North American T-6G and North American AT-6B mid-air collision near Reno, Nevada, September 17, 2023

The NTSB's narrative for the North American T-6G final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilots of the accident airplanes were participating in a closed-course air race. Both pilots had just completed the race and entered the airport traffic pattern for runway 8. Several witnesses observed the airplanes, Race 14 and Race 6, collide while Race 14 was on the base leg (a southerly heading) and Race 6 was on the downwind leg (a west-southwest heading). Witnesses, including the pilot of another race airplane, reported that Race 14 was on a wide base leg for the runway, while Race 6 was closer in on the downwind leg for the runway. While the exact flight path of each airplane could not be determined, based upon witness and other pilots’ statements, along with Race 14’s radio transmissions, it’s likely that the wider pattern flown by Race 14, and the tighter pattern flown by Race 6, placed Race 14 to the right of Race 6’s flight path. Given the pilot of Race 14’s transmission “base with gear,” it’s likely that the pilot of Race 6 may have been looking to the left for Race 14. Sun data at the time of the accident showed that the center of the sun’s disk would have been ahead and slightly to the right of Race 14’s flight path, and to the left of Race 6’s flight path, about 50° above the horizon. The person who was in the Race Control position reported that he was in the control tower providing advisory functions for the T-6 Gold Race. At the conclusion of the race, after the participants had exited the race course, Race 14 reported midfield abeam for runway 08 (meaning the aircraft was abeam the tower on downwind for runway 8); Race Control then advised Race 14 that he was in the No. 1 position to land. After Race 6 then reported midfield abeam, Race Control advised Race 6 that he was following traffic ahead on downwind. He further stated that when Race 14 reported base and gear, he had cleared him to land on runway 8. Soon after, other aircraft in the cool-down pattern started to report midfield abeam the tower; he advised them of traffic ahead on the downwind. Race Control then observed an aircraft falling from the sky about the location of the base leg for runway 08; he then alerted the people in the tower. Shortly after, he observed a second airplane falling and impacting the ground. A witness located along the edge of airport property captured audio transmissions during the race. The recording includes various transmissions from Race 14 and Race 6. Although there were multiple unintelligible transmissions, no discernible transmissions regarding a traffic alert from Race Control could be identified. Standard operating procedures outlined the duties for various positions of personnel in the tower at the time of the race along with expected radio transmissions by the pilots and tower controller. The operating procedures provided no distinct procedures for tower personnel to provide traffic separation. Additionally, the air boss stated that it was an expectation but there was no written guidance.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the North American AT-6B final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilots of the accident airplanes were participating in a closed-course air race. Both pilots had just completed the race and entered the airport traffic pattern for runway 8. Several witnesses observed the airplanes, Race 14 and Race 6, collide while Race 14 was on the base leg (a southerly heading) and Race 6 was on the downwind leg (a west-southwest heading). Witnesses, including the pilot of another race airplane, reported that Race 14 was on a wide base leg for the runway, while Race 6 was closer in on the downwind leg for the runway. While the exact flight path of each airplane could not be determined, based upon witness and other pilots’ statements, along with Race 14’s radio transmissions, it’s likely that the wider pattern flown by Race 14, and the tighter pattern flown by Race 6, placed Race 14 to the right of Race 6’s flight path. Given the pilot of Race 14’s transmission “base with gear,” it’s likely that the pilot of Race 6 may have been looking to the left for Race 14. Sun data at the time of the accident showed that the center of the sun’s disk would have been ahead and slightly to the right of Race 14’s flight path, and to the left of Race 6’s flight path, about 50° above the horizon. The person who was in the Race Control position reported that he was in the control tower providing advisory functions for the T-6 Gold Race. At the conclusion of the race, after the participants had exited the race course, Race 14 reported midfield abeam for runway 08 (meaning the aircraft was abeam the tower on downwind for runway 8); Race Control then advised Race 14 that he was in the No. 1 position to land. After Race 6 then reported midfield abeam, Race Control advised Race 6 that he was following traffic ahead on downwind. He further stated that when Race 14 reported base and gear, he had cleared him to land on runway 8. Soon after, other aircraft in the cool-down pattern started to report midfield abeam the tower; he advised them of traffic ahead on the downwind. Race Control then observed an aircraft falling from the sky about the location of the base leg for runway 08; he then alerted the people in the tower. Shortly after, he observed a second airplane falling and impacting the ground. A witness located along the edge of airport property captured audio transmissions during the race. The recording includes various transmissions from Race 14 and Race 6. Although there were multiple unintelligible transmissions, no discernible transmissions regarding a traffic alert from Race Control could be identified. Standard operating procedures outlined the duties for various positions of personnel in the tower at the time of the race along with expected radio transmissions by the pilots and tower controller. The operating procedures provided no distinct procedures for tower personnel to provide traffic separation. Additionally, the air boss stated that it was an expectation but there was no written guidance.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

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