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Accidents · NTSB ANC20FA024 · Final report

Cessna 305 accident near Mokuleia, Hawaii, February 22, 2020

On February 22, 2020 at about 7:20 pm local time, a 1979 Cessna 305, registered N65070, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Mokuleia, Hawaii (Dillingham Airfield). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

A separation of the left rudder cable due to inadequate maintenance, which resulted in an in-flight loss of control and impact with terrain.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
February 22, 2020 · about 7:20 pm local time · cases in 2020
Place
Mokuleia, Hawaii · Dillingham Airfield · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cessna 305 A, built 1979 · all 305s on the register
Registration
N65070 · registry record · serial 2035
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The flight instructor was providing familiarization training to the airline transport pilot in the tailwheel-equipped airplane. Witnesses saw the airplane land hard; the pilots shut down the engine on the runway, the instructor got out and inspected the airplane, then boarded the airplane again and the pilots subsequently departed. The witnesses stated that, upon becoming airborne, the airplane entered a significant right yaw over the runway. The airplane continued to the right and subsequently impacted terrain about 1,000 ft from the runway. Examination of the engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the airframe revealed that the left rudder cable was separated at the rudder pulley area behind the rear seat floor and displayed a combination of severely frayed and fractured strands with tension overload signatures. There was evidence of cable abrasions and rubbing in the area of the pulley bracket. A detailed examination of the cable fractures revealed that only 16 of the 133 total wires that comprised the cable were intact before they failed in overload, resulting in cable separation. The remainder of the cable strand wires were either degraded, shortened, or bent, indicative of abnormal cable contact and abrasion. Although the aileron and elevator control cables were continuous or displayed indications of overload separation due to impact, all of the cables exhibited areas of fraying and extensive wear. The most recent documented maintenance was a 100-hour inspection completed 5 months before the accident. The mechanic who had been responsible for maintaining the airplane for the previous 2 years stated that he cleaned, inspected, and lubricated the flight control cables during the inspection; however, the debris in the under-floor compartment, excessive black grease deposits, significant wear and fractured wires of each control cable were indicative of wear that had occurred over a period of time that should have been observed and rectified during previous inspections. Based on witness statements and examination of the wreckage, the pilots experienced a loss of yaw control after takeoff due to an overload separation of the left rudder cable and were unable to regain adequate control to land safely. Although when the separation occurred could not be determined, it is possible that the hard landing just before the accident takeoff may have caused the already degraded rudder cable to be displaced and encounter excessive stress loads in the pulley area.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control in flight during initial climb defining event
  2. Flight control sys malf/fail during initial climb
  3. Aircraft maintenance event during prior to flight
  4. Flight control sys malf/fail during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Rudder control system › Not serviced/maintained other cases naming the flight controls
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Rudder control system › Fatigue/wear/corrosion other cases naming the flight controls
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Maintenance personnel
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Yaw control › Attain/maintain not possible

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot, flight engineer
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: glider; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: glider
  • Flight time: 5,000 hours in all; 2,000 in this make and model
  • Medical certificate: BasicMed
  • Seat: rear
  • Injury: fatal

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 17,500 hours in all; 1 in this make and model
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: frt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, September 16, 2019; 120 hours since
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Continental O-470 (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: HDH Mokuleia HI at 7:15 pm
  • Destination: HDH Mokuleia HI
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 08, 9,007 ft by 75 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 120° at 5 knots
  • Visibility: 8 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 70°F (21°C), dew point 66°F (19°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.14 inHg
  • Observation at 9:24 pm from PHHI, 11 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

11 documents, released by the NTSB on November 16, 2021. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Materials Laboratory Factual Report 20-037 PDF, 10 pages · our copy View Download
2 Witness Statements PDF, 7 pages · our copy View Download
3 Airplane Owner Statement PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
4 Mechanic Record of Conversation PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
5 Law Enforcement Statements PDF, 5 pages · our copy View Download
6 Honolulu Soaring Pilot Statements PDF, 5 pages · our copy View Download
7 NTSB Examination Summary PDF, 9 pages · our copy View Download
8 Flight Instructor Autopsy Memo (Enoka) PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
9 Pilot Autopsy Memo (Rogers) PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
10 Toxicology Front Seat Pilot PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
11 Toxicology Rear Seat Pilot PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download

The same docket at the NTSB.

Other NTSB records under N65070 the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time

2013-11-07WPR14LA045 · accident near Mokuleia, HI · substantial damage · minor injuries

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

Aircraft
Place
Record

The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ANC20FA024.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.