Robinson R44 accident near Gustine, California, May 11, 2005
On May 11, 2005 at about 4:45 pm local time, a Robinson R44 (helicopter), registered N144SM, was substantially damaged in an accident near Gustine, California (Gustine airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
the improper installation of the nut/bolt assembly connecting the left cyclic push-pull tube to the non-rotating swashplate by maintenance personnel, which led to a loss of roll control during takeoff.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 11, 2005 · about 4:45 pm local time
- Place
- Gustine, California · Gustine · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Robinson R44 · all R44s on the register
- Registration
- N144SM · registry record · serial 1098
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The helicopter landed hard and rolled over after the nut/bolt assembly connecting the left cyclic push-pull tube to the swashplate came loose, causing a loss of roll control during takeoff. No mechanical anomalies were noted during the preflight. The certificated flight instructor (CFI) and student departed to do training at another airport. During takeoff to return to their home base, the CFI heard a clicking noise coming from the helicopter and decided to make a precautionary landing; however, the helicopter began a roll to the right. The CFI attempted to correct the roll to the right with the application of left cyclic, but there was no corresponding response. The right skid contacted the ground and the helicopter rolled over, coming to rest on its left side. Following the accident, the bolt, nut, and two spacers that connected the left cyclic push-pull tube to the swashplate were located on the runway. When the Federal Aviation Administration inspector arrived, he also walked the accident area and found the self-locking nut. A review of the aircraft logbook indicated that the left rib at the top of the mast fairing had been installed at the last 100-hour inspection, 2.5 hours before the accident. In order to remove the left rib (bulkhead), the bolt and nut assembly that attaches the left cyclic push-pull tube to the left lug of the non-rotating swashplate had to be disassembled, and then reassembled after the rib (bulkhead) replacement. According to the manufacturer's Illustrated Parts Catalog, left cyclic push-pull tube connection to the non-rotating swashplate assembly requires a bolt and self-locking nut, 3 spacers (2 of the 3 spacers were found at the accident site), a washer, and a locking palnut, were not found. A metallurgical examination of the swashplate assembly, left push-pull tube, left rib (bulkhead), nut and bolt and associated hardware was conducted. All of the fracture surfaces examined revealed no preexisting damage. The absence of the bolt between the left cyclic push-pull tube and the non-rotating swashplate after the accident and the thread imprints within the hole of the left lug of the non-rotating swashplate indicated that the bolt had been backing out of the hole over time. The bolt and nut that were recovered were in good condition, and the hole in the left lug of the non-rotating swashplate was not significantly ovalized, indicating that the bolted connection was not subjected to excessive loads of any kind. The loss of the nut (and subsequent backing out of the bolt) indicates that the connection was not properly assembled following the recent maintenance, which required the bolted connection to be disassembled.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Flight instructor
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 780 hours in all; 197 in this make and model; 247 in the last 90 days; 86 in the last 30 days; 704 as pilot in command; 456 on instruments
- Last flight review: April 1, 2005
- Medical certificate: Class 2
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Dual student
- Certificate: student
- Last flight review: April 1, 2005
- Medical certificate: Class 2
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 1,601.8 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, May 1, 2005; 2.5 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 2,400 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-540-F1B5 (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: LSN Los Banos CA at 4:30 pm
- Destination: LSN
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 36, 3,200 ft by 60 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 330° at 9 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 64°F (18°C), dew point 46°F (8°C)
- Altimeter: 30.03 inHg
- Observation at 4:53 pm from MCE, 22 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
