Cessna 172K accident near Newton, Mississippi, June 12, 2013
On June 12, 2013 at about 2:30 pm local time, a 1969 Cessna 172K, registered N7045G, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR pattern final) near Newton, Mississippi (James H. Easom Field). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The student pilot's failure to increase engine power during the descent for landing when instructed to do so by the flight instructor and the flight instructor's delayed remedial action, which resulted in collision with a static wire. Contributing to the accident was the student pilot's failure to use hearing amplification as required by his Federal Aviation Administration medical certificate.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- June 12, 2013 · about 2:30 pm local time · cases in 2013
- Place
- Newton, Mississippi · James H. Easom Field · cases near this airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 172K, built 1969 · all 172Ks on the register
- Registration
- N7045G · registry record · serial 17258745
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
After an uneventful instructional flight, the student pilot entered the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern while the airplane was at 1,200 ft mean sea level. The flight instructor then asked the student to turn onto the base leg of the traffic pattern, but "he was slow to respond," and the airplane was too fast, which extended the downwind leg farther out than normal. The flight instructor then noticed that the student had not extended the wing flaps to the 10-degree position. The student pilot then extended the wing flaps to 10 degrees and started to slow the airplane. The flight instructor then asked the student to turn onto final, and, because of the extended downwind leg, to stop descending and add power. The student then arrested the descent, but he failed to add power as instructed. The flight instructor again asked the student to add power; however, the student did not respond by either adding power or by asking the flight instructor for clarification. The flight instructor stated that he was distracted by the airplane's airspeed and altitude and the student's lack of response and that he did not see the power lines during the final approach even though he had flown over them many times. When he finally did see the power lines, he took control of the airplane and then added full power and maximum up elevator. However, the airplane struck a static wire that ran along the top of the power poles, nosed over, and impacted terrain. Review of Federal Aviation Administration records revealed that the student pilot held a third-class medical certificate with the limitation that he "must use hearing amplification." However, the student pilot was not wearing a hearing aid during the accident flight; therefore, he might not have heard the flight instructor's command to increase engine power, which would explain his failure to do so as instructed. Further, neither the student pilot nor the flight instructor were wearing headsets in the loud cockpit of the single-engine airplane, which also could have made it difficult for the student pilot to hear the flight instructor's command. Although the power lines were not included in the airport information in the Airport/Facility Directory, they were depicted in the sectional aeronautical chart for the area. Examination of the power lines revealed that not only were they below the runway's 7.00-degree glidepath that was provided by a pulsating visual approach slope indicator to ensure obstacle clearance but that they were also below the obstruction identification surfaces listed in federal regulations, and, in many areas, they were at or below the trees located on the approach end of the runway. Given this information and the fact that the flight instructor had flown over them many times, the power lines should not have been a hazard. The flight instructor's slow response to the student pilot's failure to increase power during the descent led to the airplane's collision with the wire.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Controlled flight into terrain or object (CFIT) during approach (VFR pattern final) defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- factor Personnel issues › Physical › Health/Fitness › Predisposing condition › Student/instructed pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Student/instructed pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other person › Instructor/check pilot
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Delayed action › Instructor/check pilot
- cause Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Wire › Awareness of condition
- cause Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Wire › Response/compensation
- cause Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Wire › Effect on equipment
- cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring environment › Instructor/check pilot
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Altitude › Not attained/maintained
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Instructor/check pilot
Flight instructor
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 6,450 hours in all; 500 in this make and model; 60 in the last 90 days; 20 in the last 30 days; 6,300 as pilot in command; 250 on instruments
- Last flight review: September 15, 2012
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: serious injuries
Dual student
- Certificate: student
- Flight time: 20 hours in all; 20 in this make and model; 14 in the last 90 days; 6 in the last 30 days
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 10,891 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, July 1, 2012; 259 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 2,300 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-360-A4M (piston); 2,780 hours total
- Operator: Newton Flying Club INC
The flight
- Departed from: M23 Newton MS at 1:35 pm
- Destination: M23 Newton MS
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 31, 3,800 ft by 75 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 300° at 7 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 86°F (30°C), dew point 73°F (23°C)
- Altimeter: 30.10 inHg
- Observation at 2:58 pm from MEI, 20 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
11 documents, released by the NTSB on April 2, 2015. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 - Operator | PDF, 9 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 - Pilot | PDF, 9 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Witness Statements and Interview Summaries | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Post Accident Survey of M23 (Contains 2 Aerial and 4 Satellite Images) | PDF, 7 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Weather Reports and Records – Kmei Metars and Tafs | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 6 | Statements of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 7 | Toxicology Report - Student Pilot | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 8 | Photo 1 - Accident Site (Photo Courtesy of Mbi) | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 9 | Photo 2 - Main Wreckage (Photo Courtesy of Mbi) | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 10 | Photo 3 - Damaged Electrical Transmission Lines (Photo Courtesy of Mbi) | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 11 | Photo 4 - Static Wire (Photo Courtesy of Mbi) | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N7045G on the register today · the tail number may have moved to another aircraft since
- Cessna 172 Skyhawk 20,691 registered today · the model family and its accident history
- Cessna 72,673 aircraft on the register
- Engine: Lycoming O-360-A4M 418 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- James H Easom Field · nearest airport
- Accidents and incidents in Mississippi 845 since 1982 · 90 in the last ten years
- Mississippi 2,605 aircraft registered
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA13LA281.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
