Beech 95B55 accident near Wilmington, Delaware, August 18, 2019
On August 18, 2019 at about 12:51 pm local time, a 1965 Beech 95B55, registered N678DM, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Wilmington, Delaware (New Castle airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilots’ failure to place the left fuel selector into the proper position, which resulted in a total loss of the left engine’s power due to fuel starvation. Contributing was their failure to properly secure the left engine and their failure to maintain control of the airplane during the attempt to return to the airport.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 18, 2019 · about 12:51 pm local time
- Place
- Wilmington, Delaware · New Castle · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Beech 95B55, built 1965 · all 95B55s on the register
- Registration
- N678DM · no longer on the register · serial TC-913
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot and the flight instructor were departing the airport. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot requested to return to the airport but did not state a reason for returning or declare an emergency. The tower controller cleared the airplane to land on any runway, provided the current wind information, and attempted to contact the pilot but received no response. A witness then observed the airplane in a nose low attitude as it descended into the trees below. The airplane impacted trees and terrain about 2 nautical miles from the airport and came to rest inverted in a nose-low attitude. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings, fuselage, and tail. Examination of the airframe, flight controls, engines, and engine accessories revealed no evidence of preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The right fuel selector was found in the “main” position, while the left fuel selector was observed between the “main” and “crossfeed” positions. Both fuel selector valves were removed from the airplane, and air was blown through the valves to determine position. The right fuel selector valve was confirmed on the main (right) tank. The left fuel selector valve had no airflow when air was introduced through the crossfeed port. When air was blown through the main port, the airflow was restricted due to the position of the valve. Further, fuel was drained from the right fuel strainer and tested; no water was detected. No fuel was observed in the left fuel strainer. All fuel caps were observed closed and secured. The four fuel tanks were breached, and no fuel was observed. Based on this information, it is likely that during the flight one of the pilots inadvertently placed the valve between main and crossfeed positions. The fuel flow to the left engine was then restricted due to the intermediate position of the left fuel selector valve, which resulted in a loss of engine power. Additionally, examination of the airplane revealed that, for both engines, the throttles were found full forward, the mixture controls were set to rich, and the propeller controls were set to high rpm settings, which indicated that the pilots did not attempt to secure the left engine as described in the emergency checklist for engine failure after liftoff and in flight in the pilot operating handbook for the airplane make/model. Following the loss of engine power to the left engine, the airplane’s performance and handling characteristics would have been significantly degraded, and it is likely that the pilots lost control of the airplane while attempting to return to the airport. Postaccident toxicological testing of samples from the commercial pilot detected therapeutic levels of sertraline in his system. There was no evidence available to suggest that the use of this drug or any underlying condition that prompted the pilot’s use of it impacted his psychomotor performance during the flight.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of control in flight during maneuvering
- Fuel starvation during initial climb defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Instructor/check pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Instructor/check pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of checklist › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of checklist › Instructor/check pilot
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel selector/shutoff valve › Incorrect use/operation
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 586 hours in all; 72 in this make and model
- Last flight review: September 7, 2017
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
Flight instructor
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 8,900 hours in all; 0 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Last inspection: annual inspection, August 10, 2019
- Seats: 5
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Continental Aerospace Technolo IO-470-L (piston); 1,049 hours total
- Engine 2: Continental Aerospace Technolo IO-470-L (piston); 1,049 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: ILG Wilmington DE at 12:49 pm
- Destination: ILG Wilmington DE
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 32, 4,602 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 150° at 3 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds at 900 ft
- Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 77°F (25°C)
- Altimeter: 30.02 inHg
- Observation at 12:51 pm from ILG, 2 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
15 documents, released by the NTSB on June 8, 2021. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | FAA Local Controller ATC Audio Recording | WMA file | Download |
| 2 | Pilots Logbook | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Airframe Maintenance Log (Excerpt) | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Summary of Air Traffic Control Communications | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 5 | Witness Statement | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 6 | B55 Engine Failure Procedures | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 7 | B55 Fuel System Discription | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
| 8 | Fuel Receipts | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
| 9 | Investigative Photographs | PDF, 11 pages | View Download |
| 10 | Weather Observations for Ilg | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 11 | Medical and Pathological Information | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 12 | Toxicological Report - Pilot | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 13 | Toxicological Report - Flight Instructor | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 14 | Statement of Party Representative | PDF, 15 pages | View Download |
| 15 | Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15 | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
