · bound for
- Accidents and incidents in Indiana 1,367 since 1982 · 179 in the last ten years
- Indiana 5,705 aircraft registered
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/CEN19LA320.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
