Piper PA-24-250 accident near North Kingstown, Rhode Island, March 30, 2024
On March 30, 2024 at about 6:48 pm local time, a 1961 Piper PA-24-250, registered N7538P, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR pattern final) near North Kingstown, Rhode Island (Quonset State airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A total loss of engine power during final approach due to the pilot’s failure to recognize that the environmental conditions were susceptible to carburetor icing and apply carburetor heat, which resulted in the formation of carburetor ice. Contributing to the accident was the low altitude at which the pilot recognized the loss of engine power, reducing the amount of time to troubleshoot and address the problem.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- March 30, 2024 · about 6:48 pm local time
- Place
- North Kingstown, Rhode Island · Quonset State · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA-24-250 NO SERIES, built 1961 · all PA-24-250s on the register
- Registration
- N7538P · no longer on the register · serial 24-2743
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
While about 5 miles from the destination airport and maneuvering the airplane for a straight-in approach to the runway, the pilot began performing the prelanding checklist items, which included turning on the electric fuel pumps. When the flight was about 1/2 to 1 mile from the runway and about 800 ft above ground level (agl), the pilot recognized that the airplane was low, so she increased the throttle, but the engine did not respond. She verified that the mixture was full rich and that the fuel selector was on the fullest tank, and she checked the magnetos but did not apply carburetor heat. She observed a total loss of engine power, declared an emergency to the tower controller, prepared for ditching (because the flight was over water while on the approach), and ditched the airplane into the water below. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no preimpact failure or malfunction of the engine powertrain, ignition, or lubrication systems. Foreign debris was found inside the inlet section of the engine-driven fuel pump. Although this material matched the composition of inner layer material of a fuel supply hose, none of the fuel supply hoses recovered from the airplane’s engine compartment were found to be missing any section of the inner layer. Also, because the two electric fuel pumps that were on during the approach could allow fuel to bypass the engine-driven fuel pump in the event of its obstruction or failure, the foreign material likely did not contribute to the total loss of engine power. Although environmental conditions at the time of the accident were conducive to the formation of carburetor ice at cruise and glide power, the pilot did not recognize that or apply carburetor heat during any portion of the descent, or after the loss of power. Thus, it is likely that, during the approach, carburetor ice accrued when the engine was operating at a reduced power setting (consistent with glide power), resulting in the total loss of engine power. Also, although the airplane’s engine failure checklist specified applying carburetor heat, the low altitude at which the pilot recognized loss of engine power significantly reduced the amount of time available to troubleshoot and restore engine power to prevent the ditching.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
- Ditching during landing (flare/touchdown)
- Fuel starvation during approach (VFR pattern final) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Temp/humidity/pressure › Conducive to carburetor icing › Effect on equipment
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Ice/rain protection system › Intake anti › ice, deice › Not used/operated
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 896 hours in all; 20 in this make and model; 29 in the last 90 days; 12 in the last 30 days; 819 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: June 5, 2023
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,128 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, September 1, 2023; 19 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 2,900 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Lycoming O-540-A1D5 (piston); 3,147 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: 1B9 Mansfield MA at 6:45 pm
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 23, 4,000 ft by 75 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 320° at 20 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds at 23,000 ft
- Temperature: 55°F (13°C), dew point 25°F (-4°C)
- Altimeter: 29.64 inHg
- Observation at 2:48 pm from KOQU, 1 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KOQU 301848Z 32020KT 10SM FEW230 13/M04 A2964 RMK A/C ACCIDENT
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Photographs from the investigation 6 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them
Photograph 1 – Frontal View of the Fuselage Following Recovery
Photograph 2 – Left Side View of Aft Fuselage. Note large Dent
Photograph 3 – Right Side if Aft Fuselage. Note Compression Wrinkle in Fuselage Skin
Photograph 4 – Right Forward Quartering View of the Forward Fuselage. Note the Extensive Skin Damage Aft of the Firewall
Photograph 5 – Left Side View of the Forward Fuselage. Noted the Extensive Skin Damage Aft of the Firewall
Photograph 6 – View of the Disassembled Engine-Driven Fuel Pump Showing the Foreign Object Found Inside the PumpThe NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
11 documents, released by the NTSB on April 22, 2026. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 11 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Passenger Statement | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 3 | Excerpt from Service Manual Showing Fuel Supply System Diagram | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 4 | Excerpts from Owner's Handbook | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Memorandum for Record - Carburetor Icing Probability Chart | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 6 | FAA Inspector Statement | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 7 | Investigative Photographs | PDF, 7 pages · our copy | View Download |
| 8 | NTSB Materials Laboratory E-mail Factual Report | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 9 | NTSB Memorandum for Record - Pictures of Engine Compartment Fuel Supply Hoses | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 10 | Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation | PDF, 9 pages | View Download |
| 11 | Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15, and NTSB Evidence Control Form | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
