Piper PA 32R-301T accident near Byram Township, New Jersey, September 8, 2002
On September 8, 2002 at about 10:21 pm local time, a Piper PA 32R-301T, registered CGKLY, was destroyed in an accident near Byram Township, New Jersey (Andover-Aeroflex airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed and 2 people were seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
the improper manufacturing of the crankshaft gear bolt, which resulted in the failure of the bolt due to hydrogen embrittlement, and the subsequent loss of engine power. Also causal was the engine manufacturer's failure to remove the affected bolts from fixed wing engines during the 4-year period that transpired between the initial failures and removal of the bolts from stock for installation, until the accident flight. A factor in the accident was inadequate oversight (lack of action) by the FAA during the 4-year period in which the bolts remained in serviceable engines.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 8, 2002 · about 10:21 pm local time
- Place
- Byram Township, New Jersey · Andover-Aeroflex · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed and 2 people were seriously injured.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA 32R-301T · all PA 32R-301Ts on the register
- Registration
- CGKLY · no longer on the register · serial 32-57022
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airplane was in cruise flight at 3,500 feet mean sea level when the engine lost power. The pilot then performed a forced landing to trees. Examination of the Lycoming IO-540 series engine revealed that the zinc-plated crankshaft gear attachment bolt was fractured, and that the crankshaft no longer drove the gear. Fracture surface analysis revealed intergranular separation due to hydrogen-assisted cracking. Engines had previously been built with cadmium-plated bolts, but zinc-plated bolts were being used because they were readily available, and had a "positive impact" on production. Lycoming received 8,500 zinc-plated bolts between November 1996 and July 1998. Lycoming manufactured or re-built/overhauled 1,088 engines with zinc-plated bolts, and shipped 2,667 zinc-plated bolts as spares. Two zinc-plated gear bolt failures were documented in helicopter engines in 1998, due to hydrogen embrittlement. One bolt failed at 30 hours of operation, and the other at 19 hours. Lycoming and FAA personnel believed the failures occurred due to the higher loads generated by helicopters. Based upon the two failures, Lycoming removed the bolts from its stock as a "precautionary measure" in July 1998. Bolt recalls were issued by the helicopter manufacturer and Lycoming in July 1998. The FAA issued an Airworthiness Directive (AD) in February 1999 to replace the crankshaft bolts in affected helicopter engines worldwide. In July 1999, a Piper PA-32R-301 bolt failed due to hydrogen embrittlement at 327 hours. Between March 2000 and January 2001, two bolts failed on Royal Jordanian Falcon trainer airplanes, at 292 and 179 hours. As a "precautionary measure," Lycoming replaced the crankshaft gear bolts in the five-airplane Jordanian Falcon fleet about February 2001. Lycoming and FAA personnel believed the failures did not extend beyond helicopter and aerobatic applications, although the PA-32R-301 failure occurred in 1999. In June 2002, another bolt failed on a Piper PA-32R-301, at 448 hours. The engine was examined by Lycoming and FAA personnel, and a Lycoming laboratory report stated the failure was due to hydrogen embrittlement. In September 2002, this accident occurred, and as a result of the investigation, about 2 weeks after the accident, Lycoming issued a Service Bulletin (SB) to replace bolts on certain 540-series engines. In October 2002, the FAA issued an Emergency AD to also replace the bolts. The common cause for hydrogen embrittlement is a missed or under baked condition.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Flight time: 900 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (invalid medical for flight)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 488.8 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, February 21, 2002; 73.2 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,617 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Lycoming TI0-540-AH1A; 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: TEB Teterboro NJ at 10:08 pm
- Destination: CYXU London, Ontario
- Flight plan: VFR
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 200° at 5 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 82°F (28°C), dew point 55°F (13°C)
- Altimeter: 30.21 inHg
- Observation at 10:45 pm from MMU, 16 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.