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Accidents · NTSB OPS25LA005 · Preliminary: the investigation is not finished

Boeing 737-7H4 and Diamond Aircraft Ind INC DA 40 incident near Long Beach, California, October 19, 2024

On October 19, 2024 at about 9:50 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Boeing 737-7H4 (N250WN) and Diamond Aircraft Ind INC DA 40 (N895AM), were involved in the same incident near Long Beach, California (Long Beach Airport). The NTSB record does not give the injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The NTSB has not yet published a probable cause for this incident. Investigations usually take one to two years; this page updates when the final report is released.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
October 19, 2024 · about 9:50 pm local time · cases in 2024
Place
Long Beach, California · Long Beach Airport · cases near this airport · map
Type
Incident
Injuries
The NTSB record does not give the injuries.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft 1
Boeing 737-7H4 NO SERIES, built 2006 · all 737-7H4s on the register
Registration
N250WN · registry record · serial 34972
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
Aircraft 2
Diamond Aircraft Ind INC DA 40, built 2008
Registration
N895AM · registry record · serial 40.895
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative for the Boeing 737-7H4 preliminary · quoted from the NTSB record

On October 19, 2024, at 1450 pacific daylight time (PDT), a Diamond DA40, N895AM, and a Boeing 737-7H4, N250WN, operated as SWA1671, were involved in a runway incursion in Long Beach, CA. There were no injuries reported and none of the aircraft were damaged. N895AM was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight and had departed Camarillo Airport (CMA) with a destination of Long Beach Airport, Daugherty Field (LGB). SWA1671 was operated as a Title 14 CFR Part 121 passenger flight and had departed San Francisco Bay Oakland International Airport (OAK) with a destination of LGB. A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control (ATC) audio recordings indicated that at 1442:36 PDT, the crew of N895AM established communication with the local control one (LC1) controller and reported inbound on the Area Navigation (RNAV) Runway 30 Zulu approach. The LC1 controller cleared N895AM to land on runway 30 and instructed the crew to hold short of runway 26 right for traffic. The crew of N895AM then requested to circle to land on runway 26 right which the LC1 controller verbally confirmed with the crew. At 1444:38, the LC1 controller denied the circling request and again cleared N895AM to land on runway 30 and hold short of runway 26 right for traffic. The crew acknowledged with an accurate read back. At 1446:46, the crew of SWA1671 established communication with the LC1 controller and reported inbound for landing on runway 30. At 1447:20 the LC1 controller cleared SWA1671 to land on runway 30 and provided a traffic advisory to the crew reference an uninvolved aircraft in the pattern. The crew acknowledged with an accurate readback. At 1448:27, the LC1 controller provided a traffic advisory to the crew of SWA1671 reference a Cessna that was landing runway 26 left. At 1449:50, the crew of N895AM advised the LC1 controller they were holding short of runway 26 right on runway 30. At 1450:05, as SWA1671 was completing their landing roll out on runway 30, the crew of SWA1671 advised the LC1 controller that there was an aircraft on runway 30. Following the runway incursion, both aircraft taxied to their requested parking areas without further incident. Figure 1 shows the ground tracks of N895AM (indicated by the blue track) and SWA1671 (indicated by the yellow track) overlaid on satellite imagery in Google Earth. The illustration depicts the direction of travel for each airplane as well as their closest estimated proximity. Figure 1. Overhead view of the flight tracks of N895AM and SWA1671 with the area of closest proximity. Upon notification, an NTSB Air Traffic Control (ATC) working group was formed. Parties to the investigation include the FAA and the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA). Certified Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) data and audio recordings were provided by the FAA and were used in constructing this preliminary report. The NTSB is currently analyzing this data. During the week of October 28th, 2024, the ATC working group convened at Long Beach Airport Traffic Control Tower (LGB ATCT), the facility that was providing services to both airplanes at the time of the incident, and conducted interviews with the LC1 and LC2 controllers, and operations supervisor who were working at the time of the incident, as well as the NATCA Vice Facility Representative and Air Traffic Manager.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the Diamond Aircraft Ind INC DA 40 preliminary · quoted from the NTSB record

On October 19, 2024, at 1450 pacific daylight time (PDT), a Diamond DA40, N895AM, and a Boeing 737-7H4, N250WN, operated as SWA1671, were involved in a runway incursion in Long Beach, CA. There were no injuries reported and none of the aircraft were damaged. N895AM was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight and had departed Camarillo Airport (CMA) with a destination of Long Beach Airport, Daugherty Field (LGB). SWA1671 was operated as a Title 14 CFR Part 121 passenger flight and had departed San Francisco Bay Oakland International Airport (OAK) with a destination of LGB. A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control (ATC) audio recordings indicated that at 1442:36 PDT, the crew of N895AM established communication with the local control one (LC1) controller and reported inbound on the Area Navigation (RNAV) Runway 30 Zulu approach. The LC1 controller cleared N895AM to land on runway 30 and instructed the crew to hold short of runway 26 right for traffic. The crew of N895AM then requested to circle to land on runway 26 right which the LC1 controller verbally confirmed with the crew. At 1444:38, the LC1 controller denied the circling request and again cleared N895AM to land on runway 30 and hold short of runway 26 right for traffic. The crew acknowledged with an accurate read back. At 1446:46, the crew of SWA1671 established communication with the LC1 controller and reported inbound for landing on runway 30. At 1447:20 the LC1 controller cleared SWA1671 to land on runway 30 and provided a traffic advisory to the crew reference an uninvolved aircraft in the pattern. The crew acknowledged with an accurate readback. At 1448:27, the LC1 controller provided a traffic advisory to the crew of SWA1671 reference a Cessna that was landing runway 26 left. At 1449:50, the crew of N895AM advised the LC1 controller they were holding short of runway 26 right on runway 30. At 1450:05, as SWA1671 was completing their landing roll out on runway 30, the crew of SWA1671 advised the LC1 controller that there was an aircraft on runway 30. Following the runway incursion, both aircraft taxied to their requested parking areas without further incident. Figure 1 shows the ground tracks of N895AM (indicated by the blue track) and SWA1671 (indicated by the yellow track) overlaid on satellite imagery in Google Earth. The illustration depicts the direction of travel for each airplane as well as their closest estimated proximity. Figure 1. Overhead view of the flight tracks of N895AM and SWA1671 with the area of closest proximity. Upon notification, an NTSB Air Traffic Control (ATC) working group was formed. Parties to the investigation include the FAA and the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA). Certified Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) data and audio recordings were provided by the FAA and were used in constructing this preliminary report. The NTSB is currently analyzing this data. During the week of October 28th, 2024, the ATC working group convened at Long Beach Airport Traffic Control Tower (LGB ATCT), the facility that was providing services to both airplanes at the time of the incident, and conducted interviews with the LC1 and LC2 controllers, and operations supervisor who were working at the time of the incident, as well as the NATCA Vice Facility Representative and Air Traffic Manager.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record for the Boeing 737-7H4 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Air traffic event during landing (landing roll) defining event

The aircraft

  • Seats: 143
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Operator: Southwest Airlines CO

The flight

  • Departed from: OAK Oakland CA
  • Destination: LGB Long Beach CA
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 30, 10,000 ft by 200 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 200° at 9 knots
  • Visibility: 9 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 25°F (-4°C), dew point 6°F (-14°C)
  • Altimeter: -3001.00 inHg

Weather report (METAR): METAR KLGB 192053Z 20009KT 9SM CLR 25/06 A3001 RMK AO2 SLP163 T02500061 58019=

The factual record for the Diamond Aircraft Ind INC DA 40 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Air traffic event during landing (landing roll) defining event

The aircraft

  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed

The flight

  • Departed from: CMA Camarillo CA
  • Destination: LGB Long Beach CA
  • Flight plan: VFR

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

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The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/OPS25LA005.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.