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Accidents · NTSB ERA13LA328 · Final report

Cirrus Design CORP SR22 accident near Tappahannock, Virginia, July 21, 2013

On July 21, 2013, a 2006 Cirrus Design CORP SR22, registered N223SS, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Tappahannock, Virginia (Tappahannock-Essex County airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

A failure of the engine crankshaft top rear trailing forward counterweight retaining plate, which resulted in a total loss of engine power. The reason for the retaining plate’s failure could not be determined during postaccident examination.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 21, 2013
Place
Tappahannock, Virginia · Tappahannock-Essex County · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cirrus Design CORP SR22, built 2006
Registration
N223SS · no longer on the register · serial 1819
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot reported that the airplane was in cruise flight when he heard a "loud noise" come from the engine, followed by a loss of engine power. The pilot established the airplane's best glide speed and declared an emergency with air traffic control, and an air traffic controller then provided vectors toward the nearest airport. While approaching the airport, the pilot heard another loud noise come from the engine, and oil then covered the windscreen. The pilot chose to deploy the airplane's parachute system, and the airplane descended under the canopy until it came to rest among trees. Examination of the engine revealed that the crankshaft top rear trailing forward counterweight retaining plate was fractured; the counterweight pin and portions of the plate were found in the crankcase and oil sump. The No. 2 connecting rod was fractured, and the crankcase exhibited significant damage concentrated at the No. 2 cylinder. A material analysis of the fractured counterweight pin revealed failure signatures consistent with overload. The hardness of the plate met manufacturer specifications, and microstructure analysis of the plate appeared normal. About 4 years before the accident, the engine manufacturer issued a critical service bulletin (SB) "to inform operators of the possible long term effects of low engine RPM in cruise conditions." Models affected included the accident engine make and model. The SB described two instances of sudden engine stoppage as a result of a crankshaft counterweight release. These instances were found to have been associated with engine operation at a sustained cruise rpm of less than 2,300 rpm. As a result, the manufacturer recommended that engine cruise rpm settings be no lower than 2,300 rpm. Although the engine operating manual cautioned that the minimum cruise rpm setting was 2,300 rpm, the airplane manufacturer did not include this information in the Pilot's Operating Handbook. A review of recorded data from the accident airplane revealed that nine flights were flown in the 6 months before the accident and that, during these flights, the accident airplane was operated at or below 2,300 rpm for 20 minutes or longer. However, the investigation could not determine if the top rear trailing forward counterweight retaining plate failed due to these operations.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of engine power (total) during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Miscellaneous/other during emergency descent
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip engine power section › Failure
  • cause Not determined › Not determined › (general) › (general) › Unknown/Not determined

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 2,130 hours in all; 1,270 in this make and model; 3 in the last 90 days; 1 in the last 30 days; 2,068 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: March 7, 2013
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 1,664.3 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, March 4, 2013; 66 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,600 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Cont Motor IO-550-N (piston); 1,664 hours total
  • Operator: Appendix R Solutions INC

The flight

  • Departed from: SBY Salisbury MD at 11:30 pm
  • Destination: OFP Hanover VA
  • Flight plan: IFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 170° at 5 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 82°F (28°C), dew point 75°F (24°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.87 inHg

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers3

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.