Hawker Siddeley HS-125-3A accident near Bridgeport, Connecticut, March 9, 2001
On March 9, 2001 at about 6:01 pm local time, a Hawker Siddeley HS-125-3A, registered N48DD, was substantially damaged in an accident near Bridgeport, Connecticut (Igor I. Sikorsky Memorial airport). It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot-in-commands inadequate preflight planning resulting in an approach to a runway with insufficient length. A factor related to the accident was the slush covered runway which resulted in a hydroplaning condition.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- March 9, 2001 · about 6:01 pm local time
- Place
- Bridgeport, Connecticut · Igor I. Sikorsky Memorial · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Hawker Siddeley HS-125-3A
- Registration
- N48DD · registry record · serial 25115
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
Arriving in the Bridgeport Airport area, the Pilot-in-Command (PIC) received the ATIS, which stated that the visibility was 1/2-mile with snow and fog. The ILS Runway 06 approach was in use. Braking action advisories were in effect, and all surfaces were covered with thin wet snow. During the approach to the airport, with the Second-in-Command (SIC) at the controls, the PIC visually observed that the hydraulic pressure gauge, "smiley face," was normal, and he performed a "brake test." The tower controller advised the flightcrew that a Navajo had just landed and reported a 250-foot ceiling, 3/4 miles of visibility, and that the runway braking action was "good." On final approach, the airplane broke out of the overcast clouds about 400 feet above the ground. The runway appeared dry, with only blowing snow across it. As the airplane touched down about 1,463 feet beyond the approach end of the 4,677-foot long runway on the runway, the SIC stated that she did not have any braking effectiveness, and selected the "dump flaps" to slow the airplane. The airplane continued down the runway and did not seem to be slowing to a safe speed. The flightcrew observed the 1,000-foot marker approaching and the SIC selected the emergency brakes. After she felt a lack of deceleration, the SIC selected the parking brake. The airplane continued off the end of the runway, impacted a non-frangible fence, and came to rest with about 4 feet of the airplane protruding onto a public access road. Examination of the airplane revealed a reference speed set on the pilot's airspeed indicator of 117 knots. According to the Hawker Siddeley HS-125 Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) performance section, the uncorrected landing distance, on a dry runway, at the estimated landing weight of the airplane was approximately 2,610 feet. The AFM performance section also had a chart for the "Effect of Slippery Runway on Landing Distance." The chart determined that the "equivalent scheduled landing distance available," was approximately 2,150 feet. According to airport records, a NOTAM was issued the day of the accident, which referenced the condition of the runway surfaces as having "Thin wet snow all surfaces." An air traffic controller observed slush "spraying" from the airplane, which extended 5 feet from the airplane, as the airplane rolled out. The airplane's braking system was tested after the accident and no abnormalities were noted.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 7,000 hours in all; 600 in this make and model; 43 in the last 90 days; 13 in the last 30 days; 6,600 as pilot in command; 1,000 on instruments
- Last flight review: January 24, 2001
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 9,750 hours in all; 400 in this make and model; 50 in the last 90 days; 15 in the last 30 days; 8,500 as pilot in command; 1,300 on instruments
- Last flight review: October 1, 2000
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 10,974 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, March 8, 2000; 2 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 21,700 lb
- Seats: 10
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Garrett TFE-731 (turbofan); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: BDL Windsor Locks CT at 6:35 pm
- Destination: BDR Bridgeport CT
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 6, 4,677 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 080° at 5 knots
- Visibility: 0.8 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 300 ft
- Temperature: 34°F (1°C), dew point 32°F (0°C)
- Altimeter: 29.76 inHg
- Observation at 6:54 pm from BDR
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Other NTSB records under N48DD the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.