The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily
Accidents · NTSB ENG22LA020 · Final report

Bombardier INC BD-700-2A12 incident near West Palm Beach, Florida, April 3, 2022

On April 3, 2022 at about 1:06 pm local time, a 2021 Bombardier INC BD-700-2A12, registered N63RP, was involved in an incident during initial climb near West Palm Beach, Florida (Palm Beach International airport). It was a personal flight under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). The NTSB record does not give the injuries. The weather was conditions the NTSB did not record.

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

An in-flight engine fire resulted from a fuel leak from fuel nozzle No. 16 pigtail-to-fuel manifold b-nut connection that contacted hot engine parts and ignited. Contributing to the manifold fuel leak was the misalignment between fuel manifold female ferrule and fuel nozzle male bullnose sealing surfaces coupled with distress of the ferrule sealing surface.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
April 3, 2022 · about 1:06 pm local time · cases in 2022
Place
West Palm Beach, Florida · Palm Beach International · cases near this airport · map
Type
Incident
Injuries
The NTSB record does not give the injuries.
Weather
conditions the NTSB did not record
Aircraft
Bombardier INC BD-700-2A12, built 2021
Registration
N63RP · registry record · serial 70079
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Personal flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

Post-event inspection of a GE Aviation Passport 20-19BB1A turbofan engine found light thermal distress on the outside of the engine core compartment near the top of the engine from the 10:00 to 11:00 o’clock position, aft looking forward, and localized discoloration on the inside of the core cowls in the general location of fuel nozzle No. 16 location consistent with an undercowl engine fire. This corroborates the pilot’s report of an in-flight engine fire during takeoff climb. The fuel nozzle No. 16 location appeared shiny, lacked the sooting that neighboring fuel nozzle pigtail-to-fuel manifold b-nut connections exhibited; therefore, it was considered a possible fuel leak location. The engine was removed and sent to GE for evaluation; a fuel system leak check was performed but the source/location of the fuel leak could not be identified. The fuel pressure and nitrogen check pressure used during the leak tests were well below the fuel pressure the engine experienced during the event and was determined to be insufficient to replicate the leak. A torque check of all the fuel manifold b-nut connections found four locations, all located on the left fuel manifold, which had very low torque values, less than 200 inch-pounds, when compared to the other b-nut connection locations and the required installation torque of 285 inch-pounds nominal. One of the four low torque locations was fuel nozzle No. 16 that was identified as a possible leak source during the initial examination. Detailed analysis of the fuel nozzle No. 16 pigtail-to-fuel manifold b-nut connection revealed evidence of galling and intermediate contact marks consistent with and indicative of misalignment and relative movement within the connection; none of the other low torque b-nut connection locations exhibited this type of surface distress. Since the post-event fuel system leak checks performed by GE could not induce a fuel leak, the exact location/source of the fuel leak could not be determined by testing and observations. However, the combination of low torque, misalignment between fuel nozzle No. 16 pigtail-to-fuel manifold b-nut connection, and sealing surface distress created the conditions by which there was insufficient sealing allowing fuel to leak during high engine power and high fuel pressures. No other fuel nozzle locations had this combination of factors that would have allowed a fuel leak.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Fire/smoke (non-impact) during initial climb defining event
  2. Engine shutdown during initial climb
  3. Loss of engine power (partial) during initial climb

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control › Fuel distribution › Design other cases naming the engine
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Maintenance personnel

The aircraft

  • Last inspection: inspection type not recorded
  • Seats: 22
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Ge Passport 20-1 (turbofan); 211 hours total
  • Engine 2: Ge Passport 20-1 (turbofan); 211 hours total
  • Operator: Mirasol Sky LLC

The flight

  • Departed from: PBI West Palm Beach FL
  • Destination: TEB Teterboro Airport NJ
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: not reported
  • Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

2 documents, released by the NTSB on June 13, 2023. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

Aircraft
Place

The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ENG22LA020.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.