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Accidents · NTSB WPR16FA095 · Final report

Mooney Aircraft CORP. M20K accident near Woodland, Washington, April 21, 2016

On April 21, 2016 at about 9:45 pm local time, a 1981 Mooney Aircraft CORP. M20K, registered N97119, was substantially damaged in an accident during takeoff near Woodland, Washington (Woodland State airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed and 2 people were seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's delay in recognizing that the airplane was not performing as expected and aborting the takeoff, which resulted in collision with a berm beyond the end of the runway. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's exceedance of the airplane's gross weight and the underperformance of the engine due to governor setting and magneto timing deficiencies. Contributing to the severity of the rear passenger's injuries was his decision to forego use of his shoulder harness and/or the absence of head rests.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
April 21, 2016 · about 9:45 pm local time · cases in 2016
Place
Woodland, Washington · Woodland State · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed and 2 people were seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Mooney Aircraft CORP. M20K NO SERIES, built 1981
Registration
N97119 · no longer on the register · serial 25-0503
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot and two passengers boarded the airplane for a personal cross-country flight. After a normal engine run-up, the pilot began the takeoff roll on the 1,953-ft-long runway. According to the pilot, the airplane lifted off after a ground roll of about 1,250 ft, climbed to about 35 ft above ground level, but then stopped accelerating. The pilot then lowered the nose and discovered that the airplane was just above the ground and seconds from impacting a berm. However, video of the takeoff showed that the airplane became airborne after a ground roll of about 1,933-ft, about 20 ft from the end of the runway. Further, according to the witness who took the video, the airplane attained a maximum altitude of only about 4 ft before it touched down in the grass beyond the runway end. The airplane impacted the airport's perimeter fence located about 375 ft from the end of the runway and then collided with the 9-ft-tall berm.  A sound spectrum analysis of the video's audio channel showed that the propeller rpm was about 2,430 during takeoff, which was about 270 rpm below the expected maximum rpm of 2,700. Examination of the propeller governor showed that the unit was set to a maximum rpm of about 2,600, which was about 100 rpm below the manufacturer's specified setting. In addition, during engine test cell runs with a fixed-pitch club propeller, the maximum engine rpm was increased 100 rpm, from 2,640 to 2,740, by retiming the magnetos from an improper setting to the manufacturer's specified setting. Regardless, the propeller governor would have inhibited the engine from reaching rated power, thus it is likely that the propeller governor resulted in a takeoff rpm below maximum rpm. The pilot reported that before departure, he calculated that the airplane's gross weight was about 2,864 pounds (lbs) and the takeoff ground roll would be about 1,250 ft. Postaccident calculations revealed that the airplane's gross weight was about 2,978 lbs, which exceeded the airplane's maximum gross weight by 78 lbs. The airplane's zero-wind ground roll at its maximum gross weight of 2,900 lbs was about 1,350 ft, and may have been longer due to the higher gross weight. Although the pilot's calculations indicated a safe takeoff was possible, the airplane did not perform as expected, likely due to the engine not achieving maximum rpm and the pilot's exceedance of the airplane's maximum gross weight. The pilot should have been sensitive to the short runway length and closely monitored the airplane's performance. If the pilot had recognized promptly that the airplane was not performing as expected, given the distance from the runway end to the fence and the berm that the airplane impacted, adequate distance would likely have been available to safely abort the takeoff. Additionally, if the pilot had designated a go/no-go runway liftoff point, this would have helped him detect the performance deficiency. However, the pilot did not recognize that the airplane was not performing as expected until the airplane was near the runway end and the impact with the berm could not be avoided. The pilot seated in the left front seat and the passenger seated in the right front seat were restrained with lap and shoulder belts and survived with compression fractures of the lumbar spine and extremity injuries, demonstrating that this accident was survivable for occupants who were properly restrained. The compression fractures sustained by the front seat occupants are typically caused by vertical loading from below while in a seated position; in this case, likely from the airplane striking the berm in a nose-high attitude. The passenger seated in the left rear seat was likely restrained only by a lap belt and sustained fatal injuries to his brain and spinal cord. It could not be determined if the rear seat passenger's cervical spine injuries were primarily from hyperflexion or hyperextension. The head rests had been removed from all seats in the airplane, and the rear passenger received a significant posterior scalp laceration that was consistent with hyperextension of his neck over the low back of his seat. This hyperextension could have been prevented by the presence of a head rest at an appropriate height on his seat but would not have been prevented by his use of the available shoulder harness. The rear passenger's cervical spine injuries may also have been caused by hyperflexion of his neck over the pilot's seat back and could have been prevented by his use of the available shoulder harness and/or the presence of a head rest on the pilot's seat. Thus, it is likely that the appropriate use of head rests and shoulder restraints would have mitigated the severity of the rear seat passenger's injuries.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Miscellaneous/other during takeoff defining event
  2. Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during takeoff
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during takeoff (rejected takeoff)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Delayed action › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Powerplant parameters › Not attained/maintained
  • factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Weight/balance calculations › Pilot
  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Aircraft capability › Climb capability › Attain/maintain not possible
  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Aircraft capability › Maximum weight › Capability exceeded
  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Power plant › (general) › Incorrect service/maintenance other cases naming the engine
  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Ignition system › Magneto/distributor › Incorrect service/maintenance other cases naming the engine
  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Propeller system › Propeller governor › Incorrect service/maintenance
  • factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Passenger
  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Equipment/furnishings › Passenger compartment equip › Not used/operated other cases naming the cabin, seats and restraints
  • factor Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Equipment/furnishings › Passenger compartment equip › Not installed/available other cases naming the cabin, seats and restraints

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 2,915 hours in all; 100 in this make and model; 23 in the last 90 days; 5 in the last 30 days
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: serious injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: serious injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 1,926 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, September 30, 2015; 11 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,900 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Continental Motors, Inc. TSIO-360-LB (piston); 1,926 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: W27 Woodland WA at 9:45 pm
  • Destination: RNT Renton WA
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 32, 1,953 ft by 25 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 45°F (7°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.67 inHg
  • Observation at 9:40 pm, 3 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers11

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

23 documents, released by the NTSB on December 13, 2018. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 NTSB Accident Video Study PDF, 9 pages View Download
2 Survival Factors Specialist's Factual Report PDF, 11 pages View Download
3 NTSB Medical Examination - Injury Factual Report PDF, 2 pages View Download
4 Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 9 pages View Download
5 Weather Reports and Records PDF, 7 pages View Download
6 Record of Conversations PDF, 15 pages View Download
7 Excerpts from Pilot's Logbook PDF, 11 pages View Download
8 Airplane Logbook PDF, 6 pages View Download
9 Engine Logbook PDF, 4 pages View Download
10 Weight and Balance Excerpt from AFM and Airworthiness PDF, 3 pages View Download
11 Seat Belt Excerpt from Airplane Flight Manual PDF, 2 pages View Download
12 Head Rest Part Diagram PDF, 6 pages View Download
13 Accident Flight Weight & Balance Furnished by Pilot PDF, 2 pages View Download
14 NTSB Weight & Balance Computation PDF, 5 pages View Download
15 NTSB Ground Roll and Takeoff Distance Computation PDF, 4 pages View Download
16 NTSB Airframe Examination Report PDF, 8 pages View Download
17 NTSB Engine Examination Report PDF, 22 pages View Download
18 NTSB Propeller Examination Report PDF, 6 pages View Download
19 Federal Aviation Administration Propeller Governor Examination Report PDF, 7 pages View Download
20 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 2 pages View Download
21 Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 PDF, 1 page View Download
22 Accident Photographs PDF, 4 pages View Download
23 Video of Accident MOV file Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

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The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/WPR16FA095.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.