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Accidents · NTSB ERA12IA060 · Final report

Cessna 550 incident near Key West, Florida, November 3, 2011

On November 3, 2011 at about 4:13 pm local time, a 1982 Cessna 550, registered N938D, suffered minor damage in an incident during landing (landing roll) near Key West, Florida (Key West International airport). It was a business flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 5 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilots’ failure to appropriately apply the landing gear wheel brakes after landing, to properly perform the hard brake pedal-no braking condition procedure following the reported brake failure and to apply the emergency brakes. The reason for the reported brake failure could not be determined because postincident examination did not reveal any malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the brakes.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
November 3, 2011 · about 4:13 pm local time
Place
Key West, Florida · Key West International · map
Type
Incident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 5 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cessna 550, built 1982 · all 550s on the register
Registration
N938D · no longer on the register · serial 550-0454
Damage
Minor damage
Flight
Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot-in-command (PIC) stated that he flew the downwind leg at 1,500 feet at 130 knots indicated airspeed and turned onto final approach at 1,000 feet, which he flew at 106 knots. He then touched down 800 feet down the runway at 95 to 100 knots. At touchdown, he extended the speed brakes, and, after traveling another 800 feet, he began to apply wheel braking, but the brake pedals felt "hard" and would not move. He then attempted to apply the emergency brake, but there was no braking action when he pulled it. The airline transport pilot who was in the right seat and acting as the second-in-command reported also trying to apply wheel braking after the PIC was unsuccessful and stated that it did not work. The airplane then overran the runway into the engineered material arresting system. Review of the radar data for the descent and approach portions of the flight indicated that at times the airplane was fast and the approach was unstabilized. However, the touchdown occurred at a reference speed of 103 to 106 knots. Examination of airport security camera images and deceleration values (determined by using time, distance, and velocity calculations) indicated that the airplane's deceleration was consistent with a lack of braking. Examination of the normal hydraulic braking system and antiskid system did not reveal any malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the brakes. Examination of the cockpit revealed that the T-handle for the emergency gear extension system had been activated. This handle is located immediately to the right of the emergency braking handle and was most likely pulled during the incident landing instead of the emergency brake handle. Examination of the emergency braking/landing gear blow-down nitrogen bottle revealed that it was empty; no indication of leakage was discovered, and the witness wire on the landing gear blow-down cable at the nitrogen bottle was intact, indicating that the bottle was most likely empty before the incident flight, since adequate nitrogen should have been available from a properly serviced air bottle even if the landing gear had been extended pneumatically. Review of maintenance records that were provided by the operator nonetheless listed the airplane's most recent inspection as being completed on September 5, 2011, "in accordance with the instructions and procedures of a current manufacturer's recommended inspection program." According to a signed inspection document, 13 phase inspections were completed, including a phase 5 inspection containing 126 separate tasks, comprising inspection of the emergency brake control valve, the brake reservoir, the antiskid components, and the antiskid system, as well as replacement of the antiskid motor/pump filter, operational check of the antiskid brake system, operational check of the emergency brake system, replacement of the brake reservoir air filter, and cleaning of the brake reservoir supply line and system filter. The document also indicated that servicing of the "emergency brake and gear Nitrogen" had been accomplished. The landing checklist in the airplane flight manual cautions that if a "hard brake pedal-no braking condition" is encountered during landing, the pilot should operate the emergency brake system. It also noted that to obtain maximum braking performance from the antiskid system, the pilot must apply continuous maximum effort (no modulation) to the brake pedals. The Pilot's Abbreviated Checklist also contains emergency procedures for wheel brake failure and antiskid failure. However, examination of the incident airplane revealed that neither of these documents was in the cockpit. Instead, the cockpit contained a double-sided laminated checklist from a training provider titled "Normal Procedures." No emergency procedures were printed on the checklist and "For Training Purposes Only" appeared at the bottom. Based on the available evidence, it could not be determined that a failure of the normal braking system occurred or that the pilots applied maximum braking effort, as indicated by the airplane manufacturer's guidance. Further, had the braking system actually failed, the pilots did not apply the emergency brakes, instead activating the landing gear extension handle.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Unknown or undetermined during landing (landing roll) defining event
  2. Runway excursion during landing (landing roll)
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during landing (landing roll)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Flight crew
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of policy/procedure › Flight crew
  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Flight crew

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 14,200 hours in all; 1,200 in this make and model; 10 in the last 90 days; 13,920 as pilot in command
  • Medical certificate: Class 1
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 7,000 hours in all
  • Medical certificate: Class 2
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 9,900 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, September 5, 2011; 3 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 13,300 lb
  • Seats: 8
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: P&W Canada JT15D-4 (turbofan); 6,450 hours total
  • Engine 2: P&W Canada JT15D-4 (turbofan); 6,456 hours total
  • Operator: South Aviation

The flight

  • Departed from: FLL Fort Lauderdale FL at 3:36 pm
  • Destination: EYW Key West FL
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 09, 4,801 ft by 100 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: at 6 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 68°F (20°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.07 inHg
  • Observation at 3:53 pm from EYW

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2
Passengers3

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.