Air Tractor AT802 and Air Tractor AT802 mid-air collision near Elgin, Nevada, July 30, 2020
On July 30, 2020 at about 7:56 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Air Tractor AT802 (N8510M) and Air Tractor AT802 (N1558W), were involved in a mid-air collision near Elgin, Nevada (Mesquite airport). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The trailing pilot’s failure to maintain separation from the lead airplane during a fire retardant deployment flight, which resulted in the trailing airplane flying through a plume of retardant and the trailing pilot’s subsequent loss of visibility that led to a collision with the lead airplane.
The trailing pilot’s failure to maintain separation from the lead airplane during a fire retardant deployment flight, which resulted in the trailing airplane flying through a plume of retardant and the trailing pilot’s subsequent loss of visibility that led to a collision with the lead airplane.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 30, 2020 · about 7:56 pm local time
- Place
- Elgin, Nevada · Mesquite · map
- Type
- Accident · mid-air collision
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Air Tractor AT802 A, built 2003
- Registration
- N8510M · no longer on the register · serial 802A-0151
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Firefighting flight · public-use (government) rules
- Aircraft 2
- Air Tractor AT802 A, built 1993
- Registration
- N1558W · no longer on the register · serial 802A-0004
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Firefighting flight · public-use (government) rules
The NTSB's narrative for the Air Tractor AT802 final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilots for both airplanes departed on an approximate 30-minute flight to a fire traffic area (FTA) under contract with the Department of the Interior (DOI) to extend a fire retardant line near a wildland fire for the third time that day. One airplane was flying as the lead, and the other airplane was in trail. After they received permission to enter the FTA and instructions with the drop heading, the pilots of both airplanes followed a third airplane to the drop area on a path that resembled an airport traffic pattern. The pilot in trail had maintained about 1,500 ft distance from the lead airplane for most of the flight until they were on the final leg of the drop when the trail airplane started to encroach on the lead. The trail airplane was about 500 ft behind and 100 ft below the lead airplane about 5 seconds prior to the drop. After deploying the retardant, the lead airplane began a climb while the trail airplane flew through the lead airplane’s retardant plume. The pilot of the trail airplane announced over the radio that he had retardant on his windshield, was executing a go-around, and possibly performing an emergency dump of his load, as well. The trail pilot then dumped his load and immediately entered a climb. At this point, he was 50 ft behind and 125 ft below the lead airplane. The airplane in trail then collided with the lead airplane from below and they subsequently impacted the ground. Both airplanes were destroyed by postcrash fire. Postaccident examination of the trail airplane did not reveal any preimpact mechanical anomalies. Portions of the lead airplane’s flight control system had either been destroyed by fire or were missing; however, the airplane’s flightpath and climb were consistent with a controlled flight and do not indicate the airplane experienced any preimpact anomalies. The propeller blades for both airplanes displayed signatures consistent with high power settings at the time of impact. Two of the lead airplane’s propeller blades displayed yellow paint transfer marks consistent with the mechanical cuts observed on the trail airplane forward of the engine firewall. The orientation and position of the cuts, along with rubber marks on the cockpit step suggests the trail airplane impacted the lead airplane from below, slightly ahead, and 20° left of the lead airplane’s heading. Both pilots were qualified to fly the airplanes by regulatory standards and their contractual obligations with DOI. However, there was no record either pilot had received overrun procedures training in the 4 years prior to the accident. A video of the trail airplane’s go-around maneuver showed the airplane in a controlled climb; however, the direction was not consistent with the exit procedures that had been briefed prior to the retardant deployment. Had the pilot executed a left turn and climbed as prescribed by the brief, he would have likely remained clear of the lead airplane. The amount of retardant that contacted the trail pilot’s windshield could not be determined for lack of evidence. However, the pilot’s radio call indicated he had retardant on his windscreen and that he was performing an emergency procedure to go-around and dump the retardant indicated the pilot was concerned about the loss of visibility. The wildland fire procedures stated that the pilot in trail would have been responsible for maintaining separation from the lead airplane. The pilot in trail had at least one reported event that captured him flying too close to a lead airplane during another flight. However, the investigation was unable to confirm if there were other events and an established pattern of this behavior. The available evidence is consistent with the trailing pilot’s failure to maintain separation from the lead airplane during a fire retardant deployment, which resulted in his flying through a plume of retardant that likely obscured his view through the airplane’s windshield and led to a collision with the lead airplane.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Air Tractor AT802 final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilots for both airplanes departed on an approximate 30-minute flight to a fire traffic area (FTA) under contract with the Department of the Interior (DOI) to extend a fire retardant line near a wildland fire for the third time that day. One airplane was flying as the lead, and the other airplane was in trail. After they received permission to enter the FTA and instructions with the drop heading, the pilots of both airplanes followed a third airplane to the drop area on a path that resembled an airport traffic pattern. The pilot in trail had maintained about 1,500 ft distance from the lead airplane for most of the flight until they were on the final leg of the drop when the trail airplane started to encroach on the lead. The trail airplane was about 500 ft behind and 100 ft below the lead airplane about 5 seconds prior to the drop. After deploying the retardant, the lead airplane began a climb while the trail airplane flew through the lead airplane’s retardant plume. The pilot of the trail airplane announced over the radio that he had retardant on his windshield, was executing a go-around, and possibly performing an emergency dump of his load, as well. The trail pilot then dumped his load and immediately entered a climb. At this point, he was 50 ft behind and 125 ft below the lead airplane. The airplane in trail then collided with the lead airplane from below and they subsequently impacted the ground. Both airplanes were destroyed by postcrash fire. Postaccident examination of the trail airplane did not reveal any preimpact mechanical anomalies. Portions of the lead airplane’s flight control system had either been destroyed by fire or were missing; however, the airplane’s flightpath and climb were consistent with a controlled flight and do not indicate the airplane experienced any preimpact anomalies. The propeller blades for both airplanes displayed signatures consistent with high power settings at the time of impact. Two of the lead airplane’s propeller blades displayed yellow paint transfer marks consistent with the mechanical cuts observed on the trail airplane forward of the engine firewall. The orientation and position of the cuts, along with rubber marks on the cockpit step suggests the trail airplane impacted the lead airplane from below, slightly ahead, and 20° left of the lead airplane’s heading. Both pilots were qualified to fly the airplanes by regulatory standards and their contractual obligations with DOI. However, there was no record either pilot had received overrun procedures training in the 4 years prior to the accident. A video of the trail airplane’s go-around maneuver showed the airplane in a controlled climb; however, the direction was not consistent with the exit procedures that had been briefed prior to the retardant deployment. Had the pilot executed a left turn and climbed as prescribed by the brief, he would have likely remained clear of the lead airplane. The amount of retardant that contacted the trail pilot’s windshield could not be determined for lack of evidence. However, the pilot’s radio call indicated he had retardant on his windscreen and that he was performing an emergency procedure to go-around and dump the retardant indicated the pilot was concerned about the loss of visibility. The wildland fire procedures stated that the pilot in trail would have been responsible for maintaining separation from the lead airplane. The pilot in trail had at least one reported event that captured him flying too close to a lead airplane during another flight. However, the investigation was unable to confirm if there were other events and an established pattern of this behavior. The available evidence is consistent with the trailing pilot’s failure to maintain separation from the lead airplane during a fire retardant deployment, which resulted in his flying through a plume of retardant that likely obscured his view through the airplane’s windshield and led to a collision with the lead airplane.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Air Tractor AT802 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during enroute defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot of other aircraft
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure › Pilot of other aircraft
- Personnel issues › Psychological › Perception/orientation/illusion › Visual illusion/disorientation › Pilot of other aircraft
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, flight engineer
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 13,196 hours in all; 374 in this make and model; 75 in the last 90 days; 60 in the last 30 days; 12,822 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: January 20, 2019
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: sngl
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 2,044.1 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, July 12, 2020; 0 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 16,000 lb
- Seats: 1
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Pratt & Whitney PT6A-67AG (turboprop); 3,787 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: 67L Mesquite NV at 7:25 pm
- Destination: 67L Mesquite NV
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 99°F (37°C), dew point 36°F (2°C)
- Altimeter: 30.04 inHg
- Observation at 7:56 pm
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
The factual record for the Air Tractor AT802 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Midair collision during enroute defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other aircraft › Pilot
- Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Debris/dirt/foreign object › Contributed to outcome
- Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Debris/dirt/foreign object › Ability to respond/compensate
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 31,400 hours in all; 30,520 in this make and model; 175 in the last 90 days; 60 in the last 30 days
- Last flight review: January 1, 2019
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: sngl
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 9,445.6 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, July 12, 2020
- Maximum gross weight: 16,000 lb
- Seats: 1
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Pratt & Whitney PT6A-67AG (turboprop); 3,768 hours total
- Fire on the ground
- Operator: M & M Air Service Of Beaumont Inc
The flight
- Departed from: 67L Mesquite NV at 7:25 pm
- Destination: 67L Mesquite NV
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.