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Accidents · NTSB ERA23LA218 · Final report

Piper PA-28-180 accident near Greenville, North Carolina, May 5, 2023

On May 5, 2023 at about 1:00 pm local time, a 1962 Piper PA-28-180, registered N180LR, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR pattern final) near Greenville, North Carolina (Pitt-Greenville airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

Inadequate maintenance by the operator and maintenance personnel, which resulted in a loss of engine power due to oil starvation.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
May 5, 2023 · about 1:00 pm local time
Place
Greenville, North Carolina · Pitt-Greenville · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA-28-180, built 1962 · all PA-28-180s on the register
Registration
N180LR · no longer on the register · serial 28-872
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot made a forced landing in a swamp after the engine lost complete power. The landing resulted in substantial damage to the airplane and serious injuries to both occupants. Postaccident examination of the engine found large amounts of metallic flakes and debris in the oil filter and oil sump screen. When the engine was disassembled, wear was noted on the camshaft lobes and associated lifters, and the No. 2 aft piston pin plug. The No. 2 forward piston plug was missing and metal shavings consistent with the plug were found in the oil suction sump screen. Metallurgical examination of engine components revealed damage consistent with the engine operating at high operating temperatures due to a lack of lubrication and hard contact damage after the No. 3 connecting rod released during operation. No preexisting material failures were identified. Therefore, the wear noted in the engine most likely became excessive, and over time produced metal shavings and debris that collected in the oil screen, which led to oil starvation. The bearings and connecting rods overheated, which resulted in the release of the No. 3 connecting rod from its crankshaft journal during engine operation. A review of the engine maintenance records revealed the oil had been changed and the filter replaced but had not been checked for about 8 months before the accident. Per a Mandatory Service Bulletin released by the engine manufacturer, titled “Oil Servicing, Metallic Solids Identification After Oil Servicing, and Associated Corrective Action,” the oil filter and oil sump suction screen were to be checked after each oil change. This check was to see if the engine was being contaminated with metallic particles due to excessive wear and to help prevent a future engine failure. In addition, the engine manufacturer recommended the engine be overhauled every 12 years or 2,000 hours to “mitigate engine deterioration that occurs with age, including corrosion of metallic components…” Engine maintenance records indicated the engine was last overhauled about 21 years before the accident, and had accrued 2,118.5 hours of operation at the time of the accident. As such, the engine was 9 years past its recommended overhaul interval and 118 hours over the recommended time in service. Had the airplane operator overhauled the engine as recommended by the engine manufacturer, and if maintenance personnel checked the oil filter/and oil sump suction screen in the months leading up to the accident, it is likely they would have observed metallic debris being produced by the engine due to excessive wear. Both actions would likely have prevented the engine failure due to oil starvation.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of engine power (total) during approach (VFR pattern final) defining event
  2. Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › (general) › Failure
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Maintenance personnel
  • Aircraft › Aircraft handling/service › Maintenance/inspections › (general) › Inadequate inspection
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Owner/builder
  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip eng oil sys › Failure

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 61.3 hours in all; 61.3 in this make and model; 1.3 in the last 90 days; 0 in the last 30 days; 19.2 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: December 5, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,362 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, April 26, 2023; 22 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,400 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O-360-A3A (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: GSO Greesnboro NC at 12:00 pm
  • Destination: PGV Greenville NC
  • Flight plan: VFR
  • Runway 08, 4,997 ft by 150 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 59°F (15°C), dew point 52°F (11°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.22 inHg
  • Observation at 9:05 am from PGV, 1 miles away

Weather report (METAR): METAR KPGV 051305Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM CLR 15/11 A3022

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

14 documents, released by the NTSB on March 19, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.