Boeing 757 incident near Las Vegas, Nevada, August 6, 2008
On August 6, 2008 at about 10:40 pm local time, a Boeing 757, registered N666DN, was involved in an incident during takeoff (rejected takeoff) near Las Vegas, Nevada (Mccarran International Airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 170 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The engine experienced an uncontained release of high pressure turbine material due to fatigue cracks that occurred on four consecutive blade retainig lugs on the 2nd stage turbine hub. The cracked lugs resulted in the release of four 2nd stage turbine blades that penetrated the engine's cases and nacelle. The lugs cracked due to loss of material and resultant increase in stress load on the blade slot serrations due to excessve grit blasting when the hub was being overhauled by Delta Air Lines. Contributing to the uncontained incident was the FAA's and Pratt & Whitney's failure to act in a timely manner when another PW2037 2nd stage turbine hub was found to have multiple cracks in the blade retaining lugs.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 6, 2008 · about 10:40 pm local time
- Place
- Las Vegas, Nevada · Mccarran International Airport · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 170 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Boeing 757 232 · all 757s on the register
- Registration
- N666DN · registry record · serial 25034
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The Delta Air Lines Boeing 757 airplane had just started its takeoff roll from the McCarran International Airport, Las Vegas, Nevada, when the right engine, a Pratt & Whitney (P&W) PW2037, experienced an uncontained release of high pressure turbine material. The examination of the engine revealed a hole in the high pressure and low pressure turbine case flanges at the bottom of the engine in line with the 2nd stage turbine rotor. The engine was removed from the airplane and shipped to Delta's Technical Operations Center for disassembly. The disassembly revealed four adjacent 2nd stage turbine blades were missing. In addition, the 2nd stage turbine hub had four blade retaining lugs that were fractured. Metallurgical examination of the fractures determined the fractures were due to fatigue at elevated temperatures from multiple origins along the blade slot serrations. The metallurgical examination also revealed that there were no material defects in the hub. A dimensional inspection of the hub's blades slots showed that they were missing material. Delta reported that they had to use a grit blasting procedure that was more agressive to remove the varnish-like scale from the hub in order to clean it sufficiently to permit the fluorescent penetrant inspection. Although the incident hub was only grit blasted one time, maintenance records for another PW2037 2nd stage hub that was found to have multiple cracks in the blade slots showed that it had been grit blasted multiple times to clean the hub. Grit blasting tests conducted by P&W showed that if the appropriate grit blasting procedures were not adhered to that significant material loss could result.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during takeoff (rejected takeoff) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › Turbine section › Failure
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, flight engineer
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 12,035 hours in all; 8,120 in this make and model; 183 in the last 90 days
- Last flight review: January 25, 2008
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, flight engineer
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 10,764 hours in all; 4,214 in this make and model; 221 in the last 90 days
- Last flight review: January 18, 2008
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 58,875 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, August 4, 2008
- Maximum gross weight: 232,000 lb
- Seats: 190
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney PW2037RTC (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney PW2037RTC (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Delta Air Lines INC
The flight
- Departed from: LAS Las Vegas NV at 10:40 pm
- Destination: JFK Jamaica NY
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 25R, 14,510 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: at 6 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds at 10,000 ft
- Temperature: 102°F (39°C), dew point 52°F (11°C)
- Altimeter: 29.85 inHg
- Observation at 4:56 am from KLAS
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 4 | |||
| Passengers | 166 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.