Airbus A321 231 incident near Fort Lauderdale, Florida, January 29, 2016
On January 29, 2016 at about 7:05 am local time, a 2005 Airbus A321 231, registered N587NK, was involved in an incident during takeoff (rejected takeoff) near Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood Intl airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). The NTSB record does not give the injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The air traffic controller's failure to ensure the runway surface area was clear of vehicles before clearing an aircraft for takeoff. Also causal was the flight crew's decision to initiate a takeoff while the Runway Status Lights (RWSL) Takeoff Hold Lights (THLs) were activated. Contributing to the incident was the lack of a standard procedure for vehicle operators to request runway clearances and resultant "hear back/read back" error between the vehicle operator and the air traffic controller.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- January 29, 2016 · about 7:05 am local time
- Place
- Fort Lauderdale, Florida · Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood Intl · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- The NTSB record does not give the injuries.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Airbus A321 231 231, built 2005 · all A321 231s on the register
- Registration
- N587NK · no longer on the register · serial 2476
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The runway incursion occurred during the early morning hours when traffic was light, and when the airport authority usually conducted maintenance activities on the airfield. The air traffic controller approved a request by an airport maintenance vehicle to operate on the runway; however, there were no standard operating procedures or standard phraseology regarding how airfield vehicle operators were to reference the specific runway end when requesting permission to enter a runway. This lack of standard procedure resulted in four hear back/read back errors between the operator of the vehicle and the air traffic controller immediately prior to the runway incursion event. After the airport vehicle had been approved by the air traffic controller to operate on the runway, the crew of the A321 requested a clearance to taxi to the same runway for departure and was subsequently cleared for takeoff. The airport runways and taxiways were equipped with the Runway Status Light (RWSL) system. As the crew of the A321 aligned with the runway centerline for departure, the Takeoff Hold Lights (THL) portion of the RWSL activated, displaying red lights on the runway surface. The crew continued the takeoff over the illuminated RWSL system. The RWSL system was operating correctly and the THL portion of the system deactivated when the A321 reached a predetermined speed consistent with an aircraft continuing departure. As the A321 was departing, the Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X) alerted and the air traffic controller responded by cancelling the takeoff clearance when the A321 was near takeoff speed. The A321 stopped on the runway about 500 feet from the airport vehicle.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Runway incursion veh/AC/person during takeoff (rejected takeoff) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Flight crew
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › ATC personnel
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Readback › ATC personnel
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Readback › Maintenance personnel
The aircraft
- Maximum gross weight: 205,030 lb
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: Iae V2533-A5 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Iae V2533-A5 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Spirit Airlines
The flight
- Departed from: FLL Fort Lauderdale FL
- Destination: TJBQ Aguadilla PR
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 10L, 9,000 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Wind: from 300° at 6 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 1,200 ft
- Temperature: 64°F (18°C), dew point 63°F (17°C)
- Altimeter: 29.87 inHg
- Observation at 6:53 am from KFLL
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.