Piper PA-28-140 accident near Weyers Cave, Virginia, April 12, 2021
On April 12, 2021 at about 11:20 pm local time, a 1968 Piper PA-28-140, registered N7242F, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR go-around) near Weyers Cave, Virginia (Shenandoah Valley Rgnl airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was seriously injured and 1 person had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
Maintenance personnel’s inadequate inspection of the rudder control system, which resulted in failure of the rudder control assembly and the pilot’s loss of control during a go-around.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- April 12, 2021 · about 11:20 pm local time
- Place
- Weyers Cave, Virginia · Shenandoah Valley Rgnl · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was seriously injured and 1 person had minor injuries.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA-28-140, built 1968 · all PA-28-140s on the register
- Registration
- N7242F · registry record · serial 28-25155
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot reported that, while landing, less than 100 ft above ground level, he felt that the approach was unstable and decided to go around. He smoothly applied full engine power, but the airplane did not gain any altitude and started banking hard to the left. He stated that the airplane was to the left of the runway and that he was applying right aileron and right rudder to level the wings with no effect. The airplane subsequently impacted a fence and trees. The pilot was seriously injured, his passenger received minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. Examination of the airplane revealed that the rudder bar arm and rudder pedal tube, which were part of the rudder control assembly, had separated near a weld, which displayed a crack where extensive corrosion was visible on the fracture surface. Examination under magnification revealed that the fracture of the rudder arm began with an unknown overload event, and crack growth had occurred slowly. As the crack developed, the fracture surfaces fretted against each other until the crack grew enough to cause the left and right fracture surfaces at the base of the weld to the rudder tube to fail as a hinge point, causing a cup-and-cone failure with fresh substrate at the base of the fracture surface. The airplane had accrued about 11,406 hours as of its most recent 100-hour inspection, which was completed about 3 months before the accident. A review of manufacturer’s published guidance revealed multiple documents that included inspection requirements for the rudder pedals, rudder bar, and rudder bar support assembly, which were readily accessible by maintenance personnel for visual inspection. Review of the airplane maintenance records did not reveal any entries that referenced any of the published inspection requirements for the rudder pedals, rudder bar, and rudder bar support assembly. Even without rudder control, the airplane likely remained controllable; however, given the 6-knot right crosswind that existed at the time of the accident, and the airplane’s proximity to the ground when the failure occurred, it is likely that the failure of the rudder control assembly resulted in the pilot’s loss of control.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of control in flight during approach (VFR go-around)
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during approach (VFR go-around) defining event
- Attempted remediation/recovery during approach (VFR go-around)
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during approach (VFR go-around)
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Rudder control system › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Rudder control system › Malfunction
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Rudder control system › Inadequate inspection
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Maintenance personnel
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 138 hours in all; 84 in this make and model; 45 in the last 90 days; 17 in the last 30 days; 104 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: February 4, 2021
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: serious injuries
Passenger
- Seat: left
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 11,406 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, January 19, 2021
- Maximum gross weight: 2,150 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-320-E2A (piston); 11,316 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: FRR Front Royal VA at 10:18 pm
- Destination: SHD Weyers Cave VA
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 23, 6,002 ft by 150 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: dusk
- Wind: from 300° at 6 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 6,000 ft
- Temperature: 61°F (16°C), dew point 32°F (0°C)
- Altimeter: 29.84 inHg
- Observation at 7:15 pm from SHD
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
17 documents, released by the NTSB on June 8, 2023. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
