North American T-6G and North American AT-6B mid-air collision near Reno, Nevada, September 17, 2023
On September 17, 2023 at about 8:55 pm local time, 2 aircraft, North American T-6G (N2897G) and North American AT-6B (N57418), were involved in a mid-air collision near Reno, Nevada (Reno Stead Airport). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of both the Race 14 and Race 6 pilots to see and avoid each other while in the airport traffic pattern. Contributing to the accident was both pilots’ failure to fly the standard downwind and base legs.
The failure of both the Race 14 and Race 6 pilots to see and avoid each other while in the airport traffic pattern. Contributing to the accident was both pilots’ failure to fly the standard downwind and base legs.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 17, 2023 · about 8:55 pm local time · cases in 2023
- Place
- Reno, Nevada · Reno Stead Airport · cases near this airport · map
- Type
- Accident · mid-air collision
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- North American T-6G, built 1959 · all T-6Gs on the register
- Registration
- N2897G · registry record · serial 49-3492
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Air show or air race flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
- Aircraft 2
- North American AT-6B, built 1942 · all AT-6Bs on the register
- Registration
- N57418 · registry record · serial 84-7748
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Air show or air race flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative for the North American T-6G final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilots of the accident airplanes were participating in a closed-course air race. Both pilots had just completed the race and entered the airport traffic pattern for runway 8. Several witnesses observed the airplanes, Race 14 and Race 6, collide while Race 14 was on the base leg (a southerly heading) and Race 6 was on the downwind leg (a west-southwest heading). Witnesses, including the pilot of another race airplane, reported that Race 14 was on a wide base leg for the runway, while Race 6 was closer in on the downwind leg for the runway. While the exact flight path of each airplane could not be determined, based upon witness and other pilots’ statements, along with Race 14’s radio transmissions, it’s likely that the wider pattern flown by Race 14, and the tighter pattern flown by Race 6, placed Race 14 to the right of Race 6’s flight path. Given the pilot of Race 14’s transmission “base with gear,” it’s likely that the pilot of Race 6 may have been looking to the left for Race 14. Sun data at the time of the accident showed that the center of the sun’s disk would have been ahead and slightly to the right of Race 14’s flight path, and to the left of Race 6’s flight path, about 50° above the horizon. The person who was in the Race Control position reported that he was in the control tower providing advisory functions for the T-6 Gold Race. At the conclusion of the race, after the participants had exited the race course, Race 14 reported midfield abeam for runway 08 (meaning the aircraft was abeam the tower on downwind for runway 8); Race Control then advised Race 14 that he was in the No. 1 position to land. After Race 6 then reported midfield abeam, Race Control advised Race 6 that he was following traffic ahead on downwind. He further stated that when Race 14 reported base and gear, he had cleared him to land on runway 8. Soon after, other aircraft in the cool-down pattern started to report midfield abeam the tower; he advised them of traffic ahead on the downwind. Race Control then observed an aircraft falling from the sky about the location of the base leg for runway 08; he then alerted the people in the tower. Shortly after, he observed a second airplane falling and impacting the ground. A witness located along the edge of airport property captured audio transmissions during the race. The recording includes various transmissions from Race 14 and Race 6. Although there were multiple unintelligible transmissions, no discernible transmissions regarding a traffic alert from Race Control could be identified. Standard operating procedures outlined the duties for various positions of personnel in the tower at the time of the race along with expected radio transmissions by the pilots and tower controller. The operating procedures provided no distinct procedures for tower personnel to provide traffic separation. Additionally, the air boss stated that it was an expectation but there was no written guidance.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the North American AT-6B final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilots of the accident airplanes were participating in a closed-course air race. Both pilots had just completed the race and entered the airport traffic pattern for runway 8. Several witnesses observed the airplanes, Race 14 and Race 6, collide while Race 14 was on the base leg (a southerly heading) and Race 6 was on the downwind leg (a west-southwest heading). Witnesses, including the pilot of another race airplane, reported that Race 14 was on a wide base leg for the runway, while Race 6 was closer in on the downwind leg for the runway. While the exact flight path of each airplane could not be determined, based upon witness and other pilots’ statements, along with Race 14’s radio transmissions, it’s likely that the wider pattern flown by Race 14, and the tighter pattern flown by Race 6, placed Race 14 to the right of Race 6’s flight path. Given the pilot of Race 14’s transmission “base with gear,” it’s likely that the pilot of Race 6 may have been looking to the left for Race 14. Sun data at the time of the accident showed that the center of the sun’s disk would have been ahead and slightly to the right of Race 14’s flight path, and to the left of Race 6’s flight path, about 50° above the horizon. The person who was in the Race Control position reported that he was in the control tower providing advisory functions for the T-6 Gold Race. At the conclusion of the race, after the participants had exited the race course, Race 14 reported midfield abeam for runway 08 (meaning the aircraft was abeam the tower on downwind for runway 8); Race Control then advised Race 14 that he was in the No. 1 position to land. After Race 6 then reported midfield abeam, Race Control advised Race 6 that he was following traffic ahead on downwind. He further stated that when Race 14 reported base and gear, he had cleared him to land on runway 8. Soon after, other aircraft in the cool-down pattern started to report midfield abeam the tower; he advised them of traffic ahead on the downwind. Race Control then observed an aircraft falling from the sky about the location of the base leg for runway 08; he then alerted the people in the tower. Shortly after, he observed a second airplane falling and impacting the ground. A witness located along the edge of airport property captured audio transmissions during the race. The recording includes various transmissions from Race 14 and Race 6. Although there were multiple unintelligible transmissions, no discernible transmissions regarding a traffic alert from Race Control could be identified. Standard operating procedures outlined the duties for various positions of personnel in the tower at the time of the race along with expected radio transmissions by the pilots and tower controller. The operating procedures provided no distinct procedures for tower personnel to provide traffic separation. Additionally, the air boss stated that it was an expectation but there was no written guidance.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the North American T-6G from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during approach (VFR pattern downwind) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › ATC personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 10,976 hours in all
- Last flight review: June 27, 2022
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: frt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 6,232.4 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, May 7, 2023
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: P & W R-1340-AN-1 (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Runway 8, 7,608 ft by 150 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 28°F (-2°C)
- Altimeter: 30.13 inHg
- Observation at 1:55 pm from KRTS
Weather report (METAR): KRTS 172055Z AUTO VRB05G13KT 10SM CLR 27/M02 A3013 RMK AO2
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
The factual record for the North American AT-6B from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during approach (VFR pattern downwind) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › ATC personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 3,404 hours in all
- Last flight review: July 6, 2023
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: frt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 5,602 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, July 7, 2023
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: P&W R1340 SERIES (piston); 0 hours total
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
16 documents, released by the NTSB on September 3, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
Aircraft
- N2897G on the register today · the tail number may have moved to another aircraft since
- North American T-6 Texan 109 registered today · the model family and its accident history
- North American 1,297 aircraft on the register
- N57418 on the register today · the tail number may have moved to another aircraft since
- North American AT-6 Texan 228 registered today · the model family and its accident history
- North American 1,297 aircraft on the register
- Engine: P & W R-1340-AN-1 64 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Engine: P&W R1340 SERIES 1,229 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
Place
- Reno/Stead Airport · nearest airport
- Accidents and incidents in Nevada 1,294 since 1982 · 223 in the last ten years
- Nevada 4,583 aircraft registered
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/WPR23FA345.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.