The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily · Carbon Free Flight by 2050
Accidents · NTSB WPR25FA090 · Final report

Beech B24R accident near Skull Valley, Utah, February 10, 2025

On February 10, 2025 at about 9:55 pm local time, a 1975 Beech B24R, registered N9324S, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Skull Valley, Utah. It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

Preview. This page is not yet listed for search engines.

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The flight instructor’s improper fuel management, which resulted in fuel starvation and a total loss of engine power. Contributing to the accident were multiple distractions that diverted the flight instructor’s attention from the proper monitoring and management of the fuel load.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
February 10, 2025 · about 9:55 pm local time
Place
Skull Valley, Utah · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Beech B24R, built 1975 · all B24Rs on the register
Registration
N9324S · registry record · serial MC-345
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The flight instructor and student pilot departed the airport for the student pilot’s first flight lesson, which was also the flight instructor’s first flight in the accident airplane make and model. The flight instructor stated that the airplane was fully fueled, and the fuel selector valve was initially set in the right tank position. After about 1 hour 44 minutes, the airplane’s engine lost all power. During the approximate 4-minute descent, the flight instructor’s efforts to restart the engine were unsuccessful, and he executed a forced landing at an off-airport site. During the landing rollout, the airplane impacted vegetation and terrain, sustaining substantial damage to the fuselage and empennage. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the right fuel tank had been exhausted of all usable fuel, while the left fuel tank was nearly full of fuel. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation. A test run of the engine after the accident revealed normal operations from idle to full speed. Although the flight instructor reported that he repositioned the fuel selector valve handle multiple times during the flight, the fuel evidence in the wreckage was consistent with the right fuel tank having been selected for most or all the flight. Given that the flight instructor was unfamiliar with the airplane make and model and encountered a communications anomaly and the student pilot’s motion sickness during the flight, it is likely that he was distracted by these multiple events such that he failed to adequately monitor the fuel tank quantities. This allowed for the consumption of all usable fuel in the right-wing tank and resulted in the loss of engine power.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Fuel starvation during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Fuel planning › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid management
  • Environmental issues › Physical environment › Terrain › Rough terrain › Contributed to outcome
  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Attention › Pilot
  • Environmental issues › Operating environment › (general) › (general) › Effect on personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 300 hours in all; 2 in this make and model; 54 in the last 90 days; 32 in the last 30 days; 256 as pilot in command; 26 on instruments
  • Last flight review: December 19, 2024
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

Dual student

  • Certificate: student
  • Flight time: 2 hours in all; 2 in this make and model; 2 in the last 90 days; 2 in the last 30 days
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Last inspection: annual inspection, February 8, 2025
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,750 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Lycoming IO-360-A1B6 (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: SPK Spanish Fork UT at 8:09 pm
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 320° at 9 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 36°F (2°C), dew point 10°F (-12°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.05 inHg
  • Observation at 2:55 pm from KU42, 32 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KU42 102155Z AUTO 32009KT 10SM CLR 02/M12 A3005 RMK AO1 T00221116

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig2

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number WPR25FA090.