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Accidents · NTSB ERA25FA082 · Final report

Cessna 172 accident near Cintrona, Puerto Rico, December 20, 2024

On December 20, 2024 at about 6:00 pm local time, a 2007 Cessna 172, registered N22088, was destroyed in an accident during initial climb near Cintrona, Puerto Rico (Mercedita Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

Maintenance personnel’s inadequate inspection of the airplane, which resulted in inflight the failure of the right aileron carry through cable due to wear, reduced effectiveness of the airplane’s ailerons, and a subsequent loss of control.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
December 20, 2024 · about 6:00 pm local time
Place
Cintrona, Puerto Rico · Mercedita Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cessna 172 S, built 2007 · all 172s on the register
Registration
N22088 · no longer on the register · serial 172S10439
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot had completed a check out flight earlier in the day, and the accident flight was her first solo flight in the accident airplane. She departed the airport where the airplane was based, flew to another airport and performed a touch-and-go landing, then flew to the airport nearest the accident site where she again performed a touch-and-go landing. Upon departure from that airport, while making a turn likely to return to the airport where the airplane was based, the pilot transmitted a mayday call over the common traffic advisory frequency. In the mayday call the pilot reported a loss of control. The airplane then began a descending right turn until impacting a tree and the ground in a mango orchard. Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed that the right aileron carry through cable had fractured, and that 62% of strands on one side of the fracture and 60% of strands on the other side of the fracture failed due to wear. The other strands on the cable failed due to overstress. Based on these findings, it is likely that the wear of this cable progressed to the point where it could no longer support the stresses of flight, resulting in the in-flight failure of the right aileron carry through cable. With this cable failure, the closed loop aileron system would be interrupted and the control inputs from the pilot would only tension a single cable run. This would result in the aileron on the unloaded side tending to float toward its zero hinge-moment (aerodynamically neutral) position, while the aileron on the loaded side would remain responsive to pilot input. The pilot would retain partial roll control; however, control effectiveness would be reduced because only the lift-increasing aileron would be actively driven, while the opposing surface would not provide a corresponding aerodynamic response. Due to a lack of available flight data, this investigation could not determine how much control the pilot would retain, and if the pilot would have retained enough control to make a safe landing. A review of the airplane’s maintenance logbooks found that the left aileron carry through cable had been replaced about 6 months prior to the accident while the airplane was undergoing an annual inspection. The maintenance log entry documenting the inspection and the cable replacement did not note a reason that the cable was replaced. Given the degree of wear observed on the right aileron cable that was observed after the accident, it is likely that the condition had developed over a prolonged period of time. These wear indications, like fractured cable strands, should have prompted maintenance personnel to replace the cable prior to its failure on the accident flight. The results of postmortem toxicological testing indicated that the pilot had used the sedating antihistamine medication diphenhydramine, but provided no clear evidence that impairing effects of that medication were impairing the pilot at the time of the accident. The toxicological testing also detected ethanol in blood, but not in vitreous fluid, indicating that the detected ethanol likely was from postmortem sources, and not alcohol consumption.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control in flight during initial climb
  2. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during initial climb
  3. Flight control sys malf/fail during initial climb defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Aileron control system › Failure
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Aileron control system › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Aileron control system › Capability exceeded
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Aileron control system › Inadequate inspection

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 169.9 hours in all; 169.9 in this make and model; 34.5 in the last 90 days; 14.9 in the last 30 days; 71.1 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: March 14, 2024
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,471 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, October 23, 2024
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,550 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming IO-360-L2A (piston); 3,500 hours total
  • Operator: Flight World INC

The flight

  • Departed from: SIG San Juan PR at 4:30 pm

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 130° at 16 knots
  • Visibility: 9 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 90°F (32°C), dew point 77°F (25°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.89 inHg
  • Observation at 1:55 pm from TJPS, 4 miles away

Weather report (METAR): TJPS 201755Z AUTO 13016KT 9SM CLR 32/25 A2989 RMK AO2 PWINO

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

17 documents, released by the NTSB on September 10, 2026. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Statements from Pilot's Former Flight Instructors PDF, 5 pages · our copy View Download
2 Pilot Logbook Excerpts PDF, 8 pages · our copy View Download
3 Pilot Rental Record PDF, 14 pages · our copy View Download
4 Cessna Model 172 (Series 1996 and on Maintenance Manual Excerpt PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
5 Maintenance Logbook Excerpts PDF, 16 pages · our copy View Download
6 FAA Ramp Inspection Letter to Operator PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
7 ADS-B Flight Track map file · our copy Download
8 ADS-B Track Data spreadsheet · our copy Download
9 Memorandum for Record A�� Common Traffic Advisory Frequency Recording PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
10 Common Traffic Advisory Frequency Recording (Tjps) audio · our copy View Download
11 Wreckage Examination Summary PDF, 36 pages · our copy View Download
12 Memorandum for Record A�� Aileron Carry Through Cable Information PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
13 Toxicological Report PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
14 Materials Laboratory Factual Report 25-028 PDF, 11 pages · our copy View Download
15 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 9 pages · our copy View Download
16 Evidence Control Form PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
17 Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download

The same docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.