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Accidents · NTSB WPR24FA053 · Final report

Amateur-built KITFOX accident near Eloy, Arizona, December 8, 2023

On December 8, 2023 at about 8:29 pm local time, a 2004 amateur-built KITFOX, registered N66180, was destroyed in an accident during initial climb near Eloy, Arizona (Eloy Muni airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The separation of a propeller blade during the initial climb due to insufficient blade retention forces. Contributing to the accident was the propeller blade retention design, manufacturing defects that prevented the propeller from achieving adequate grip forces, the pilot’s decision to use the propeller with an untested engine combination, and the lack of initial and ongoing maintenance documentation provided to the pilot by the manufacturer.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
December 8, 2023 · about 8:29 pm local time
Place
Eloy, Arizona · Eloy Muni · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Amateur-built KITFOX 5, built 2004
Registration
N66180 · registry record · serial S9606-0180
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

Shortly after takeoff, during the airplane’s initial climb, a witness just below the airplane’s flight path heard the airplane “go quiet” before he saw white pieces fall from the airplane. The airplane continued to maintain a level flight attitude and he looked away. When he looked up again, he saw the airplane rapidly descending in a nose-down attitude before it struck the ground in the field across from his house and burst into flames. The airplane was not trailing smoke or vapors at any time before impact. Postaccident examination revealed that one of the airplane’s propeller blades had released from the hub in flight but its collar detached from the root and remained within the hub. The second blade root remained in the hub and its blade had broken off at impact. Examination of that remaining blade root revealed wear and fracture features consistent with the blade sliding outboard in the hub grip as the initiating event. This outboard movement likely caused an imbalance that led to vibration, wear, and release of the opposing blade followed by airframe vibrations so extreme that the airplane became uncontrollable before it rapidly descended to the ground. The initial movement of the blade was due to insufficient retention force between the blade root and the hub. Despite extensive thermal damage, no additional issues with the engine or airframe were found that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot had upgraded the experimental amateur-built airplane with a Lycoming four-cylinder, 160-horsepower, direct-drive aircraft engine and, about 8 flight hours before the accident, he installed a two-blade ground-adjustable uncertified composite propeller. The design of the propeller was such that the blade was retained in the hub by frictional clamping forces. The propeller blade root incorporated a collar, comprised of non-structural epoxy and a fiber layup orientation that did not provide for adequate strength in the spanwise plane. The collar was therefore only a positional reference locating the blade within the hub rather than a mechanical interlocking feature to help retain the blade if the frictional clamping forces of the hub were exceeded. Further examination revealed multiple voids and resin-starved regions within the retained blade root. These anomalies would have lowered the stiffness of the blade root, requiring more blade root deformation to achieve the required hub clamping pressure. The risk of cracking and crushing of the fiber plies was therefore increased, as was the subsequent loss of hub clamping pressure during operation. The liberated blade also exhibited a large, elongated void near its leading edge, which could also compromise blade root stiffness, frictional retention, and reduce the pullout force. The manufacturer of the propeller advised the pilot that although the propeller had been used with engines up to 170 horsepower, these were automotive engines and no data was available for the Lycoming engine. The automotive engine would have been fitted with a propeller speed reduction unit (PSRU). Although the accident engine’s power rating was comparable, it was direct drive and as such the propeller likely exhibited torsional excitation forces more extreme than if it had been installed on an engine with a PSRU. The propeller manufacturer did not make installation and proper bolt torque information available on its website, nor did it readily publish inspection and maintenance information. Evidence suggests that, if available, this information was not provided to the pilot with the propeller assembly. It is possible that with proper maintenance guidance, the pilot would have detected the impending failure before the accident. Several factors, therefore, could have contributed to the insufficient retention, including blade root design, blade manufacturing, engine application, and propeller installation and maintenance. Because of the multiple factors at play and their potential interaction, it was not possible to rule any of these out as contributing to the blade’s separation.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during initial climb defining event
  2. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Propeller system › Propeller blade section › Capability exceeded
  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Propeller system › Propeller blade section › Design
  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Propeller system › Propeller blade section › Damaged/degraded
  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Propeller system › Propeller blade section › Failure
  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Propeller system › Propeller blade section › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Propeller system › Propeller assembly › Inadequate inspection
  • Organizational issues › Development › Design › Equipment design › Manufacturer
  • Organizational issues › Development › Manufacture/production › Equipment manufacture › Manufacturer
  • Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Availability of policy/proc › Manufacturer
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 364.6 hours in all; 250 in this make and model; 11.5 in the last 90 days; 6.5 in the last 30 days
  • Last flight review: February 8, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Sport Pilot (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 574.5 hours
  • Last inspection: condition inspection, November 8, 2023; 8 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,550 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O-320 (piston); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Departed from: E60 Eloy AZ at 8:27 pm
  • Destination: RYN Tucson AZ
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 20, 3,901 ft by 75 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: at 4 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 32°F (0°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.96 inHg
  • Observation at 1:15 pm from KP08, 13 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KP08 072015Z AUTO VRB04KT 10SM CLR 23/00 A2996 RMK AO2

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

11 documents, released by the NTSB on October 22, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 ADS-B Data zip file · our copy Download
2 Airframe and Engine Examination Report PDF, 8 pages · our copy View Download
3 WPR24FA053 Ct Factual Report for Propellers PDF, 35 pages · our copy View Download
4 Materials Laboratory Factual Report 25-021 PDF, 27 pages · our copy View Download
5 Witnesses PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
6 Engine Logbook Excerpts PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
7 Airframe Logbook Excerpts PDF, 5 pages · our copy View Download
8 Pilot Logbook Excerpts PDF, 8 pages · our copy View Download
9 Teamkitefox Threads PDF, 4 pages · our copy View Download
10 Pilot and Nrprop Correspondence Excerpts PDF, 8 pages · our copy View Download
11 Toxicological Report PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download

The same docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.