Piper PA32R accident near Attalla, Alabama, November 27, 2023
On November 27, 2023 at about 11:48 pm local time, a 2001 Piper PA32R, registered N4187Q, was destroyed in an accident during enroute near Attalla, Alabama (Mountainous Terrain With Trees airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The undetected wear of both pawl retaining rivets of the left magneto impulse coupling and fatigue failure of one pawl retaining rivet, which led to cascading fractures of the second pawl retaining rivet, left gear retainer assembly, and gear teeth of multiple gears in the accessory section of the engine and resulted in a loss of engine power. Contributing to the accident was the lack of current information available to the pilot regarding the status of a nearby airport’s closed runways.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 27, 2023 · about 11:48 pm local time · cases in 2023
- Place
- Attalla, Alabama · Mountainous Terrain With Trees · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA32R 301T, built 2001 · all PA32Rs on the register
- Registration
- N4187Q · registry record · serial 3257214
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
While on a night cross-country flight in visual meteorological conditions, the airplane began descending, then the pilot declared an emergency and informed the controller of a loss of engine power. The controller advised the pilot of his proximity to two airports and after turning onto a westerly heading consistent with flying toward Robbins Field Airport (20A), Oneonta, Alabama, which was located about 16 nm west-southwest from the airplane’s position, the pilot realized he was closer to Northeast Alabama Regional Airport (GAD), Gadsden, Alabama, whose runways were both closed by NOTAM. The pilot twice asked about GAD, and the controller informed him both times that GAD’s longer runway was closed, and its shorter runway did not have lights. The controller also told the pilot that work was being performed on GAD’s runways, and landing there would not be feasible. The flight continued in the general direction of 20A but was unable to reach it due to the distance, altitude, and descent rate of the airplane with reduced engine power. While maintaining controlled flight in a wings-level, slightly nose-low descent, the airplane impacted trees in mountainous terrain about 11 nm and 3.7 nm from 20A and GAD, respectively. The airplane was destroyed by a postcrash fire. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that one pawl retaining rivet of the left magneto impulse coupling exhibited fatigue fracture features that originated at areas of heavy wear along the shaft, followed by overload fracture. The other pawl retaining rivet also exhibited wear on the rivet shaft and subsequently fractured due to torsional and shear overstress. Deformation on the respective holes of the impulse hub assembly was noted, consistent with relative movement of the impulse hub assembly. Additional overload fractures occurred in the left magneto gear retainer assembly and multiple gear teeth of multiple gears in the accessory section of the engine, including the fuel pump idler gear assembly. Although the airplane was equipped with an independent right magneto that was capable of operating and producing spark to one spark plug of each cylinder and an auxiliary fuel pump that was capable of providing adequate fuel to the engine in the event of an engine-driven fuel pump failure, the switch positions and operational status of these components could not be determined due to the extent of the postcrash fire. Thus, the loss of engine power was likely the result of the cascading effects from the fracturing of the left magneto gear retainer assembly and multiple gear teeth of multiple gears in the accessory section, including the fuel pump idler gear assembly. Although both rivets and holes of the left magneto impulse hub assembly exhibited wear consistent with being loose relative to each other, the investigation could not determine when that wear or fatigue initiated, or if either was present at the last impulse coupling inspection performed about 1.5 years and 300 hours before the accident, in accordance with a non-mandatory service bulletin. At the time the pilot declared an emergency, all construction personnel for a runway sealcoating project at GAD had left the airport, one runway was free of equipment, and both runways had operable pilot-controlled lighting. Based on the airplane’s distance flown after the pilot declared an emergency and the actual status of GAD’s runways, it is likely that the pilot could have conducted an emergency landing at GAD had he expeditiously diverted there. However, because GAD is a non-towered airport and no airport personnel were present, it would have been difficult for the controller to obtain details about the current runway conditions at GAD (beyond what the NOTAMs provided) and to relay this information to the pilot in a timely manner. Although the pilot could have exercised his authority as pilot-in-command in an emergency situation to land at GAD after being advised by the controller that its runways were closed, the information available to the pilot likely led him to proceed toward 20A instead.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
- Fire/smoke (post-impact) during post (impact)
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent
- Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during enroute defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Ignition system › Magneto/distributor › Fatigue/wear/corrosion other cases naming the engine
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Ignition system › Magneto/distributor › Failure other cases naming the engine
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Accessory gear › boxes › (general) › Damaged/degraded other cases naming the engine
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Power plant › (general) › Malfunction other cases naming the engine
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › (general) › (general) › Pilot
- Environmental issues › Operating environment › Airport facilities/design › Runway/landing area condition › Availability of related info
- Environmental issues › Operating environment › Airport facilities/design › Runway lighting › Availability of related info
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,218 hours in all; 859 in this make and model; 64 in the last 90 days; 27 in the last 30 days; 1,121 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: July 10, 2022
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Last inspection: annual inspection, May 3, 2023; 113 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,600 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Lycoming TIO-540-AH1A (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: SCX Oneida TN at 10:41 pm
- Destination: CQF Fairhope AL
- Flight plan: IFR
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Wind: from 310° at 4 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 36°F (2°C), dew point 27°F (-3°C)
- Altimeter: 30.23 inHg
- Observation at 5:56 pm from GAD, 4 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KGAD 272356Z AUTO 31004KT 10SM CLR 02/M03 A3023 RMK AO2 SLP244 6//// T00221033 10094 20022 53016 FZRANO PNO $
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Photographs from the investigation 21 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them
Photograph 1 – NTSB Digital Photograph. View Looking From Main Wreckage Towards Impacted Trees
Photograph 2 – NTSB Digital Photograph. Left Side View of the Engine Assembly with Attached Propeller, Cockpit and Cabin Areas
Photograph 3 – NTSB Digital Photograph. View of the Aft Empennage Suspended in Tree
Photograph 4 – NTSB Digital Photograph. Frontal View of the Engine Assembly with Attached Propeller
Photograph 5 – NTSB Digital Photograph. View of the Right Wing
Photograph 6 – NTSB Digital Photograph. Left Side View of the Upright Engine Assembly with Attached Propeller After Removing Upper Engine Cowling
Photograph 7 – NTSB Digital Photograph. Frontal View of the Upright Engine Assembly with Attached Propeller Following Removal of the Upper Cowling
Photograph 8 – NTSB Digital Photograph. Right Side View of the Upright Engine Assembly with Attached Propeller Following Removal of the Upper Cowling
Photograph 9 – NTSB Digital Photograph. Left Side View of the Inverted Engine Assembly Following Removal of the Cowling
Photograph 10 – NTSB Digital Photograph. View Focused on the Remaining Portion of the Nose Landing Gear
Photograph 11 – NTSB Digital Photograph. Rear View of the Engine Assembly Following Removal of the Firewall
Photograph 12 – NTSB Digital Photograph. Arrow Points to Heat Damaged Left Magneto
Photograph 13 – NTSB Digital Photograph. Close-Up View of Heat Damaged Left Magneto
Photograph 14 – NTSB Digital Photograph. View of Heat Damaged Right Magneto
Photograph 15 – NTSB Digital Photograph. View of the Accessory Section of the Engine Following Removal of the Accessory Case
Photograph 16 – NTSB Digital Photograph. View of the Accessory Case Following Removal From the Engine
Photograph 17 – NTSB Digital Photograph. View of the Parts Retained For NTSB Metallurgical Examination
Photograph 18 – NTSB Digital Photograph. View of the Aft Empennage Following Wreckage Recovery
Photograph 19 – AMF Aviation Digital Photograph. View of the Left Magneto
Photograph 20 - AMF Aviation Digital Photograph. View of the Impulse Coupling End of Left Magneto
Photograph 21 – NTSB Digital Photograph. Annotated photograph depicting pieces of Impulse Coupling Rivet Found in Oil SumpThe NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
24 documents, released by the NTSB on January 14, 2026. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N4187Q on the register today · the tail number may have moved to another aircraft since
- Piper PA-32 Cherokee Six, Lance and Saratoga 3,916 registered today · the model family and its accident history
- Piper 44,853 aircraft on the register
- Engine: Lycoming TIO-540-AH1A 89 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Scott Municipal · departed from
- H L Sonny Callahan Airport · bound for
- Accidents and incidents in Alabama 1,211 since 1982 · 173 in the last ten years
- Alabama 4,354 aircraft registered
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA24FA050.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.